MINISTER'S REPORTS

Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves

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National Defence Défense nationale

Canada

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Minister of National Defence established the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves on April 5, 1995. The Commission's report, presented to the Minister on October 30, 1995, takes into account the views of Canadians who testified in public hearings and made individual or collective submissions. It is also based squarely on history and the current military and economic realities facing the nation.

Mobilization

In any restructuring of the reserves, care must be taken to prepare for all eventualities. The Commissioners believe that, while the mobilization concept offered in the 1994 White Paper on defence is appropriate, the priorities given to its four phases fail to recognize that the fundamental role of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for war. Such a role should be paramount in planning, and a mobilization plan should be completed with dispatch.

In any such plan, considerable numbers of skilled personnel can be found in a restructured Supplementary Reserve, composed of retired Regular and Reserve Force members. The nation has invested substantial resources in training its military forces, and Canada should continue to benefit from that investment. The Commission recommends that all honourably released personnel be automatically transferred to the Supplementary Reserve. This plan would maintain a large pool of trained men and women, many with specialist skills, to be selectively activated in an emergency. The Supplementary Reserve can make a significant and essential contribution to national mobilization.

At the same time, the Commission recognizes that the Canadian Forces need to use the Reserve Force on an ongoing basis. The augmentation of the Regular Force for peacekeeping and other operations requires well-trained reserves. This role not only assists the regulars in meeting their operational commitments but also provides reservists with training that cannot be found within their unit. It helps hone skills for the later stages of mobilization.

Organization

Naval Reserve

The Commission finds the Naval Reserve in good order, thanks to the assignment of specific tasks to the reserve, especially the manning of Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels. This role has had a positive impact on morale and training, and naval reservists are generally satisfied that they are needed and that they can meet their commitments.

Militia

The Militia's organization is designed to support national mobilization. It is composed of regiments and units widely dispersed across the country; many of these units have a large complement of officers but only a company's strength (or less) of Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs). Above the units are 14 districts in four Land Force Areas. The Commissioners consider this organization inefficient, requiring a large, expensive infrastructure with too many headquarters, and with far too many units unable to offer effective training. Moreover, many units are located far from their potential recruiting pools.

The Commissioners conclude that the peacetime Militia must be organized and trained to provide augmentation for the regulars and to be capable of expansion to meet mobilization needs. The mobilization plan for the army, therefore, should be based on the formation of a corps. While much of this structure would be notional at present, a corps provides an effective framework for force development.

A corps is composed of divisions and divisions are composed of brigades. The framework already exists in the four Land Force Areas. The Commission recommends that the present Militia Districts be disbanded and replaced by seven Militia brigade groups, with Land Force Atlantic Area having one brigade group and the other areas each having two. Each brigade group would be responsible for the training and administration of nine to eleven units.

Many units are too small to train their personnel effectively and, when infrastructure costs and training potential are taken into account, are not viable. The Commissioners believe that units must be of a size sufficient to provide both effective command preparation for officers and senior NCMs and a suitable vehicle for individual and collective training. This can be achieved only if units are amalgamated into larger organizations. The process will be difficult, but the Commission has recommended criteria to be followed and, most important, has recommended that the Militia be directly involved in making the choices. Many units that may be disbanded will find a place in the corps structure.

The Commissioners also recommend that Militia units be guaranteed four days' funding per month for their soldiers for the September-to-May training period.

Air Reserve

The Air Reserve has suffered from substantial difficulty because of the downsizing of Air Command and the shift from operational to support roles. Air reservists want to participate in more flying operations, and the Commission has urged Air Command to make the fullest use of the large pool of civilian pilots in support of the other components of the reserves.

Communication Reserve

The Communication Reserve, like the Navy, is in good shape and is well advanced towards the implementation of Total Force. The Commission is concerned, however, that Militia signallers are not commanded by Land Force Command (LFC) and recommends that the signals component tasked with providing army field communications be expanded and, at the earliest possible time, transferred to the LFC.

Canadian Rangers

The Commission finds the Canadian Rangers to be doing valuable work, and commends both its enhancement program and the Junior Rangers program trials.

Cadet Instructor Cadre

The Cadet Program and the Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) do first-class work. The Commissioners recommend the establishment of an NCM class within the CIC, and they call for the Cadre to remain a component of the reserves. The Commission also urges that adequate support for the Cadet Program be

continued.

Administration

The Commission strongly believes that, if Canada intends to ask more of its reservists, it must treat them as full members of the Canadian Forces. This means that regulars and reserves must serve together in headquarters and in units, and that the possibility of a career pattern permitting greater movement between the Regular and the Reserve Forces be explored.

The Commissioners recommend that inequities in the Reserve Force pay system, compensation, benefits, and pension be addressed. They call for Reserve Force personnel to sign contracts committing them to specified training obligations in return for a guaranteed level of pay, and they urge the creation of a system of bonuses on completion of a fixed term of service. The Commissioners also recommend job protection legislation, with obligations on and incentives to employers to permit reservists to train and to serve on operations.

Conclusion

The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves set out to provide the Canadian Forces, and especially the Reserve Force, with a framework to permit both current operations and any future national mobilization to occur with maximum efficiency. The Commissioners' intention - an effective and equitably treated Reserve Force that, with the Regular Force, serves Canada with pride - is wholly realizable. All that remains is for regulars and reservists to tackle the coming changes with good will and the determination that has always characterized Canada's military forces.

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PREFACE

Our report will deal specifically with a number of issues and matters concerning Canada's reserves. First, however, we wish to comment on the general impressions we formed as a result of the extensive research and public hearing process in which we have been engaged in the past six months. We would be remiss if we did not underscore the very high calibre of the Regular Force senior officers who shared with us their knowledge and their views, as well as making intelligent, articulate, and extremely helpful submissions to the Commission. We also wish to commend the reservists (senior and junior officers, and non-commissioned members) who appeared before us or submitted written briefs. On two separate occasions, we met groups of NCMs and junior officers that included many who had recently served in peacekeeping missions in which Canada has been involved. We were most impressed by the quality of those reservists and their genuine commitment to the reserves. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Canada received two of the three United Nations commendations awarded for performance in the field in the former Yugoslavia, and that one of the units that received this commendation was composed approximately of 40 percent reservists.

Thus, although our report recommends that a number of changes be made to Canada's Reserve Force, our recommendations must not be interpreted as suggesting that Canada is burdened with inefficient reserves. To the contrary, the Commission wishes that Canadians could gain a better appreciation of the quality of the Canadian Forces, including the reserves, than they appear to have. We trust that our report will make our Reserve Force and its structure even better.

Finally, the Commission wishes to acknowledge the significant and most valuable assistance it received from its staff, which was largely drawn from the various reserve components of the Canadian Forces. Three members of the Commission staff deserve special mention: LCol Jacques Bérubé, our Chief of Staff, Major Bob Gemmell, our Deputy Chief of Staff and Guy Pratte, our Counsel, worked with great diligence and effectiveness day in and day out. The Commission could not have functioned without their hard work, knowledge, and cheerful assistance. Every staff member who worked on the Commission is listed in Appendix C.

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THE COMMISSION'S MANDATE

Terms of Reference and Mandate

In April 1995 the Honourable David Collenette, Minister of National Defence, appointed an external review committee to be known as the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (the Commission), chaired by the Right Honourable Brian Dickson. The Minister also appointed Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile (Ret.) and Professor Jack L. Granatstein as Co-commissioners.

The reasons for the establishment of the Commission were set out in Terms of Reference communicated to the Commission at the time it was created (Appendix A). Specifically, the Terms of Reference noted that in the government's 1994 White Paper on defence one of the most pressing problems identified was ``the need to restructure Canada's Reserve Forces, notably the Militia, with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to the requirements of the new global strategic environment." The Terms of Reference also referred to the 1992 Auditor General's report, which stated that the Department of National Defence (DND) was not getting full value for money spent on the Primary and Supplementary Reserves. While increasing the reserves' effectiveness, both from an operational and an economic point of view, was clearly one of the imperatives justifying the establishment of this Commission, the Terms of Reference underscored the importance of maintaining the traditions of the reserves ``that make them so important a bridge between the Canadian Forces and the people they serve."

The Terms of Reference also set out some ``general restructuring guidelines" which, for convenience, we reproduce as follows:

- Reservists are essentially part-time servicemen and servicewomen.
- The Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve are to be structured to provide a greater contribution to existing operational commitments. The various elements of the Primary Reserve support different Regular Force missions, and hence different organizational and managerial approaches may be necessary.
- The structure of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve is to be fully compatible with the new mobilization concept. However, given resource limitations, any capability beyond that required for ``force enhancement" will have to be achieved at nominal cost.1
- The review must address ways whereby the Primary Reserve command, control and administrative and support ``overhead" can be reduced. Command and control elements are to be streamlined and officer/NCM ratios reviewed, with the goal of reducing command and control elements to the level consistent with operational and administrative requirements.
- The new Reserve structure must be compatible with the Total Force concept.2
- Consideration is to be given to the idea of assigning to the Primary Reserve, selected Regular Force service support tasks such as medical, logistics, communications, information services and transportation, where this makes operational and economic sense.
- Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency are to be sought in all aspects of the operations and the structure of the Primary Reserve, including rationalization of infrastructure, consolidation of units, and the elimination of any redundant elements or sub-components.
- The strength of 23,000 for the Primary Reserve noted in the White Paper is the maximum (ceiling) to be funded in the immediate future. The revised structure must be designed to ensure that the majority of Reserve funding available is used to engage the maximum number of reservists, consistent with operational requirements and the training and employment opportunities available to Reserve personnel.

- Although unit traditions, heritage, socio-economic factors and regional sensitivities are to be considered in restructuring options, the overriding criteria will be CF [Canadian Forces] operational requirements: unit effectiveness and efficiency, the demographic distribution of reservists, available infrastructure and the location of Regular Force bases and units.
- Consideration is to be given to establishing differing levels of ``readiness'' for the various elements of the Reserves.

In this context the Commission was given the following mandate:

The Commission will examine and make recommendations concerning the role, structure and employment of the Canadian Forces Reserve Force and options for restructuring the Force, notably the Primary and Supplementary Reserve sub-components thereof, to maximize their operational and cost effectiveness and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the following matters:

- The most suitable roles, missions, tasks and structure for each element of the Primary Reserve and of the Supplementary Reserve under the new mobilization concept.
- The most suitable command and control arrangements to achieve an effective and efficient use of scarce Reserve resources.
- The level of training required within all components of the Primary Reserve to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
- How the elements of the Primary Reserve can contribute more effectively and efficiently to Canada's defence commitments, and support other government departments and agencies.
- Specialist functions, if any, that could be effectively performed by elements of the Primary Reserve.
- The options available to the government on the organization and control of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves.
- Ways and means whereby the responsiveness and productivity of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves can be enhanced.
- Methods to reduce overhead in the Primary Reserve structure and program.
- Changes in regulations, orders, procedures or administrative approaches to implement the recommended Primary Reserve structure.

Process

By ministerial order dated April 5, 1995 (Appendix B), the Commission was given certain powers necessary to discharging its mandate, namely:

- to sit at such time and at such places in Canada as it may from time to time decide;
- to adopt such procedures and methods as it may from time to time consider expedient for the proper discharge of its mandate;
- to have, subject to law, complete access to personnel and information relevant to the Reserve Force in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;
- to be provided, from within the resources of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, with adequate working accommodation and clerical assistance; and
- to be provided with or to engage the services of such staff and other advisers as it considers necessary to aid and assist the inquiry, at such rates of remuneration and reimbursement as may be approved by the Treasury Board.

Once its staff had been assembled, the Commission was determined to obtain swiftly from all available sources the relevant information concerning matters pertinent to Canada's reserves. Accordingly, the

Commission divided its information-gathering process roughly into three phases. First, it held a series of ``technical briefings" to acquire essential background information relevant to a proper understanding of the numerous issues confronting the reserves (see Appendix D). Short summaries of these briefings were prepared, and all documentation received during these briefings was kept and indexed. This documentation was made available to the public and could be viewed at the Commission's offices located at 45, Sacré-Coeur Boulevard in Hull, Quebec.

During the second phase of its process, the Commission held public hearings in every province beginning on May 29, 1995, and concluding on July 6, 1995. (The dates, locations, and names of witnesses who attended these public hearings appear in Appendix E.) The public hearings were advertised in advance in various newspapers throughout the country and on the Internet, and briefs relevant to the Commission's mandate were solicited from serving and retired members, citizens, groups, associations, and other organizations. The hearings were audio and video recorded.

Those wishing to appear before the Commission were required to submit a request, along with a summary of their intended remarks, at least 10 days before the hearing. Notwithstanding this requirement, the Commission did not refuse to hear any witness who wished to appear before it, including persons who asked for time to make submissions on the very day that the Commission was holding the hearing in question.

More than 300 persons addressed the Commission during the course of the public hearings, and more than 800 written submissions and documents were received. All submissions were analysed by the Commission. (A list of people who submitted written briefs to the Commission, but did not appear at the public hearings, is found in Appendix F.)

During the course of the public hearing process, it became evident to the Commission that, in certain cases, it needed to pursue further the technical aspects raised by the witnesses. For instance, one of the major issues during the public hearings was the inadequacy of the budgeting process for the reserves. Therefore, in a third phase, which took place between August 17 and September 19, 1995, the Commission invited knowledgeable persons to explain the budgeting process in as much detail as possible. In effect, the third phase of the hearing process consisted of a second series of technical briefings, mainly designed to obtain specific answers to issues raised by various witnesses during the course of the public hearings. (See Appendix E.)

The Commission then began its deliberations so as to produce the report for the Minister of National Defence by the deadline included in the Terms of Reference - namely, October 30, 1995. Thereafter, the Commission will deposit all the documents it received and the complete record of its proceedings in the National Archives of Canada.

The Report

Because, by its very terms, the Commission's mandate was much broader than the specific matters identified above, our report as such is not structured around them. Rather, we have tried to look at each component of the reserves individually, except where issues, such as the perennially problematic pay system, were common to all reservists. Conversely, where issues such as the budgeting process for the Militia were common to all reserve components, but appeared to be of particular significance to one component of the reserves, we have dealt with them in that more specific context. Ultimately, however, our report addresses all the items raised in our Terms of Reference.

Our report is organized into five parts, plus appendices referred to throughout the text. Part I serves as an introduction, setting out the information essential to understanding the issues confronting the Commission. Part II deals with the Primary Reserve components, which have been the main focus of our inquiry in accordance with our Terms of Reference. Part III is devoted to the other components of the Reserve Forces - namely, the Supplementary Reserve, the Canadian Rangers and the Cadet Instructor Cadre. Part IV focuses on a number of issues that affect all reservists, hence its title, ``Generic Matters.'' Part V, ``Conclusion,'' contains the Commission's final remarks on this detailed inquiry into Canada's Reserve Forces.

One final note: the military, like many other professions, has a special fondness for abbreviations and acronyms which, while saving time for initiates, can confuse civilian readers. This report has tried to deal with the problem by setting out in parentheses the pertinent abbreviation or acronymfollowing the words or expressions they denote the first time they appear in the text. Thereafter, the relevant abbreviation is generally used, but we have also included a list of abbreviation and acronyms at the end of our report for reference purposes.

Footnotes

1 "Force Enhancement" is the name given to the second phase of the four-stage framework for national mobilization outlined in the 1994 White Paper on defence. See chapter 2, p. 16.

2 ``Total Force'' was defined in 1989 as follows:

> ``Total Force is composed of members of both the Regular and the Reserve Force, who are serving in the same units or other elements in such numbers as are directed by the CDS [Chief of Defence Staff], with each member and each such unit or other elements retaining his or her distinctive terms and conditions of service.'' NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/94 - Implementation of the Total Force Concept, Draft Report-04 Jul 95.

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THE RESERVE FORCE

Our Commission was established in response to two fundamental imperatives. First, the 1987 White Paper on defence called for the establishment of a Total Force in Canada - that is, the integration of members of the Regular and the Reserve Forces to the maximum extent possible for the purposes of conducting operations and staffing the necessary administrative infrastructure. By 1995 this integration process still had not been fully realized. Secondly, the 1994 White Paper on defence called for a reduction in the cost and number of reservists while increasing their overall efficiency, thus echoing the 1992 Auditor General's Report. Moreover, the 1995 budget imposed further financial constraints on the Canadian Forces.

To implement Total Force, reduce cost, and increase efficiency required that a comprehensive analysis of our Reserve Force be undertaken; in essence, that is the task we were given by the Minister of National Defence in April 1995. To discharge this onerous mandate, we soon realized that we needed to put the various problems confronting the reserves in a proper perspective. This chapter is devoted to outlining this necessary overview of Canada's Reserve Force.

Historical Overview

Canada is an unmilitary nation. Though Canadians have a proud record of service in war and, more recently, in peacekeeping operations, there is no doubt that, wartime aside, the public is now and has been remarkably uninterested in the Canadian Forces.

Yet the historical record of Canada is inextricably intertwined with the military. From the earliest days of New France, every *habitant*, though effectively untrained in formal military operations, was expected and required to defend both his home and his community against the enemies that threatened the tiny colonies. After the advent of the British regime, the mandatory nature of the *levée en masse* remained, and in 1775 Canadien militia and British regulars drove off the attacking Americans at Quebec City. During the War of 1812, the militias of Upper and Lower Canada played valuable roles again in helping to defend British North America against the United States, though the bulk of the fighting and the casualties were sustained by British regu- lars. The departure of the British garrisons for home in 1870-71, three years after Confed-eration, obliged the Canadian government to give serious consideration to defence for the first time. As a result, a small permanent force was established, with the primary task of training the Militia, which by this stage was organized in volunteer regiments.

If the Militia was intended for home defence, Canada nonetheless found itself, as part of the British Empire, drawn into the dispatch of expeditionary forces for overseas wars. The first significant participation abroad came in the South African War (1899-1902), when successive contingents of volunteers, in all numbering 8372 men, went to fight against Boer commandos. Most of the costs were paid by Britain, and most of the volunteers came from Militia units, ex-British regulars, the permanent force, and off the street. The Canadians earned a fine reputation in South Africa as fighting troops. Their performance reinforced the myth, initiated in the War of 1812 and popularized in oratory in the intervening century, that every Canadian was a natural-born soldier who required little training. In the Great War, however, the importance of training became clear.

The Militia, though not the regiments that had been created in towns across the country, served as the basis for the first contingent sent overseas in 1914, though again there were substantial numbers of ex-

British regulars and untrained volunteers in the ranks. Militia units raised battalions as the war went on (some dispatched several), but so too did ad hoc recruiting committees; in 1917 the government resorted to conscrip-tion to fill the ranks, at the cost of a political crisis that sharply divided Canadians. In all, 620,000 Canadians served; 60,000 did not return from France and Flanders.

The Canadian Corps that was produced by four years in the trenches was a superb force, arguably the best formation of its size on the Western Front. Its units, however, had to learn their tasks in action, and at the cost of heavy casualties, but learn they did. The Corps' senior officers, especially the first Canadian-born commander of the Corps, LGen Sir Arthur Currie, a Militia soldier, devised innovative solutions for overcoming the problems of trench warfare, and the result was a corps of four divisions that was much more than the sum of its parts; in other words, a very professional force in every respect.

The lesson that professionalism was a key component in military success tended to be forgotten after 1919. War weariness and budgetary constraints led Canada once again to revert to a large and relatively untrained Militia of some 50,000 officers and men, and a tiny permanent force (some 4500 in 1939) that trained the Militia. By the middle of the interwar years, although the defence of Canada remained the official *raison d'être* for military planning, most attention was focused on the planning for an expeditionary force.

What was new was that, for the first time, Naval and Air Reserve Forces had begun to take form, matching the development of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). In 1939 the Regular Force strength of both these services was small, that of the RCN peaking at fewer than 1800 personnel, and that of the RCAF at 3000. The Naval Reserve had begun as a volunteer movement just before the Great War, and in the 1920s Naval Reserve Divisions were created in cities across the country. The Air Reserve also began in the 1920s, and its members assisted the RCAF in civil government air operations until the mid-1930s. Both Reserve Forces were tiny in 1939: the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve numbered at most 1500, while the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary had around 1000 members in 12 squadrons. They were composed largely of untrained volunteers but, like the equally untrained Militia and the three regular services, they were the readiest force Canada had when World War II erupted. There was a desperate shortage of modern equipment and instructors.

The fit and willing members of the reserves, along with the three small Regular Forces, formed the Canadian Active Service Force and became the basis for the huge expansion during World War II. Naval reservists commanded corvettes in the Battle of the Atlantic, RCAF auxiliary pilots flew fighters, bombers, and transports in every theatre of war, and the Militia produced some of the country's best fighting men, including, by war's end, three of the five division commanders in First Canadian Army. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of the more than one million Canadians who served joined from civilian life, their military professionalism being acquired entirely during the war. By war's end, no one doubted that the Canadian forces were as professional in operations as any other military forces in the world.

The errors made after the Great War were not repeated entirely after the victory in 1945. The huge forces of wartime quickly melted away, but Regular Forces totalling 50,000 were authorized, easily the largest permanent forces Canada had had to that time; author-ized strengths, however, were never attained before the Cold War. The reserves, too, were soon recreated at substantial authorized strengths (navy 18,000, army 180,000, and air a few thousands), but again these numbers were never attained before the East-West confrontation sparked rearmament. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Canada decided to contribute naval, ground, and air contingents to the United Nations ``police

action." Since the Regular Force was assigned to the defence of Canada, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was essentially recruited from veterans and from civilian volunteers. A year later, Canada prepared itself to dispatch an air division and a brigade group, which was recruited in substantial part from the Militia, to Europe for service with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These efforts, and additional recruiting, increased the size of the Regular Force to some 120,000 by the mid-1950s.

For the reserves, the Cold War period was destined to be much less satisfactory. The Militia was not intended for operational roles; the Naval Reserve was effectively without a role; and the small RCAF reserve, although it kept up its flying skills and provided much of Canada's domestic air defence before 1950, did not keep this air role for long. Once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons and there was the threat of a possible nuclear war, reserves tended to be discounted and reduced in strength. Forces in being were what was required, and at the end of the 1950s, the Militia, for example, became responsible for ``national survival" - in effect, the rescue of civilians from the ruins of bombed urban areas. The result was substantial demoralization of the Militia. A succession of parliamentary and Department of National Defence committees were set up to try to find a viable role for the Reserve Force, all without success. By the early 1970s, the Reserve Force had been reduced in total to fewer than 21,000.

Not until the 1987 White Paper did the Canadian government fully accept the policy of graduated response that had become NATO doctrine years before. The doctrine looked to the possibility of a prolonged war, one in which reserves might again be valuable. At the same time, because Canada's Regular Force was to be upgraded in equipment but reduced in numbers, owing to budgetary constraints, the reserves were to be increased in size to 40,000, and Total Force became the policy. There was now one military, regular and reserve, and, although reservists had served on occasion with the Regular Force in the past, individuals from the reserves now were intended to be used primarily to augment the regulars. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed many assumptions. There was no longer a ``big war" threat, but nationalist passions were unleashed in hitherto calm parts of the world.

For the Canadian Forces, the end of the Cold War coincided with a national deficit crisis, and the pressure to reduce expenditures became severe. As a result, naval, Militia, and air reservists have been called on for service in peacekeeping operations in substantial numbers. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the Militia contribution to regular units has averaged 20 percent of strength, an important contribution indeed, while air reservists have played useful roles in Haiti, and naval reservists have served in the Adriatic and in Cambodia. In all, some 4000 reservists have served with distinction. The demands of Total Force led National Defence Headquarters to increase its requests for augmentees and to insist on improved Reserve Force Standards. Some units have complained, however, that their traditional role was to prepare for national mobilization.

The White Paper of 1994 and the federal budget of 1995 together made clear that the Total Force concept was to remain and that the country's Regular and Reserve Forces were again to be reduced in size. Meanwhile, the demands for personnel for peacekeeping and for the other roles of the Canadian Forces continue. While there is no immediate threat of a general war, the world is far from stable, and prudent policy demands that Canada have reserves that can participate in the many military roles that might arise in an uncertain future.

Regardless of the changes that Total Force and economic constraints impose on the military, however, the chain of command at all levels must keep firmly in mind the ideals that make the military special. These ideals, which translate into a military ethos, include such things as the team cohesion which is

called for in battle or in an emergency short of war; they include the guarantees of equal treatment and compensation for equal work and risk; and they include the need for special instruments such as a Code of Service Discipline. The military is a mirror of the society that produces it, but we believe that it can and must have rules and customs of its own. If the traits peculiar to the military ethos are eliminated or watered down, then the motivation that makes soldiers willing to put themselves in harm's way will likely be constrained - with effects that could only be disastrous in war or emergency.

Current Organizational Structure of the Reserve Force

The *National Defence Act (NDA)* identifies the Reserve Force as one of three components of the Canadian Forces, the other two being the Regular Force and the Special Force.3

The Reserve Force is the component of the Canadian Forces ``that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service."4 Generally speaking, therefore, a reservist is engaged on a part-time basis, although, as we shall see when we deal with the complex terms of service that regulate them, some reservists essentially serve on a full-time basis.5

The Reserve Force is divided into the following subcomponents:

The **Primary Reserve** is made up of officers and non-commissioned members who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, and contains all formed Reserve Force units. The Primary Reserve is further divided into the Naval Reserve, the Militia, the Air Reserve, and the Communication Reserve.

The **Supplementary Reserve** is made up of officers and non-commissioned members who, except when on active service, are not required to perform military or any other form of duty or training. The Supplementary Reserve is essentially a casually maintained list of names of former regulars and primary reservists, and of selected individuals with no military experience but who possess militarily valuable skills and expertise. The Supplementary Reserve is divided into the Supplementary Ready Reserve (SRR) and the Supplementary Holding Reserve (SHR).

The **Canadian Rangers** is made up of officers and NCMs who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but who are not required to undergo annual training. The Rangers are located mostly in Northern Canada and other isolated areas. Their principal role is to monitor activities in the country's more remote areas.

The **Cadet Instructor Cadre** is made up of officers who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but whose primary duty relates to the cadets mentioned in section 46 of the NDA. Their primary duties are to supervise, administer, and train cadets belonging to 1100 cadet corps/squadrons across the country.

Economic Considerations

If I were to reduce the general restructuring guidelines provided to the Commission to their lowest common denominator, it would spell out ``cost-efficiency." How does the Department of National

Defence get the biggest bang for its reserve buck?

Maj G.K. Sykes

The 1994 federal budget continued the trend of reducing the defence budget, and subsequent budgets are expected to reflect the government's intention to reduce substantially or to eliminate the annual deficit. The Reserve Force must, therefore, be scrutinized to extract the maximum efficiency and savings, while maintaining the capability of the Canadian Forces to meet all their commitments.

For fiscal year 1994-95, the full cost of the Primary Reserve was estimated at $1.028 billion. Following an audit conducted by the Chief Review Services which expressed concern over the lack of consistent and accurate systems on which to base cost information, a revised methodology resulted in a downward adjustment of the estimates to $875 million. The audit also recommended the development of a comprehensive full-cost methodology to refine the estimates further. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that even when adequate systems are in place to capture costs more precisely, many of the cost factors and formulae will remain subject to different interpretations. Precise accounting, particularly with regard to shared operational or capital costs, is not always feasible.

Indeed, the difficulties in arriving at precise and agreed numbers on the costs of the Reserve Force are manifold. The budgeting process cannot distinguish all items that are intended for reserve use, especially if they are used by regulars as well. If a helicopter is intended for use by regulars and reservists, to whom should it be charged? If a ship sails with a mixed regular and reserve crew, what portion of the fuel and ammunition should be charged to which budget? Many frustrated and angry reservists have argued that the Reserve Force should have a separate budget and that reserve commanding officers should buy services from the Regular Force and pay for the courses their personnel choose or are required to take; some even argue that the reserves should be able to purchase their own equipment from this separate budget, although for reasons stated later we cannot support them.

Some witnesses attacked the cost estimates prepared by the Regular Force and by the Auditor General, so we obtained additional information in this area, including responding comments from the Auditor General. As a result of these inquiries, we are persuaded that the Regular Force is making genuine and objective attempts to refine its cost allocation methodology so as to capture as accurately and fairly as current accounting theory allows the true costs of the reserves.

For the purpose of this report, and given the myriad other important issues and the short timeframe in which it had to conclude its work, the Commission did not go beyond its mandate to conduct a detailed audit in an attempt to fix on the ``true" costs of the reserves. Regardless of the precise total cost of the reserves, however, we have heard enough evidence to convince us that, on the whole, reservists are a ``good bargain" in light of the roles assigned to them.

In this context, the Commission wishes to comment specifically on one of the guidelines quoted earlier - namely, that the ``strength of 23,000 for the Primary Reserve ... is the maximum (ceiling) to be funded in the immediate future."6 The Commission does not understand this figure as an inflexible limitation on the actual number of reservists who can be included in the total establishment of the Primary Reserve, but rather as an economic ceiling that must be respected. This interpretation is confirmed by that same guideline, which goes on to stipulate that the ``revised structure must be designed to ensure that the majority of Reserve funding available is used to engage the maximum number of reservists." Indeed,

because the average number of reservists who train on a regular basis, and therefore must be paid, is less than the total establishment of the reserves, it follows that the total actual number of reservists who can be members of reserve units at any point can be greater than the actual paid ceiling.

Another way to maximize the number of reservists on strength is to allocate a greater portion of the funding for lower-paid individuals. For example, a lieutenant-colonel is paid $157 per day; with the same funds, two lieutenants or four privates could be maintained on strength. Thus the lowering of the officer/NCM rank ratio, mainly by the elimination of headquarters and by rationalizing unit establishments to anticipated officer needs, provides the basis on which the number of 23,000 reservists expressed in the White Paper can be exceeded. The reserves are an immensely valuable asset to the Canadian Forces in particular and to Canada in general, and their numbers should be maximized wherever possible.

"Two Cultures"

It amazes me that in 1995 it is still possible to meet Regular Force personnel who say that they have never been in contact with reservists, much less have served with them!

D.B. Collins

Even though the Regular and the Reserve Forces have been working more closely together than ever before on peacekeeping and other operations, the existence of ``two cultures" remains a major impediment to the ideal of Total Force. While the Naval and the Communication Reserves have gone a substantial distance to overcoming this division, the Air Reserve remains troubled by squadron closures and amalgamations, and, despite substantial effort by Land Force Command, the gap between the Regular Force and the Militia remains.

The root cause of this last split is clear. The regulars, to generalize and to oversimplify a complex set of circumstances, believe that their training is of a higher standard than that of the Militia. They resent the demands from a number of the Honorary Colonels, Commanding Officers, and some senior NCMs of several Militia regiments in Land Force Central Area (LFCA), for example, that reserve officers and NCMs should not be expected to meet the Regular Force's individual physical and training Standards. As a result, some regulars appear to believe that Militia officers and NCMs are, by definition, militarily inferior.

The Militia, for its part, resents what it sees as the condescending attitude of the regulars. It criticizes NDHQ's failure to understand the need for maintaining proud unit traditions, for providing clear roles for units, and for fostering a military footprint across the country as the basis on which future national mobilizations can be conducted. It opposes skimming off the most able reservists who have served overseas. And it holds that the Militia has been maltreated or misused by regulars. The active campaign waged by some Honorary Colonels against Total Force and the policy of using the Militia for Regular Force augmentation have also fuelled the fire.

Thus, ``two cultures" do exist. They are extremely harmful to the functioning of the Canadian Forces, and they must be addressed. Much of what we will recommend in this report is directed to overcoming

these divisions between regulars and reservists.

The Four-Stage Mobilization Plan

As we noted earlier, the 1994 White Paper on defence confirmed Canada's commitment to Total Force. We believe that the most important and, to a certain degree, troublesome aspect of the White Paper is the emphasis it puts on the primary role of the Reserve Force in the context of the new four-stage mobilization plan.7 The first stage, ``force generation," includes all the measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake new operational tasks and to sustain and support them within the existing resource framework; the second stage, ``force enhancement," calls for the improvement of the existing forces through provision of more resources and the possible formation of temporary units or specialist elements; the third stage, ``force expansion," means the enlargement of the Canadian Forces, permanent changes in structures, roles, and tasks, and the likely creation of new units; the fourth stage, ``national mobilization," requires preparing the Canadian Forces and the nation for a major global war.

The Reserve Force is intended to augment and sustain the Regular Force in the context of the first two phases of mobilization - that is, to provide individually selected reservists, rather than whole reserve platoons or companies, to the Regular Force for the purposes, among other things, of fulfilling Canada's international peacekeeping commitments. Such tasks imply a major shift away from the primary role the reserves have played in the past - namely, to provide the organizational framework and leadership foundation for national mobilization. We shall deal with the implications of this shift in chapter 3.

I was very impressed at how well the regular and reserve team worked in UNPROFOR ... the performance of the reservists in 2PPCLI was just outstanding.

MGen J.M.R. Gaudreau, Deputy Commander UNPROFOR, 1992-93

Footnotes

3 Section 2.01(2) 15 and 16, Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&Os). The Regular Force is defined as a component of the Canadian Forces ``that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service." The Special Force is a component of the Canadian Forces which the Governor-in-Council may establish in an emergency or in response to Canada's international commitments, as occurred, for example, in the Korean conflict. Neither the Regular Force nor the Special Force component fall within the scope of the Commission's mandate.

4 NDA, section 15(3) (emphasis added).

5 See chapter 12, p. 62.

6 See chapter 1, p. 7.

7 See Appendix A, p. 87, for the relevant excerpt from the White Paper defining each phase of the

mobilization plan.

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3 FUNDAMENTAL ROLES OF THE PRIMARY RESERVE

Currently, the Primary Reserve is to perform three distinct roles. First, it is to serve as the basis for augmenting the Regular Force in the first and second phases of mobilization; secondly, it is to serve as the basis for full-scale mobilization; and, thirdly, it is to serve as the link between the military and the community at large. We wish to address each of these principal roles in turn.

Augmentation

In today's environment, augmentation has meant that individually selected reservists serve with the Regular Force on Canada's peacekeeping missions. Reservists have responded eagerly and well to the opportunity to be part of these missions. For example, to join in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia is an opportunity for Militia NCMs or officers to serve their country, have an adventure, work with the Regular Force, and improve their military skills significantly through experience in an operational theatre.

Most Militia and Air Reserve units and Naval Reserve Divisions see great benefits in having their NCMs and officers serve on peacekeeping operations. Some Militia officers, however, are unhappy with the augmentation role, referring to it as ``office overload," the provision of ``temps" to meet a short-term Regular Force need. Augmentation, in this perception, robs units of their best soldiers and distracts them from their real role - training for national mobilization. There have also been complaints that follow-up services for peacekeeping veterans have been weak. This concern is legitimate, given the potential for post-traumatic stress syndrome among UNPROFOR soldiers.

Moreover, after the experience of serving abroad in an area of high tension, ordinary reserve service in an armoury in Canada can seem very boring, and retention of peacekeeping veterans in some parts of the country is reported to be relatively low. However, in Land Force Quebec Area (LFQA), we have been informed that the retention rate has been as high as 94 percent. Many reservists leave the forces entirely on their return from overseas service or transfer to the regulars.

There is also some resentment that the regulars usually oblige reservists to drop one rank when they are transferred to operations like UNPROFOR, and that they do not often allow reserve junior officers to command platoons in operational units, even though reservist officer training in the Reserve Entry Scheme Officer (RESO) program is the same as that given to regular officers. Moreover, senior reservist Warrant Officers (WOs) and officers above the rank of Captain are frequently denied the opportunity to serve on peacekeeping operations - except, perhaps, in rear area posts. The Land Force argues, and they have substantial data to back their case, that the training and experience of senior Militia WOs and officers of the rank of Major or higher are relatively weak. They agree that RESO-trained junior officers are as good as their own, but they are understandably reluctant to take platoon commanders away from the men and women with whom they have worked and replace them with reservists.

How can such problems and perceptions be resolved? The Commissioners believe that so long as Canada maintains its present large peacekeeping commitments, the Land Force, in particular, will continue to require substantial augmentation from the Militia, and we reaffirm the necessity for the Militia to provide such personnel as it can. On the other hand, we can understand the frustration of Militia units that only individuals, and often their best soldiers, are drained away. Therefore:

1 The Commission recommends that Militia units selected by Area commanders be asked to provide formed platoons and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Force units proceeding on peacekeeping duties.

2 The Commission further recommends that, on United Nations and other operations, junior Militia officers, wherever practical, be employed in command of troops rather than as liaison officers or in other staff positions, as now frequently occurs.

The Commissioners heard additional complaints from reservists about the way individuals were processed out and returned home in a single day after their return from UNPROFOR service. In particular, soldiers were rushed through assembly line medical checks without being given appropriate screening to determine if they might be suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. The Commission believes that this haste is unacceptable. Sufficient time must be allowed for an orderly transition from the regular to the reserve unit, for adequate medical and dental assessments, and for a proper evaluation of the individual's susceptibility to post-traumatic stress syndrome. Therefore:

3 The Commission recommends that all reservists returning from overseas service be entitled to an immediate disembarkation leave of two weeks, as at present, followed by six weeks of paid employment and screening with the unit with which they served.

The Commission also heard anecdotal evidence that some reservists did not have the full term of their contracts with the Department of National Defence honoured. From what we have been able to determine, however, it does not appear that contracts were actually broken, but rather that termination notices were given, as is expressly permitted under the terms of the applicable contracts, before the full term of the contract had run its course, presumably because the need for those reservists' services no longer existed. The Commission sympathizes with reservists who arrange their lives to serve overseas, perhaps giving up jobs or postponing schooling, only to find out that they are no longer needed, or at least not for the full term of the contract of service. Still, we believe that it would be unreasonable to require the Canadian Forces to pay for the full term of the contract regardless of need, and that it is appropriate that reasonable notice be given before the expiry of the term if the reservists' services are no longer required. (It should also be noted in this context that reservists have the right to terminate their service contract with the Canadian Forces on 30 days' notice in Canada and 60 days' notice outside Canada.) We urge the Canadian Forces, however, to explain clearly when calling for volunteers that service contracts may be terminated on relatively short notice and that, before reservists sign up, their future plans should take that possibility into account.

Basis for Mobilization

As we mentioned in chapter 2 of this report, the 1994 White Paper on defence established a four-stage mobilization structure, each phase of which directly impinges on the reserves. In stages 1 and 2, the Reserve Forces are expected to provide personnel on an individual basis to augment Regular Force units, as, for example, has been done with infantry and armoured regiments on peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, and with air units that participated in the confrontation at Oka.

In stage 3, selective activation of reservists individually and in units would be effected by call-up under the terms of an order-in-council. In stage 4, an emergency would be declared and the reserves would be activated.

We believe that, given the present Canadian commitments to peacekeeping operations abroad, the augmentation role of the reserves is critical and must be maintained. It is also true, however, that Canada's peacekeeping commitments are, by definition, transitory and thus may not continue into the future. To base fundamental policy decisions on present commitments does not strike us as wise.

Surprisingly, there is no detailed plan in existence for a stage 4 national mobilization, despite the White Paper's statement that "it remains prudent to have ready `no-cost' plans." The Commissioners agree that it would be most prudent to have a plan for national mobilization for a major global war, however unlikely such a conflict might seem at this time. Indeed, not to have one seems very imprudent. Therefore:

4 The Commission recommends that a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.

The omission in the White Paper of any clearly defined role for reserve units, and most especially the Militia, in stages 3 and 4 of mobilization has been a cause of widespread and justified concern. We believe that, in stage 3, the best-trained Militia subunits should be activated for service; because of their organization, the Air and Naval Reserves would likely look upon stage 3 as a stepped-up version of stage 2 mobilization, with the focus remaining on individual augmentation in most cases, though where squadrons and Naval Control of Shipping units exist, for example, they too might be considered for activation, depending on their state of training.

I find it amazing ... that phases 3 and 4 of the mobilization plan would be given so little importance ... If we only have phases 1 and 2 we must hope our allies have made plans to look after us.

Hon LCol K. Willcocks

In stage 4, the national mobilization phase, we believe that naval, Militia, and air units must become the basis for recruitment and training, the building blocks for the massive increase of the Canadian Forces required to fight and win a major global war. For the Land Force, stage 4 must, in other words, envisage formed units, based on the Militia structure of regiments and units, being recruited, trained, and equipped to take the field. A clear statement to this effect in a revised version of the four-phase mobilization structure would go a substantial distance to assuring the Militia, and the Air and Naval Reserves, that the community-based unit system that has served this country well in the past will be expected to do so again in the future. Therefore:

5 The Commission recommends that the definition of stages 3 and 4 in the four-phase mobilization scheme set out in the 1994 White Paper on defence be amended immediately to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment, training, and the provision of formed units required in the event of a major conflict.

Community Link

The Commission's Terms of Reference expressly stress the importance of the Reserve Force as a ``link" or ``bridge" between the Canadian Forces and the community at large. This assessment was confirmed by many who appeared before the Commission.

The Commission was impressed by the local governments, both urban and rural, that made presentations or sent delegates to accompany reserve unit representatives. All, without exception, expressed support for the reserves, for the traditions, community links, and economic benefits the reserves provided their citizens. Moreover, the presence of formed and disciplined units was seen as a vital adjunct to the civil authorities, most notably in British Columbia, where earthquake dangers are the greatest in the country.

The Commissioners were also struck by the fact that municipalities seemed willing to share resources, accommodation, and equipment with reserve units *if asked* - and one offered to do so in writing. The City of Montreal has a councillor designated to serve as the liaison between the City Council and the military, a useful device that other municipalities might emulate. We recognize that municipalities, like the federal and provincial governments, are suffering under financial constraints, but we urge reserve units to seek assistance from their local government.

The Commission affirms the paramount importance of building a bridge between the community and the country's armed forces. Indeed, it is clear that the community at large needs to know much more about the importance and the quality of the Canadian Forces. The bridge not only needs to be maintained, but should be strengthened and expanded. For instance, many European armed forces, and indeed Canada's Regular Force, train on land owned by civilians, placing their soldiers in direct contact with the population. The use of this land can provide field training conditions without the expense of deploying to remote training centres. The Commission believes that such contacts help Canadians to know their military better, and we urge the Canadian Forces to encourage such activities.

Indeed, better ways need to be found to strengthen the reserves' presence in the community. We have heard repeatedly of instances where the Militia could have been used to assist the civilian authorities but unfortunately was not, as, for example, in fighting floods in Alberta in the spring of 1995. In British Columbia, where the possibility of national disasters such as earthquakes is present, the need was stressed to simplify procedures so as to have ready access to the reserves in case such a disaster occurred. While Canadians are becoming more aware of the invaluable contributions the Canadian Forces can make because of their involvement abroad in peacekeeping operations, they could be even more cognizant of the reserves' utility at the local level, if municipal and provincial authorities could efficiently have access to them.

Two main factors appear to impede the swift resort to the reserves when local or regional emergencies arise - namely, the complex and cumbersome procedures involved and the potential costs related to the provision of assistance to civil authorities. As to the first obstacle, we have been advised that revised and simplified procedures are about to be implemented. Having received the ``instruction manual" that outlines these procedures, we find that the procedures involved can still be fairly complex. Be that as it may, the most important matter is that pro-active steps must be taken once the new procedures are approved to have them explained to reserve unit commanding officers, so that they, in turn, will be able to explain them to local authorities if and when the need arises.

In addition, administrative entanglements could be avoided if plans and agreements involving the reserves were settled before an emergency arose. Thus, interested municipalities could define the parameters of the assistance they might seek from local units in specific circumstances and secure the

agreement of the reservists in advance.

On the issue of costs, we have been advised that by far the most significant factor is the reserves' pay. On average, a reservist's daily rate of pay is roughly $65; assuming 100 members of a unit volunteered, for example, the daily cost would be $6500. If flood assistance were required for a full 10 days, then the total costs would be $65,000. We consider this to be a paltry sum to pay in comparison with the extent of the manpower afforded. If emergency plans were drawn up in advance, the allocation of such costs between the various levels of government concerned could be prearranged, so as to remove costs as a potential obstacle to reserve assistance to civilian authorities.

In addition, we believe that the Canadian Forces' interest in enhancing the reserves' profile in the community is such that it warrants the creation of a special emergency fund that local reserve unit commanders could draw on when necessary in order to respond to local emergencies. A relatively modest amount (for example, $1 million) would provide flexibility to reserve units across the land in assisting civilian authorities in often highly visible crises.

The Commission wishes to stress, however, that while it is important to make the reserves visible in their local communities, it is also important not to repeat the errors of the past and to turn the reserves into a mere instrument of relief for civilian authorities, who may look upon them as a source of cheap labour. The main motivation for reservists is to serve their country and, specifically, to assist in countering any military threat, whether current or future. As we insisted earlier in this report, the role of the reserves in phases 3 and 4 of the mobilization plan - namely, to serve as a basic structure and source of leadership in the case of full-scale mobilization - needs to be reaffirmed and put first on the list of priorities.

While dealing with the rapport between the Canadian Forces and the community, it is also appropriate to deal with the presence of the military on university campuses. The Canadian Forces historically have had a substantial presence on university campuses. The Army's Canadian Officers Training Corps, the University Naval Training Divisions, and the Air Force's University Reserve Training Plan provided a focus for the recruitment and summer training of officer candidates, many of whom thereafter joined the Regular or the Reserve Forces. These schemes ended in the mid to late 1960s in the face of universal indifference or even antipathy from the universities.

The sole military presence on university campuses today, aside from the small number of Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) candidates at civilian universities and those officers and NCMs pursuing undergraduate or graduate work on their own time (usually at their own expense), comes from the Department of National Defence's modest program to encourage military and strategic studies through the creation of chairs in a number of universities spread across the country. The White Paper on defence in 1994 recommended that these programs be continued.

We have discovered virtually no interest among senior officers in restarting the various university officer training programs, though many of the briefs presented to us by reservists lamented the lack of a stronger link between the universities and the armed forces. The demand for officers in the Reserve Force is being satisfactorily met by the RESO officer training scheme, and the recommendations we have put forward for increased reserve obligations for Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP) officers may add to the supply.8 Nonetheless, the Commissioners believe that it is in the interest of the Canadian Forces that the military presence on campus be increased and made more visible.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, has created a scheme for experienced diplomats to spend a year on campuses across the country, using their time for study, if desired, but primarily to

participate in seminars and discussion groups. A similar plan could usefully be created by the Canadian Forces, especially now that the National Defence College has been closed. It would allow regular and reserve officers to undertake a year of graduate study in fields that would enhance their qualifications, in areas ranging from history and strategic studies to scientific research. At the same time, such officers could be made available to work with faculty in seminars where their military expertise could usefully be employed, and to meet with students and advise them of the opportunities offered by the Regular and the Reserve Forces. We urge the Canadian Forces to consider such a scheme.

Footnotes:

8 See chapter 12, p. 64.

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4 THE NAVAL RESERVE

Structure and Roles

The Naval Reserve is one of three formations in Maritime Command, the other two being Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) and Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC). Naval Reserve Headquarters (NAVRESHQ) is located in Quebec City. The Commander of the Naval Reserve is a reserve Commodore, and he is supported by a regular Captain(N) Deputy Commander. Reporting to NAVRESHQ are 24 units, called Naval Reserve Divisions (NRDs), which are located in cities across Canada. Each NRD is commanded by a reserve officer, and each of the four regions is headed by a reserve Captain(N). The rank of the NRD Commanding Officer varies according to the size of the NRD and the availability of officers suitable for command. Currently, each NRD has a personnel strength ranging from about 85 to 375, giving the Naval Reserve a total strength of approximately 4300 personnel.

The role of the Naval Reserve is to provide trained personnel for operational tasks. The NRDs and NAVRESHQ are responsible for various aspects of the administration and training of naval reservists. Training is conducted in NRDs, at various Canadian Forces schools, and ``on-the-job" at Canadian Forces bases and aboard ships. The Canadian Forces Fleet School (Québec) is designated as the principal facility to support Naval Reserve training. Within an NRD, most trained naval reservists are assigned to an operational unit, or subunit, that the NRD is required to produce. These units, elements, or individuals are deployed to the coast, where they are commanded and given operational tasks by the coastal operations commander of either MARLANT or MARPAC.

Naval Reserve operational tasks include manning Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs), Harbour Defence Units (HDUs), Naval Control of Shipping Units (NCSUs), and Convoy Commodore Units (CCUs); augmenting the Regular Force; and providing a mobilization base. The Regular Navy, with the exception of two technicians for each MCDV, does not train or provide personnel for manning the MCDVs, HDUs, NCSUs, and CCUs. The Naval Reserve is distinct among the various reserve components because it has its own tasks.

The evidence we heard about the Naval Reserve has generally been consistent with the view that it is experiencing few serious problems. In essence, the decision to give to the Naval Reserve the specific and exclusive task of maritime coastal defence through the use of the newly constructed MCDVs appears to have had a positive and energizing effect.

With its modest facilities at its 24 units and with its national headquarters and training facilities in Quebec City, the Naval Reserve is a ``lean and mean" organization with no redundancy of positions or duplication of effort....

Nova Scotia Naval Officers Association

The MCDVs are superbly designed, small, and versatile ships that can handle coastal operations,

fisheries patrols, mine countermeasures, and route survey. The Navy has been planning for the MCDVs and their manning for more than a decade, and naval headquarters is confident it can find the reservists needed to crew the 10 MCDVs that will be in service at any one time from among the 4000 or so naval reservists, 2000 of whom are dedicated to the MCDVs from NRDs all across the country. That confidence is based on historical data about the percentage of reservists who will be able and willing to go to sea for extended periods. If all goes as planned, the MCDVs will be manned by officers and ratings who are under contract for periods ranging from four months to two years. Computer-based distance training, as well as courses offered at the Fleet School in Quebec City, will ready individual reservists and, where possible, whole or partial crews from the divisions for service.

The Commissioners have heard extensive evidence on the Naval Reserve and generally agree that this manning plan is both feasible and more economical than crewing the MCDVs with regulars. The success of this scheme, however, is directly dependent on the condition of the economy, the pay and benefits, and the proper scheduling and availability of courses offered to naval reservists, who at present suffer under the same difficulties in these areas as reservists in the other services.9 There is also some concern among naval reservists that the Navy expects, indeed hopes, that the reserves will prove unable to man the MCDVs, so that the regulars can take over this role. Nothing we have heard leads us to lend any credence to this view, though the fact that it is expressed at all confirms that the Navy is not immune from the ``two cultures" problem referred to in chapter 2.

Government Fleets

The Canadian Coast Guard, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), and the RCMP operate fleets of their own. The most recent study of these government fleets, the Osbaldeston Report of 1990, concluded that little was to be gained by integrating the fleets under the control of Maritime Command, and we concur. But the Osbaldeston Report did not consider the personnel of these fleets and their relationship to the Naval Reserve. The Commission believes that, although there are memoranda of understanding governing the role of the civil fleets in emergencies, the closest possible connection between civil sailors and the Navy should be encouraged. Those who sail in the Coast Guard and DFO vessels should be encouraged to enrol in the Naval Reserve, and their qualifications should be rewarded with appropriate rank. As a minimum, members of these civil fleets should be enrolled in the Supplementary Reserve as ``selected personnel without previous military experience who have special skills or expertise for which there is a military requirement."10

Footnotes :

9 The problem of course scheduling is addressed in chapter 10, pp. 55-56

10 Canadian Forces Administrative Order 49-8.

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5 THE MILITIA

Current Structure and Roles

The Army Reserve (known as the Militia) is a component of Land Force Command (LFC), and all aspects of command and control are directed by LFC Headquarters. The Militia is organized into four Areas and further divided into 14 Districts. In addition to regular units, there are 133 Land Force Reserve units located in 125 cities and towns across Canada.

The four Areas are:

Atlantic Area (LFAA)

LFAA covers the four Atlantic provinces, with headquarters in Halifax. It is divided into three Districts and 21 units, with an effective strength of 3648. A complete list of units and locations is found in Appendix H.

Quebec Area (LFQA)

LFQA covers the province of Quebec, with headquarters in Montreal. It is divided into three Districts and 27 units, with an effective strength of 4940 soldiers. A complete list of units and locations is found in Appendix I.

Central Area (LFCA)

LFCA covers the major part of Ontario (exclusive of the Lakehead portion of the province), with headquarters in Toronto. It is divided into four Districts and 43 units, with an effective strength of 5514 personnel. A complete list of units and locations is found in Appendix J.

Western Area (LFWA)

LFWA covers the four western provinces and includes the Lakehead portion of Ontario, with headquarters in Edmonton. It is divided into four Districts and 42 units, with an effective strength of 4245. A complete list of units and locations is found in Appendix K.

Generally speaking, the command, control, and administrative structures are the same in each Area. Ultimately, all Militia units are accountable, from the command and control point of view, to the Area Headquarters, and thence to LFC. At the Area Headquarters level, each Commander is assisted by a Deputy Commander who is a reservist.

District Headquarters are essentially designed to provide administrative support for Militia units. They are on the whole staffed by reservists. At the Militia unit level, the Commanding Officer (CO) is usually a Lieutenant-Colonel, although occasionally a Major. Normally these officers are reservists, unless a suitable reserve officer is not available. A regular officer may then be appointed as CO.

Figure 1 shows the various levels of organization from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) to Militia units, with the current strength of each Area Headquarters, District Headquarters, and Militia

units.

In chapter 3, we discussed the importance of defining roles for the Primary Reserve. Only in this way can reservists have a clear goal before them. This need is most acute for the Militia. In phases 1 and 2 of mobilization, the goal must be augmentation, ordinarily by individuals but, as we have suggested, where practical by formed sections and/or platoons. In phase 3, selected units should be required to provide formed subunits of company strength. The selection process, designed to reinforce successful units, should become the focus of inter-unit competition and a healthy spur towards improvement. In phase 4, all Militia units should have the task of mobilizing for war.

Revised Structure

The Commission heard much evidence, stemming mostly from Honorary Colonels and Commanding Officers of Militia units, to the effect that the current administrative structure is cumbersome, inefficient, and costly. In particular, we heard repeated criticisms of overstaffing at each level of the organization, from NDHQ down to Militia units themselves. However, there were few concrete suggestions as to how the system should be reformed. Generally speaking, some witnesses preferred the status quo, while others advocated a new structure based on a brigade group model (see figure 2).

LFC developed a more detailed list of seven options, and provided the Commission with its analysis of the ``pros" and ``cons" for each. The options were:

1.the status quo

2. the improved status quo (Total Army Establishment)

3. the new formed unit model

4. the battle group model (composite)

5. the brigade group model

6. Militia subunits attached to regular units, and

7. the base support model

Options 1, 6, and 7 were considered unworkable by LFC, and the Commission accepts this analysis. Options 2, 3, and 4 had much to recommend them, but did not, in our estimation, satisfy the need to reduce the numbers of headquarters and to absorb the cut in strength imposed by the 1994 White Paper on defence and the 1995 budget while simultaneously improving efficiency. The brigade group model, option 5, seemed to us to be the most satisfactory approach to restructuring the Militia. It provides a ``template" for reorganization, offers a tactical formation that mirrors regular units and formations, and supplies realistic training staff positions for Militia officers. We will explain our reasons for preferring the brigade group model, particularly in comparison with the status quo.

There have been repeated complaints about the number of Land Force Headquarters in the Regular and the Reserve Forces, and rightly so. Efforts have been made over the past few years to tackle the problem - among other things, Militia District Headquarters have been cut from 22 to 14 - but some of the

beneficial effects of these cuts were offset by the creation of four LFC Area Headquarters. The Commission believes that the recent implementation of Total Force and the 1997 move of LFC Headquarters to Ottawa present another opportunity for important savings.

The Commission accepts the need for Area Headquarters to organize the regional operations that are the army's responsibility and to provide liaison with provincial governments for planning and executing operations for aid to the civil power and for assistance to civilian authority. As well, Area Headquarters integrate the command and control of both regulars and reserves.

The Commission believes that the District organization, the level below that of Area, is where the greatest savings should occur. We believe that a brigade group organization is preferable to a District organization for the following reasons:

a brigade group organization mirrors the Regular Force organization, it is tactical, and, hence, it eases the transition to the requirements of phases 3 and 4 of the mobilization plan;

a brigade group organization guarantees that the staff officers assigned to it will receive valuable training in the roles they might have to play in phases 3 and 4;

a brigade group organization will facilitate the (eventual) integration of a core communications capability, such as a signals squadron;

a brigade group organization will permit better planning for collective training on an on-going basis, rather than the present ad hoc creations put together by Area Headquarters for Militia summer concentrations;

a brigade group headquarters can support units just as effectively as the present District structure; and

a brigade group organization will allow for a significant reduction in the number of headquarters required, in this case from 14 to seven.

The Brigade Group Headquarters, supplemented if necessary by a small administrative increment, should be responsible for the administrative support and training of the units under its command, exactly as the present District Headquarters are. A typical Militia brigade group is shown in figure 2. The Commission considers that this proposal is the best way to reduce the number of headquarters, but it is not unmindful of the problems of demographics, span of control, and geography. As a result, the seven brigades need not have exactly the same configuration. One brigade might have four infantry battalions rather than three because of population density; another might require more engineering support because of its potential peacetime tasks or operational missions. Moreover, the Commission is aware that, historically, Canada has not sent regionally based brigades or divisions into action. In all likelihood, brigades would be assembled as required from units from across the country.

Structuring options are best presented in diagrammatic form. The model favoured by the Commission for the Militia, incorporating the regular brigades, is shown in figure 3. As figure 3 suggests, below Land Force Command Headquarters, the Areas remain as at present - namely, Land Force Western Area, Land Force Central Area, Land Force Quebec Area, and Land Force Atlantic Area. The Area Headquarters would have under their command formations as follows:

LFWA:

one Regular brigade group and two Militia brigade groups;

LFCA:
one Regular brigade group and two Militia brigade groups;

LFQA:
one Regular brigade group and two Militia brigade groups; and

LFAA:
the Combat Training Centre and one Militia brigade group.

Therefore:

6 The Commission recommends that the Districts be eliminated and that they be replaced by seven Militia brigade groups, each commanded by an officer in the rank of Colonel.

For the same reason that Brigade Group Headquarters should be organized as much as possible in a tactical fashion, so too should Area Headquarters be configured as closely as possible to Divisional Headquarters and renamed accordingly. In each Area, provision must be made for the existence, even in nominal form, of units designated as divisional and corps troops for phases 3 and 4 of mobilization. These steps would go a substantial distance to fleshing out the mobilization plan the Commission has recommended.

The brigade group model we propose, even with the necessary flexibility in organization we have suggested, will provide a template for Militia formation and unit restructuring. There are several ways such restructuring can be accomplished. It may well prove advantageous, for example, to combine three small infantry battalions into one larger unit or to meld two service battalions or two medical companies into one. Other units may have to be relegated to the Supplementary Order of Battle or be given a new role in tasks identified by Land Force's combat development process. An infantry regiment that might otherwise be redundant, for example, could be reassigned tasks as a divisional anti-tank battalion. Therefore:

7 The Commission recommends that the four existing Area Headquarters be retained, but reorganized as and renamed Divisional Headquarters.

As we suggested, the Commission believes that the restructuring option above the existing Regular brigade groups and the recommended Militia brigade groups should be that of a corps. This is the organization from which the structure of national mobilization should flow. We are aware that in the recent past the Canadian Forces have resisted the terminology associated with divisions and corps, primarily because of fear that such a structure would create unrealistic expectations about human and material resources.

The Commission believes that these fears are groundless. Divisional and corps structures today are primarily teaching tools in our staff colleges, and the students are subsequently quite capable of adapting themselves to military realities. There are genuine advantages in using the terms `division' and `corps' in training and in planning for an eventual mobilization requirement, not least because it will align the Land Force with the organizations, terminology, and staff systems used by our allies.

The Commission believes that LFC should adopt a corps structure as the basis of its planning for mobilization. This structure would provide yet another template into which units in the existing Districts and Areas can be fitted. A corps structure would go a substantial distance in determining the balance between combat functions, in helping to identify redundant units, and in establishing the eventual need to give some of those units a new role to meet mobilization needs.

Organization

Number of Units

Although we are of the view that reserve units in general are cost efficient, it is apparent that a number of them are not at a viable level of strength. In certain areas, notably in the Atlantic and Western Areas, the Militia has recognized this reality and has proposed ways to amalgamate or even eliminate certain units. Elsewhere, however, there appears to have been a reluctance to provide the Commission with "restructuring" proposals that might affect the continued existence of units.

Some witnesses proposed various schemes whereby the Regular Force would directly recruit individuals on short-term contracts to meet its augmentation needs, thus bypassing the Primary Reserve entirely. We consider this an extreme solution, and prefer to retain the existing structure of distinct Militia units.

In this connection, the Commission heard a large number of submissions that ardently supported the regimental system. While the Commission is strongly in favour of maintaining the regimental system as absolutely critical to the viability and performance of our reserves and their link to the community, this does not mean that all currently existing Militia units need to be kept. Indeed, the regimental system is much more important than the regiments themselves.

The Commission stated in chapter 2 that it is appropriate to maximize the actual number of reservists within the allowed paid ceiling. NDHQ has estimated that, in order to bring the total paid ceiling for reserves to the 23,000 level mandated by the 1994 White Paper on defence, the Militia component would have to be reduced from its current paid ceiling of 19,957 to 14,500 by April 1, 1999. This should mean, in practice, that more than 14,500 Militia reservists can be on strength at any one time, perhaps as many as 16,000.

Whatever the optimum number of reservists, however, there is no reason to maintain units that are not viable as units or as training vehicles. The main role of the Militia, as its representatives have stressed in the public hearings, is to prepare for mobilization; moreover, a number of units have argued that they should be given the opportunity to send sub-units on peacekeeping missions. These objectives presume that Militia units are well trained and sufficiently up to strength. Yet a number of units are well below their allowed paid ceiling and would not be able to field a company or even a platoon, although a consolidated sub-unit gathered from the various units of a District or an Area might be achievable.

Militia units must be able to show that they are viable structures with the requisite leadership and personnel strength to serve as a credible basis for mobilization, as well as units able to supply individual and subunit needs for current operations. However, finding the exact criteria by which the viability and effectiveness of a unit ought to be judged is not an easy task. The Commission has been significantly assisted in this regard by the experience of the Australian and British armies, which have recently gone through processes of profound reorganization.

We have also sought advice from Land Force Command Headquarters, the Area Headquarters, and other sources. Therefore:

8 The Commission recommends, in determining the relative viability of existing Militia units, that the following factors, to be applied in the context of the reduced Militia paid ceiling of 14,500 and the revised Militia structure incorporating seven brigade headquarters, must be taken into account in this order of priority:

(a) Operational Requirements
While the unit must be prepared to meet its mobilization tasks in phases 3 and 4, it must also be prepared - and have demonstrated its capability - to provide augmentees to meet the demands of the present situation.

(b) Capacity to Recruit and Retain Effective Strength
Over time (say, the last five years), the unit must have demonstrated its ability to recruit effectively and to retain its personnel at or near its paid ceiling. In demographic terms, it must also have access to a nearby pool of potential recruits or be willing to relocate.

(c) Capacity to Train Individually and Collectively
The unit must have demonstrated that it can train effectively and that its personnel can qualify in high percentages on the Individual Battle Training Standards and perform with reasonable effectiveness in collective (platoon and company) exercises.

(d) Regular Force Support
The unit must have demonstrated its ability to make effective use of Regular Force support in training.

(e)Cost Effectiveness
The unit must have demonstrated the ability to manage its personnel, operating, and maintenance budgets effectively.

(f)Historical Performance and Battle Honours
The unit record in war and peace should be considered, so as to reinforce success.

(g)Footprint and Link to the Community
The unit must be geographically located so as to serve as a link between the military and the general population. It must also enjoy the support of the community in which it functions.

Several reasons have convinced the Commission that it was neither practical nor desirable for us to apply these criteria to the existing Militia units. First, we did not have the requisite information about each unit's individual situation; secondly, we did not have the staff required to carry out such a detailed analysis within the timeframe allowed to produce our report; and, thirdly, we felt that given those limitations, it would not have been fair to impose a somewhat arbitrary solution on reserve units. This having been said, two additional points must be made: first, the outright elimination of a unit or a regiment should be a last resort, and the regimental traditions of a redundant unit should be preserved at the subunit level wherever practical; secondly, we believe strongly that a process involving the reserves ``from the ground up," such as has already taken place in LFAA and LFWA, should be instituted to effect as soon as practicable the necessary rationalization of Militia units using the new brigade group

structure we recommend, a paid ceiling of 14,500, and the criteria set out in recommendation 8. Such a process is outlined later in this chapter in the section headed Restructuring Process.

In the total force reality of today's world it may be necessary to remove some units in the interest of economy and the effectiveness of the survivors. It has happened in the past and will mean the loss of some leaders.

LCol L.R. Hillier, Commanding Officer,
The Governor General's Foot Guards

As suggested above,11 we believe that a brigade group in one Area need not look precisely the same as a brigade group in another. Even so, there is a finite limit to the number of units in such a formation which, including the headquarters, should ordinarily be 9 to 11. To go beyond these limits would serve no purpose, except to perpetuate the problem of too many units being too small to train properly.

Size and Composition of Units

The senior officers in the Militia, including the Honorary Colonels and Honorary Lieutenant-Colonels, tend to be oversuspicious of the Regular Force, concerned about the effects of Total Force, and worried about the implementation of the Total Army Establishment (TAE) policy, which proposes that the same rank establishment exist in Militia units as in Regular Force units. They fear that the effect of this policy will be to reduce most Militia units to a company-size organization, with a Major as the senior officer. They are very concerned with the maintenance of unit identity and traditions, and with the retention of their historic armouries and messes. Some senior officers have given notice that they will fight to keep their units alive, with a full regimental officer complement, even if their present effective strength is below that of a company or a squadron.

The junior NCMs and officers we have talked with seem, in large measure, to take a different view. While proud of their unit traditions, they are more interested in thinking of themselves as part-time professionals able to serve on equal terms with the Regular Force on peacekeeping duties and in other operations. The Militia's record in UNPROFOR, for example, suggests that they can. The junior ranks appear to want to serve in ``real" reserve units, real being defined as full strength, and if this goal means the amalgamation of units, with or without the retention of unit badges, traditions, and colours, then so be it. The junior members want their ranks to mean something: to be the platoon Warrant Officer of a full-strength reserve platoon obviously would be important, much more so than to be the Warrant Officer of a section-sized platoon; similarly, to command a platoon at full strength means much more to a Lieutenant or a Captain than to lead a platoon with the strength of a section.

How to balance this split between the junior and senior Militia members has been exceedingly difficult for the Commission. We understand and accept the importance of unit traditions, just as we appreciate the financial stringency that has led to reductions in the defence budget and the operational commitments that have obliged the regulars to turn with increasing frequency to the reserves.

The regular forgets that the ordinary militiaman is not a part-time regular. He fails to recognize that

the Militia has special characteristics: limited time for training, limited experience, and limited equipment...

Hon Col W.J. Patterson

TAE, a program designed to shift the focus of reserve pay from senior commissioned officers and NCMs to the junior ranks, and the concerns it has raised in the Militia, has exacerbated the situation. In fact, the Militia appears to have an exaggerated fear of TAE, which is not intended to reduce battalions to company strength, or to eliminate all senior officers other than the CO an a few senior Warrant Officers. Nor is it intended to make it impossible for units to handle successions from within their own ranks. TAE allows for redundancies, though it imposes fair but stringent controls on them and requires units to negotiate with the Area commanders over the size of the Unit Training Lists or ``Manning Overheads.'' On the other hand, the Area will pay for the Unit Training List, which will be included within the unit's paid ceiling. Our British colleagues have recognized that their Territorial units need a higher ratio of senior officers and NCMs than do regular units. We agree that this distinction is necessary in Canada, too, to recognize the need for succession and the preservation of a leadership cadre. Therefore:

9 The Commission recommends that Total Army Establishment be put in place, and that LFC Headquarters make every effort to disseminate information to units in order to correct the misinformation that surrounds this project.

We have referred above to Honorary Colonels and other honorary appointments, and we must acknowledge the services these valued officers render to their branches, regiments, and units. Their tasks are many and varied, but their primary role is to support government policy even when it impinges on the interests of their units. As the repositories of unit traditions and a vital link between the unit and the community, they are in an ideal position to help in many areas, not least in securing employer support for their reservists. Many contribute substantial amounts of time and money to the fulfilment of these roles, all of which is much to the benefit of the Militia and the other components of the Reserve Force.

Infrastructure

There is no question, in the Commission's view, that the recently announced base closures pose a serious challenge to the effectiveness of the reserves. For example, the closures of Canadian Forces Bases (CFBs) London, Toronto, and Chilliwack will create serious difficulties, since these bases have supported regions with high concentrations of reservists. Precise, efficient, and effective support arrangements must be established for Areas in which bases are closed.

LFC is committed to the construction of Militia Training Support Centres (MTSCs) for each of its four Areas. Currently, only one has been completed, and it is located in Meaford, Ontario. The Commission visited Meaford, and will make its comments in the section of this report that deals with training.12 Similar centres are to be built in Valcartier (Quebec), Wainwright (Alberta), and Gagetown (New Brunswick).

From the Commission's point of view, insofar as infrastructure is concerned, perhaps the cost of supporting a large number of reserve armouries is of greatest concern. There are more than 150 Militia armouries throughout Canada. While most were built before 1940, their condition varies widely, from poor to very good. However, the age of an armoury is not necessarily an indication of its condition;

indeed, many armouries built in the early 1900s are in better condition than facilities originally built as temporary structures during World War II.

While it is within the Commission's mandate to find means to reduce costs, including infrastructure costs, we are not in a position to identify specifically those armouries that should be closed. This recommendation cannot be made until the process we have suggested below to effect the rationalization of reserve units has been completed.

Restructuring Process

The Commission is well aware of the problems involved in restructuring an organization as historic and as rooted in the community as the Militia. To make cuts is very difficult and, in our view, the fairest way to proceed is one that parcels out the hardship equally to each Land Force Area. We believe that the organization we have proposed meets the requirements of the Canadian Forces, and we urge reservists and regulars to undertake the difficult process of reorganization mindful of the higher interest: to provide the nation with an effective and affordable military. Therefore:

10 The Commission recommends thefollowing restructuring process: That LFC direct the Area Commanders to plan their internal restructuring using the following guidelines:

(1) Each Land Force Area will cut its paid ceiling by approximately 25 percent, so as to move from the current paid ceiling to a new paid ceiling of 14,500 by April 1, 1999.

(2) Militia brigade groups, in terms of numbers of units, will be organized with some discretion within each Area.

(3) Units will be structured to conform to Total Army Establishment with a minimum of overhead. Each unit must constitute an effective training vehicle.

(4) Existing units that might be amalgamated or relegated to the Supplementary Order of Battle in this restructuring process should be, wherever practical, assigned a role in phase 4 of the mobilization plan.

(5) The number of armouries will be reduced to the minimum required to support the new Militia structure, with due regard being paid to cost-benefit analyses, heritage properties, sale of land and buildings where this can be done advantageously, and the urban transportation networks in the large cities. The armoury reductions might necessitate sharing of facilities by units and even by different elements of the reserves, wherever this use proves economical.

(6) The restructuring process will commence no later than the

beginning of April 1996.

(7) Currently serving reservists will be direct and effective participants in the formulation of the Area plans for restructuring. The Militia, in other words, must be actively involved in determining which units remain.

LFC HQ will review the Area submissions, and present its recommendations to Armed Forces

Council and the Defence Council for approval no later than July 1, 1996.

Budgeting Process: Personnel, Operations and Maintenance

The budgeting process for the reserves is relatively complex. Although it is essentially similar for all components of the reserves, we have decided to deal with it in some detail in this chapter, since most of the problems and complaints we have encountered in this regard touch the Militia.

The Reserve Force budget for one year is arrived at by multiplying so-called ``person days" by ``average reservist's salary" and ``total number of reservists." Approximately 100 days per year are allocated for the Militia. For example, assuming an average daily salary of $65 per reservist, and 20,000 reservists, 100 allocated days would equal a yearly pay budget of $130 million. However, most of these ``person days" are absorbed by higher levels of administration before they get to the unit. Thus, according to the most recent figures we have been able to obtain, the Militia budget is allocated roughly as follows between the various levels of bureaucracy:

Administrative Level	Person Days
NDHQ	15
LFCHQ	15
Area HQ	35
District HQ	5
Unit	30

Each organizational level has funding responsibilities that directly or indirectly pertain to the reserves. They can be summarized as follows:

NDHQ
: funds NDHQ reserve personnel and national undertakings such as support for VE-Day celebrations

LFCHQ
: funds LFCHQ reserve personnel and army duties such as the ``Rendezvous" national exercises

Area HQ
: funds Area HQ reserve personnel and all Area-sponsored collective training, as well as national and Area-run career courses

District HQ
: funds District HQ reserve personnel and District-sponsored training, as well as limited ceremonial functions such as Remembrance Day parades

Unit
: funds unit reserve personnel and all training sponsored and conducted by the unit

Obviously, too much money is carved out of the reserve pay budget before it reaches the armoury floor. When LFC assesses the effectiveness of reserves, it considers the performance of individual units and

holds them fully accountable for their training Standards. While such accountability is appropriate in principle, it must also be accompanied by the assurance that sufficient funds are provided at the unit level to effect the requisite training.

The major problem that units face is the shortage of training funds for their Class A personnel, the ordinary part-time reservists who turn out one or two nights a week, one weekend a month, and for two weeks' training in the summer. Depending on the Land Force Area in which they serve, some reserve units apparently receive more than 40 days of Class A pay for their personnel, while others get only 25 or less. Furthermore, funds may unexpectedly be withdrawn, causing further instability in the training plan. In this connection also, the perception exists, although we have been unable to confirm its accuracy, that too many reservists on Class B(A) contracts are used at various levels of headquarters to perform work that bears little o no relation to the reserves.13 The Commission believes strongly that Class B(A) reservists, who are paid from the budget allocated to the reserves, should be employed only in positions that directly relate to the training of the reserves.

The cost of maintaining armouries and equipment can be lowered through innovative and business-like approaches that encourage local decision making... It may come as a surprise to National Defence Headquarters but there are many Militia officers and non-commissioned officers who are successful business owners, employees, and professionals who are quite capable of managing a building like the armoury in Brockville.

The Regimental Council of The Brockville Rifles

We have been advised that to achieve a satisfactory standard of training, the Militia needs a personnel pay budget sufficient to fund approximately four days of training per month per member from September to May, while additional funds are required for periods of continuous training during the summer. The funding for the summer training period is provided by the District or Area Headquarters. The Commission believes that these funds are of critical importance to the effectiveness of units and individuals, and must be protected from being used for other purposes. The Commission has also heard ample evidence that the failure to provide these training days was a major factor of discontent and attrition for young reservists, who often turned to alternative forms of employment to secure a predictable income. In addition, Militia units require the funds necessary to exercise the command, control, and administration of their members and activities. Therefore:

11 The Commission recommends that every Militia unit should be guaranteed funding of four days per month for each of its effective members to receive the required training for the September-to-May period. The unit must devote these funds entirely and directly to training its members.

12 The Commission also recommends that the level of funding necessary to exercise command, control, and administration of units be quantified, and that units be funded accordingly.

13 The Commission further recommends that any delegation of tasks to units (such as collective training) be accompanied by the funds necessary to execute the tasks.

The Commission has heard evidence that substantial savings could be realized in the units' operations and maintenance budgets. We understand that virtually all such costs are paid centrally, thus precluding any motivation for innovative cost-cutting at the unit level. Instances of gross inefficiencies were related to us, such as the requirement to have truck repairs done at support bases located far away, when identical repairs at lower costs could have been effected at a local garage. Another example is the cost of cleaning services, which is felt to be exorbitant. Therefore:

14The Commission recommends that increased authority and flexibility be delegated to reserve units to manage the operations and maintenance costs of their units and their infrastructure.

FOOTNOTES:

11 See pp. 30-31.

12 See chapter 10, p. 55.

13 Class B(A) contracts are discussed in chapter 12, p. 62.

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6 THE AIR RESERVE

From 1976 to 1994 the Air Reserve was organized as a separate group within Air Command, commanded by a reserve Brigadier-General. Air Reserve Group (ARG) was mainly responsible for the administration of reserves within the Command, including recruitment, career management, component changes, and releases. The operational commanders and base commanders were responsible for employment Standards and requirements. The Deputy Commander of Air Reserve Group was a Regular Force Colonel who was ``double hatted" as the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reserves) in Air Command. In 1994 ARG was subsumed into Air Command Headquarters.

Organizational Structure

There are approximately 1500 air reservists in Air Command with an authorized paid ceiling of almost 1800. The Chief of Staff (Reserves) at Air Command, a reserve Brigadier-General, is responsible to the Commander Air Command for all administrative and policy matters for air reservists. His staff carries out most of the functions previously done by ARG. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Reserves and Cadets) is a reserve Colonel on full-time service.

Essentially, the air reservists associated with Air Command are divided into two categories, those who belong to Air Reserve or Regular Force squadrons and headquarters' staffs and those who are assigned as augmentees at air bases. The air reservists at various headquarters and formed Air Reserve units come under command of the applicable commander or commanding officer for task assignments and administration. Those air reservists who support Regular Force units or are base augmentees come under command of the appropriate commanding officer or branch head for task assignments and under the base Air Reserve Augmentation Flight (ARAF) commanders for administration.

There are two Air Reserve wings, 1 Wing at St-Hubert and 2 Wing at Toronto. 1 Wing consists of the Wing Headquarters, 401 Squadron, 438 Squadron, 1 Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), and 450 Squadron. The first three units are manned primarily by air reservists. Recently, 450 Squadron moved from Ottawa to St-Hubert and has mainly Regular Force personnel. 2 Wing consists of the Wing Headquarters, 400 Squadron, and 411 Squadron. Most of its members are air reservists, and Air Command has expressed its intention to move the wing to CFB Borden. The only other squadron with mainly Air Reserve personnel is 402 Squadron. (Appendix L lists the location and size of Air Reserve units.)

Air Command plans to amalgamate the squadrons currently located in St-Hubert and Toronto and disband 1 and 2 Wing.

Roles and Missions

Air Command sees the Air Reserve's mission as one of providing the required personnel to enhance Air Command's national emergency capability. Until recently, this mission has meant concrete roles for the Air Reserve, including substantial flying duties. But this scenario is about to change.

Some units, notably in Montreal, are very concerned about the diminishing role of the Air Reserve. More specifically, air reservists were anxious about being reduced to the role of mere mechanical supporters with few flying duties. They advocated that some roles should be assigned exclusively to the Air

Reserve, a role similar to the Maritime Coastal Defence given to the Naval Reserve. The transport function was mentioned as one that could be given exclusively to reservists. Air Command was concerned, however, that at a time when it has been forced to release a large number of pilots, it did not seem to make sense to assign flying roles to reservists.

Pilots are an important component of the Air Reserve. They are often employed by our national airlines and are highly qualified. It is obvious that, to retain these skilled people, Air Command must continue to let them fly important missions. Air Command must therefore be committed to assigning meaningful flying roles to the Air Reserve. It seems to us, for example, that with the advent of the army's four MTSCs, there will be a real need for transporting Militia reservists to relatively remote locations. This transport role could be assigned to the Air Reserve.

Contingency Support Wing

Air Command has recently begun the formation of a Contingency Support Wing (CSW), to deploy assets currently unavailable within Air Command. The CSW, which will increase Air Reserve strength substantially, is intended to be a composite group comprising an airfield engineer squadron, an airfield defence squadron, a medical squadron, a rapid runway repair flight, and an administrative (logistic) flight, among other functions.

The Air Reserve has shown commendable initiative in the way it has gone about creating the first of the new units required for the CSW. Studies fixed on likely communities with high unemployment in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and bids were sought for reserve Airfield Engineering Flights.

The community/industry and the Air Force have developed a win-win partnership where the Air Force has access to essential and cost-effective personnel resources and the community/industry has, in part, employment for seasonal workers, trade and supervisory skills development for employees, and additional dollars being spent in the community.

Capt. W.A. Watson

Communities were expected to provide services, facilities, and personnel in a new regular/reserve - community/industry partnership. This innovative approach, which should produce effective units in Bridgewater and Gander at relatively low cost and with significant community benefit, has much to recommend it, and may well serve as a model for the other Reserve components.

The role of the CSW, its command and control, and its operational concept, missions, and units are still being formulated. The Commission believes that NDHQ should use this time to consider whether Militia units that might otherwise be declared redundant and relegated to the Supplementary Order of Battle could take on CSW roles. The Commission considers the CSW functions most important to the Air Force's missions abroad, and we can understand Air Command's desire to control the units it must deploy to serve and protect its air operations. Even so, it seems potentially wasteful to disband some units in the Militia when complementary units in the CSW are being formed. Therefore, while it recognizes the need for the CSW,

15 The Commission recommends that the establishment of new Contingency Support Wing units be reviewed so that redundant Militia units, if properly sited or willing to relocate, can be considered for CSW roles.

Recruitment

To reduce the need for training pilots and aviation technicians, Air Command launched an innovative project called ``Project Helicop" specifically to target civilians with skills in the operation and repair of helicopters. This successful operation significantly reduced costs, and was greatly facilitated by the fact that relevant military trade qualifications were harmonized with civilian Standards.

This Air Command initiative is an outstanding example of the opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies that exist when the Regular Force defines its specific needs and investigates whether these needs can be fulfilled by individuals already trained and available in the civilian community. We will discuss the appropriateness of increasing the Regular Forces' reliance on civilian specialists later in our report.14

Air Reserve Deployment

The Commissioners appreciate the necessity of having tactical helicopters co-located with the Regular Force brigade groups. It makes sense, therefore, for helicopters to be based in Edmonton with 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group now being concentrated there. We are concerned that British Columbia, located on geological faultlines, has little helicopter support other than the limited naval resources in the province and the search and rescue helicopters based at Patricia Bay and Comox. British Columbia's location might well justify the establishment of a reserve helicopter squadron in the area, although the Commission is hesitant to recommend it on grounds of cost.

Footnotes :

14 See chapter 10, pp. 52-53.

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7 THE COMMUNICATION RESERVE

Structure and Roles

The Communication Reserve has a current strength of 2267 members distributed among 23 units across Canada. It was created in 1969, when the army declared 11 of its Militia Signals units redundant and transferred them to the Commander, Canadian Forces Communications Command. In 1994 the Communications Command was transformed into the Defence Information Services Organization (DISO), which includes the Communication Reserve. In this regard, the Commission finds it anomalous that a staff agency should have command of units.

The primary role of the Communication Reserve is to provide combat capable augmentees to meet requirements in technical and strategic command, control, and information systems missions. This role is consistent with the new mobilization policy, in that it provides individuals in small formed detachments to augment the Regular Force in the first and second stages of mobilization.

In addition to providing augmentees to the Regular Force, Communication Reserve units have taken over a number of responsibilities previously provided by Regular Force Communication Squadrons. These tasks include operating a secure message service for units in their local area and providing a communication system extension in support of regional operations.

Implementation of Total Force

Of all the components in the Reserve Force, the Communication reserve units have probably moved closest to full implementation of Total Force. Of the 23 units distributed across Canada, 10 were identified as being geographically co-located with regular units and, therefore, candidates for full integration. Among these 10 units, full integration has occurred in three locations where formerly regular units were incorporated and integrated into reserve units. We have been advised by the Senior Communication Reserve Advisor that both regular and reserve personnel involved in those units have welcomed the move to integration and would not want to return to the previous situation. It is intended that integration of the remaining seven units will proceed in the near future.

In the Total Force units recently created, every effort has been made to provide reservists with meaningful work and with positions at all rank levels. Moreover, DISO has attempted to provide equivalent Regular and Reserve Force training Standards wherever possible. These Standards are now in place for the ranks of private to master-corporal and officer cadet to lieutenant. In many cases, reserves and regulars attend the same courses. This approach not only provides standardization, but greatly strengthens working relationships.

The Communication Reserve appears to be a leader in designing its courses to be as accessible as possible to reservists with full-time job commitments. It has reorganized some courses, and is in the process of reorganizing the remainder, into ``modules,'' each of two weeks' duration, to accommodate greater reserve participation. In the view of the Senior Communication Reserve Advisor, ``this increased flexibility is critical, if we are to meet the special needs of reservists.''

Subject to what we say below about Militia Signals, we have heard no evidence to suggest that any major restructuring or changes are required in the Communication Reserve. All steps intended to

implement Total Force and to reduce overhead appear to be well under way.

Militia Signals

Since 1969 the Communication Reserve has included the reservists who used to be found in army field signals units. These personnel are required to bring Land Force Command's Regular Force field signals units, the basis for communications on exercises and in operations, to full strength. At present, LFC pays for 392 positions in the Communication Reserve, a number that should, the fiscal situation permitting, increase to allow the creation of new Militia signals units.

The present situation is anomalous. There seems little doubt in anyone's mind that LFC cannot function at maximum effectiveness if it must negotiate with DISO for its signalers; it must control the signals units it will need to function effectively in the field. This is particularly so given our recommendation to create Militia brigade groups. The other units of the Communication Reserve are increasingly and necessarily computer-driven, and are staffed for the most part by experts in advanced data processing who are removed from the problems and practices of field signalers. Still, field signalers' work is increasingly computer-based, and DISO is in this regard a source of helpful computer expertise. The answer to the field signalers' difficulties, however, lies in better recruiting and training, and in a direct chain of command between the eventual Militia signals units and LFC. Therefore:

16 The Commission recommends that command and control over the recreated Militia field signals units be returned to Land Force Command at the earliest possible time.

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8 THE SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE

The Supplementary Reserve (SR) was created as a list of personnel to be recalled in the event of general mobilization. It is divided into two parts, the Supplementary Ready Reserve (SRR) and the Supplementary Holding Reserve (SHR). The SRR is a registered manpower pool of former regulars and primary reservists who are current, qualified, and fully ready for mobilization. Alternatively, the SRR will act as a resource for the incremental staffing of the Canadian Forces in the event that the necessary skills are not available in the Regular or Primary Reserve Forces. The SRR list numbers just over 18,000 personnel and is maintained and updated by Commands, with varying degrees of care and attention.

The SHR is a list of selected individuals who have special skills or expertise of a defence/industrial nature, for which there will be a military requirement in the event of a national mobilization. The SHR list of 27,000 names is casually updated and maintained nationally and must be considered of dubious value, given the frequency with which Canadians move from house to house and city to city.

In the recent past, SRR members were entitled to be issued uniforms and were expected to report once a year for briefings, medical checks, and the updating of files and security clearances, in return for which they were paid $300. None of these entitlements and/or requirements now survive, and the 1994 White Paper on defence directed that the SRR receive ``zero funding."

We believe that the decision to limit the SRR to a list of names was penny wise and pound foolish. The SRR and the SHR are priceless resources that must not be allowed to deteriorate further. Their members are skilled officers, NCMs, and specialists who have substantial expertise in all areas needed in a national mobilization. We have repeatedly been advised that almost all members retain a keen desire to serve their country in any emergency - international, national, or local. We believe they must be encouraged to do so and that the Supplementary Reserve must be revitalized. This is especially important as the Regular and Primary Reserve Forces are being cut in strength, thus reducing the national ability to mobilize in crisis and to find individual specialists who might be in short supply in an emergency short of war. There may be no impending crisis on the horizon, but we must recall that many Canadians had a similar view in 1935, a few years before the outbreak of World War II, or at the beginning of 1990, just before the Gulf War. Therefore:

17 The Commission recommends that it be a condition of joining the Canadian Forces that all trained personnel, officers, and NCMs, regular or reserve, will be enrolled in the Supplementary Ready Reserve on leaving the Canadian Forces. After five years or at age 55, whichever is earlier, to take into account the process of aging and the ephemeral nature of military skills, all enrollees should be placed on a restructured Supplementary Holding Reserve List where they will remain until age 65. Other than the possibility of being put on active service by the Governor-in-Council, Supplementary Ready Reserve members, like those in the Supplementary Holding Reserve, have no obligation placed upon them. If a member volunteers for service, he or she is subject to the usual terms of service.

18 The Commission further recommends that personnel honourably released from the Canadian Forces retain their service uniforms.

The SRR and SHR lists should be maintained centrally at NDHQ, with sufficient priority attached to this task to ensure that the files are updated regularly and efficiently. The files should be downloaded by

geographic area to the appropriate reserve units so that SRR members will have a Militia armoury, a Naval Reserve Division, or an Air Reserve Augmentation Flight to contact them and to which they can report. Where possible, for obvious reasons, SRR members should report to the nearest unit from their own service. The local unit should have the responsibility to provide the annual briefing and to check the SRR members' addresses and any newly acquired civilian skills for transmission to NDHQ.

A properly working Supplementary Reserve list coupled with a mobilization plan could ensure a smooth transition from peace to war. SRR personnel could also be used in assistance and aid to the civil power in peacetime emergencies.

LCol J. Russ Comeau

The Commission believes that the role of the Supplementary Reserve should be to provide individual augmentation to the Canadian Forces in all phases of mobilization. During the first two phases, and until an order-in-council activates selected portions of the Supplementary Reserve, its members who are still under 55 years of age should be able to serve on a part-time or a full-time basis as required, and on a voluntary basis with a minimum of administrative impediments.

We note, by way of conclusion, that the obligation to enrol in the SRR on leaving the Canadian Forces would not be merely an academic exercise. We are advised that, in the last five years alone, some 30,000 members have left the Canadian Forces. Many, perhaps the great majority, have not joined the SRR. This rich pool of qualified personnel is now dispersed, not to say lost, with no effective means of being tapped in case of need. We believe that the recommendations made in this chapter should effectively staunch the current senseless loss of invaluable military expertise and experience.

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9 THE CANADIAN RANGERS AND THE CADET INSTRUCTOR CADRE

The Canadian Rangers

Structure and Roles

In 1942 the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were established in British Columbia and the Yukon Territory to counter the threat of possible Japanese incursion. The Rangers were irregular troops who could defend small localities until properly trained troops arrived, and who would then act as guides for those troops. By 1945 they had reached a strength of 15,000.

At the end of the war, it was decided that the Ranger concept remained valid and should be expanded to include all areas in Canada where there were no formed bodies of troops. In 1947 the Canadian Rangers were established as a separate subcomponent of the Reserve Force, and command remains centralized at National Defence Headquarters. Operational control of Canadian Rangers in the field is delegated to the Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA)15 and to the Commander of Land Force Command. There are currently 3250 Canadian Rangers. CFNA has 1190 Rangers primarily deployed in the Yukon and Northwest Territories; LFC has 2060 Rangers deployed mostly on the east and west coasts as well as in isolated areas of the provinces.

The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence that cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces in sparsely settled northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada. As they go about their normal daily activities, the Canadian Rangers report unusual activities that are out of character with the routine of the area, and they collect local data of military significance, such as the availability of local assets a military commander would likely need to conduct operations in the area. These duties are unpaid and are performed on a volunteer basis. Everything we have heard suggests that those duties are superbly handled and of genuine value to Canada and the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Rangers are paid to provide specific services. They receive remuneration when they support Canadian Forces exercises or search and rescue operations

in their area by providing advice on local conditions and expertise as guides. They are also paid when they are asked by their headquarters to conduct sovereignty or surveillance patrols, such as inspecting the North Warning Sites for bear damage.

In addition, CFNA is conducting an interesting experiment aimed at establishing a Junior Ranger program for local youth. This program is similar to the Cadet Program supported by the Canadian Forces in other areas. Local Ranger patrols would organize and train Junior Ranger patrols in their communities, and the training would emphasize local values and traditions. This trial is creating much interest and, if successful, will contribute to the social fabric of these communities and will, in time, provide excellent candidates for enrolment as Canadian Rangers. The Commission commends this initiative.

Enhancement of the Program

In response to the 1994 White Paper on defence, the Canadian Forces are planning to enhance the Rangers program and to deploy additional Rangers in the North. This initiative will address current deficiencies by providing Ranger patrols with the means to navigate with accuracy and to communicate with their home base and with headquarters. It will also provide members with accoutrements that identify them as Canadian Rangers. The Commission wishes to commend this initiative, too.

The Commission has heard evidence that supports the value of the Canadian Rangers program from an operational aspect and for its importance to isolated communities. The Commission agrees that it is cost effective, that it functions well and should continue to do so under the planned arrangements, and that it is significant in enriching the social fabric in remote areas. Therefore:

19 The Commission recommends that the Canadian Rangers Program be continued and enhanced.

We must deal briefly with a special initiative launched a few years ago to recruit aboriginals in Saskatchewan for the Canadian Forces Reserve. The Bold Eagle Program, a laudable initiative, has thus far met with very limited success, producing only a few reservists at remarkably high cost. NDHQ, however, believes that the program has improved relations with native peoples, and has recently expanded it throughout the Prairie provinces. The Commission agrees that Bold Eagle should be continued for two more years and then be closely assessed, in terms of cost per recruit. If such an assessment cannot justify its continuance, we suggest that the Canadian Rangers, a reserve component notable for its cost effectiveness and its success, be expanded southward into isolated parts of the subarctic area to absorb the Bold Eagle program. An expanded Rangers program would help the aboriginals that the Bold Eagle scheme aims to assist and would, more generally, extend the Rangers' coverage. Therefore:

20 The Commission recommends that the Bold Eagle Program be continued for two more years and then a decision be made on its continuance. If the Bold Eagle Program is discontinued, the Commission recommends that the Canadian Rangers Program (with its concept of operations and terms of service unchanged) be expanded to absorb the Bold Eagle scheme.

The Cadet Instructor Cadre

Structure and Roles

The Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) is a subcomponent of the Reserve Force. It consists of about 6000 officers who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but whose primary duty is to fulfil a youth training function in the supervision, administration, and training of cadets. They mostly perform these duties on a volunteer basis. They are paid only when they are employed in the conduct of Cadet summer camps and for a portion of their time during the rest of the year.

The Cadet Program is the only federally sponsored national youth training program for 12-to-18-year-old girls and boys in Canada. It is aimed at developing good citizenship and leadership, promoting physical fitness, and stimulating the interest of youth in the sea, land, and air activities of the Canadian Forces. The program is conducted in partnership with the Navy League, Army Cadet League, and Air Cadet League, which provide local sponsors for each corps or squadron, while DND provides Regular

Force and Primary Reserve support as well as the Cadet Instructor Cadre.

There are more than 60,000 girls and boys in the Cadet Program who benefit from the training given or organized by some 1100 cadet corps or squadrons, 610 cadet bands, 28 summer camps, gliding, sailing and land training schools and centres located across the country.

Although these [Cadet Instructor Cadre] volunteers are paid, they are paid very little for the time they put in and the pressures on them ... They are expected to be military officers, child psychologists, teachers, guidance counsellors...

The Navy League of Canada

The Canadian Forces' Chief Review Services has recently completed a comprehensive review of the Cadet Program which concluded that it is functioning as intended, with positive results. The review recommended that DND and the Canadian Forces continue to support the Cadet Program as part of their contribution to the development of youth in Canada. It also made a number of additional recommendations considered necessary to ensure an appropriate level of support and optimal resource allocation. One of those recommendations dealt with the desirability of dropping the CIC as a component of the reserves. The Commission does not support this view and believes that the CIC should remain a component of the Reserve Force. In addition, we are persuaded that a requirement exists to expand the Cadet Instructor Cadre with an NCM component. This expansion would enable the Cadet Program to benefit from the experience of reserve and regular NCM instructors, without having to commission them as officers. Therefore:

21 The Commission recommends that the Cadet Instructor Cadre remain a component of the Reserve Force, and that the desirability of expanding the CIC with an NCM component be seriously considered.

The Commission heard convincing testimony in support of the Cadet Program in its public hearings and is convinced of its value to the youth of the country. In this context, the Commission endorses the statement made in the 1994 White Paper on defence that the Cadet Program will benefit from a modest increase in departmental support, and it urges the continuation of such endeavours. Therefore:

22 The Commission recommends that the modest increase in financial support for the Cadet Program indicated in the 1994 White Paper on defence remain departmental policy.

With regard to the potential impact of the restructuring of the reserves on some of the units with which Cadet corps and squadrons are affiliated, and on whose support they are dependent, we are concerned that this support not be eroded. We urge that appropriate measures be taken so that this vital support be maintained.

The future command and control of the Cadets is unclear. At present, Cadets are administered by the nearest major headquarters in the region. For example, Maritime Command administers all Cadets in the Atlantic area, whether they are navy, land, or air. The three service commands are to return to Ottawa in 1997, and this may provide the opportunity to rationalize the administration of the Cadets. It could well

be that the best approach will be to place the Cadet Program under the direct responsibility of each sponsoring service - namely, the Sea Cadets under the Navy, the Army Cadets under the Land Force, and the Air Cadets under the Air Force. Therefore:

23 The Commission recommends that the issue of command and control as it affects the Cadet Program be reviewed.

Footnotes :

15 CFNA is a separate command responsible for the Canadian Forces in the far northern region of Canada.

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10 ADMINISTERING THE RESERVE FORCE

Recruitment

Recruitment is currently conducted by the Canadian Forces Recruiting Centres (CFRCs), which select and enrol personnel for both the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. We have heard innumerable complaints about recruitment from units and from individuals, and some reserve COs have urged that recruiting be returned to the armoury floor. We are not convinced that this is an appropriate solution.

Centralization should produce savings, and it is appropriate in the Total Force context that attempts are made to minimize the differentiation between the regular and the reserve components. The cost of securing a recruit is approximately $4500, a figure that compares satisfactorily with the American Forces' cost of between US$7000 and US$9000. None of this recruiting cost is charged to the Reserve Force budget. What is highly unsatisfactory, however, is that it takes about six months for a recruit for the Regular or the Reserve Forces to be enrolled; such a delay results in promising candidates abandoning hope and turning away disgruntled. The primary reason for the delay, we have been advised, is the ``reliability check" that must be done within the department before a recruit is enrolled.16 We agree that reliability checks are important; the delay involved, however, is unacceptable. Therefore:

24 The Commission recommends that conditional enrolment be considered, before the completion of reliability checks. It also recommends that all necessary measures be implemented to modernize and to speed up the processing time required for enrolment in the Canadian Forces, a process that should be completed within one month.

The CFRCs do send mobile recruiting teams into remote areas and to armoury floors. These are useful methods that can help to attract and to secure recruits. We believe that such efforts must be enhanced, and that the staff of the CFRCs must be prepared to work at reserve units in the evenings on a regular basis and be available to process forms and handle medical checks outside regular working hours. How else can the reserve units attract potential recruits?

There is, despite all these difficulties, no shortage of recruits for the Reserve Force. The major problem in terms of competing with alternative forms of employment, which the reserves must do to attract candidates, relates to the timeliness of pay and a guaranteed minimum of paid training days. We believe that our recommendations on the pay system and the budgeting process should deal adequately with these concerns.

Another facet of recruitment that we wish to deal with relates to increased reliance on specialists to fulfil specific, usually short-term needs, of the Regular Force. Indeed, contracting out for services is popular nowadays in government, and the military has followed suit. Thus, in respect of medical services, a study called ``Operation Phoenix" has been undertaken. Its main purpose is to see the extent to which the Regular Force could reduce its reliance on permanent medical staff and call instead on civilian specialist doctors, as the need may arise. Ultimately, this could be extended to more general medical trades, including nurses and medical assistants.

Representatives of a few medical reserve units who appeared before us seemed either unaware of Operation Phoenix or vigorously opposed to it, because they saw it as a direct attack on their own survival. The evidence seems to suggest, however, that these units had difficulty recruiting at their

approved establishment levels. In any event, their argument was that they were able to provide all the requisite services and, more to the point, that it required a special kind of military training to be able to perform the medical services needed on the battlefield.

The Commission agrees with the rationale behind Operation Phoenix - namely, that of recruiting specialists, in this case medical doctors, from the civilian workplace if and when their services are needed. There is no reason for the Regular Force to keep on staff specialists, be they doctors or other individuals with specialized skills, if their services are required only on an ad hoc basis. However, we do not believe that the Regular Force should automatically bypass reserve units when it is recruiting for its short-term specialist needs and go directly, for example, to hospitals. Specialists, be they doctors or skilled tradespersons, should be exposed to the military ethos and the basic training offered by the reserves. Therefore, while we support the initiative to recruit specialists as the needs arise rather than to keep them on a permanent roster, we believe that reserve units should be advised of the specialists that the Regular Force considers it may need from time to time. This information would provide reserve units with the opportunity, and indeed encourage them, to recruit such individuals. Thereafter, the Regular Force should always look first to reserve units to see if the specialists it requires to meet a specific need are available there. If the right person is not to be found among the reserves, then there ought to be no impediment to the Regular Force recruiting specialists directly from the civilian world. Therefore:

25 The Commission recommends that the Regular Force first attempt to meet its specialist needs by considering the availability of such individuals from the Reserve Force, and contract directly with civilians only if it has been determined that the appropriate persons cannot be found in the reserves.

One impediment to reserve units recruiting appropriately qualified civilians, however, is that military trade Standards do not necessarily match civilian qualifications, even though, in practice, both the military and the civilian person may be equally qualified. The Air Reserve, as we observed earlier, has made some progress in this regard, but it is clear that the issue of harmonizing military and civilian trade Standards is still uppermost in the minds of many reservists. It makes sense to the Commission that the Regular Force, instead of bypassing reserve units to recruit specialists when they are needed for their augmentation role, should look first to reserve units to see if those specialists are available. For this to happen, however, the units must have been able to recruit civilians by offering them professional or trade equivalencies when there is no practical difference between their existing qualifications and the work they would be called on to do within the unit or in conjunction with their augmentation role. That they retrain only to obtain the trade designation peculiar to the military does not seem cost effective. Therefore:

26 The Commission recommends that all necessary steps be taken to assist reserve units to recruit the specialists that may be needed from time to time, including maximizing the harmonization of civilian and military qualifications.

The Terms of Reference request the Commission to propose specialist functions that can be performed by the Primary Reserves. Except to the limited extent noted above, we cannot. Unlike the United States forces, which are large enough to afford a high degree of Reserve Force specialization, Canada has no such luxury. Our small Regular Force is of necessity multipurpose, and it cannot have all its specialists in any field in the Reserve Force.

Administrative Burden

Repeatedly throughout our hearings and in the written submissions that were provided to us, Militia units (as well as units from other reserve components) told us that the administrative burden put on them was overwhelming. Although we were given very few specific examples, the complaint was so pervasive that the Commission is convinced that it represents a real problem. One example we were given, however, relates to the recruitment process and suggests that 14 separate forms have to be completed by an applicant. This system seems unjusti-fiable in an era of automated data processing.

We offer the following list of routine reports and returns ... irrelevant to the reserves ... Pregnancy Report; the Qualification Status Report and Personnel Record Résumé; Semi-annual Summary of MSE Accidents; Dental Return Semi-annual; Retention in the Reserves; Drug and Alcohol Counselling Return...

Hon LCol Douglas Ludlow

The causes for this situation were variously attributed to the inherent bureaucratic nature of the military and, more specifically, to the fact that regulars were not sensitive to the part-time nature of reservists' work. Thus, what may have seemed like an acceptable administrative burden to a full-time regular member becomes, in fact, impossible to manage in the context of a part-time reserve unit.

The Commission has been advised that there is an ongoing operation, called ``Operation Red Tape,'' which is aimed at identifying and minimizing the administrative burden in the Regular Force. The Commission believes that it is imperative that this operation be extended to cover reserve units, which, perhaps more than other units, need a streamlined and efficient operation. Therefore:

27 The Commission recommends that Operation Red Tape be extended to the Primary Reserve.

Training and Equipment

Training is a critical activity of the Reserve Forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that this topic attracted comment during the course of our public hearings, particularly insofar as the Militia is concerned.

One of the first issues canvassed in relation to training was that the number of days available for training were too few. This problem related to the budgetary concerns we have already addressed.17 For example, there seems to be a consensus that the minimum individual training necessary to produce an effective Militia soldier is about 35 days; it is imperative, therefore, that the budgetary process take account of this need. Effective training is critical now that the Regular Force insists that training Standards ought to be identical for the Reserve and the Regular Forces. It would obviously be inconsistent for the Regular Force to insist on parity of Standards, yet not ensure that the necessary funds are provided.

The quality of training is also made more important by the augmentation roles given to the reserves. We have already mentioned the performance of the reserves during peacekeeping missions. Generally speaking, the evidence supported the claim that the reserves, at least after their three months' work-up

training, were roughly equivalent in effectiveness to the regulars. Indeed, the experience in UNPROFOR operations attested to the fact that there was basically no difference between the regulars and the reserves and that, after an initial period of mutual accommodation, regulars and reservists treated each other, at least at the lower rank levels, as if they were one and the same, all genuine members of Total Force.

LFC has recognized, however, that the objective of a single training standard requires means of measurement. Thus, the Warrior Program was developed to measure Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS): it provides an objective standard on the basis of which individual combat skills can be assessed, as well as providing reservists with a better focus for training. The first Warrior Program was conducted in LFCA in 1994 and, overall, proved to be a resounding success. We are given to understand that similar programs are to be implemented presently in the other areas in the country, and we strongly support this initiative.

The quality and efficiency of training is also being significantly improved by the introduction of the MTSCs mentioned earlier. The Commissioners visited the MTSC in Meaford, Ontario, and had the opportunity to see this outstanding facility and to talk to instructors and trainees. It consists of a dozen or so large buildings erected under budget between 1992 and 1995. The camp covers 7000 hectares and is designed to provide support to Militia and regular training, though primarily the former. The critical feature of this camp is its ability to take a Militia unit for weekend training and to issue its vehicles, completely ``kitted-up," in 30 to 35 minutes. The unit can return vehicles, if well organized, in the same timeframe. The maintenance operation is equally impressive, as it is able to repair everything up to and including armoured fighting vehicles. The efficiency of this operation is critical for the reserves, as it maximizes actual training, as opposed to travelling and needless waiting periods, which have been a recurring complaint. The Commissioners commend LFC for taking the initiative and encourage it to proceed with its plans to construct similar MTSCs in other areas of the country. However, there is a problem of transporting units to train in these centres, one that could possibly be addressed if the Air Reserve, as we suggested, were given transport as a specific role.18

The obvious next step is the development of collective training Standards that will allow LFC to measure the training performance of units and subunits. This measurement is necessary in determining which units should be given different taskings. Collective training Standards have recently been put in place in LFCA, and will soon be applied across the country. The Commission commends these efforts and urges that they be expedited.

Another important feature of training is to assess which courses are necessary to upgrade reservists' technical and leadership skills. A significant and repeated criticism in this regard was that the courses offered by the Regular Force were too long (sometimes six or seven weeks) for most reservists (especially those with full-time jobs) to attend. As a result, many reservists' progress through the ranks was impeded. Also, we heard several times that scheduled courses tend to be cancelled at the last minute. We have been unable, however, to verify the frequency with which this occurs.

One possible solution to the length of the training courses, assuming that they cannot be made any shorter, is to break them up into shorter segments or modules of two to three weeks. Many reservists made that suggestion, and the Commission believes it is reasonable. Indeed, this is already common in the Communication Reserve. Therefore:

28 The Commission recommends that training courses be made, insofar as possible, accessible to reservists by carving them into segments of two to three weeks.

Moreover, it was suggested that not all courses necessarily have to be taken outside the unit. With the now pervasive presence of modern computer technology, it was suggested that many technical courses could be done via terminals. This solution impresses the Commission as reasonable and efficient, and we urge that it be implemented to the maximum extent possible.

Better training would also result from integrating reservists and regulars more often and more effectively. This integration applies at all levels. For example, regulars and reservists should serve and work together in all units and at all levels of headquarters. While some integration now exists, it needs to be increased, perhaps to as much as 10 percent in all formations, regular or reserve. Other nations have done better in this respect than Canada. The Australians, for example, try to see that each regular army officer serves at some point in his or her career with the reserves. Indeed, they suggest that every officer with expec- tations of reaching high rank must ``punch his ticket" in this fashion. We agree with this approach. In war, and increasingly in peace, regulars and reserves will be required to serve together, and it has been pointed out repeatedly and convincingly to us that it requires different talents to lead reservists, who might have, for example, one or two university degrees and civilian qualifications of a high order. The more often regular officers can be exposed to the reserves the better; the reverse is equally true. Moreover, staff college courses should be more readily available to qualified reservists who are able to find time to attend. All staff courses should offer the regular officers a better exposure to the Reserve Force and to the problems that will be associated with national mobilization. We believe strongly that both regulars and reserves will benefit from such steps. Therefore:

29 The Commission recommends that reservists and regulars should serve in each other's units and formations; that regular officers should at some point in their career serve with the reserves; and that the staff colleges should provide places for reservists as well as an appropriate curriculum dealing with reserve and mobilization matters.

Another issue raised with respect to training was the lack of equipment. We were told that some soldiers had never seen, let alone trained on, the type of military hardware they are expected to handle proficiently, such as Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons. To a certain degree, this problem has been addressed by the introduction of MTSCs, where the requisite equipment is available. However, most reserve unit training is still being done locally, rather than at MTSCs, and it is there that the lack of equipment is most serious. It is obviously not necessary, in our view, that each unit should be fully equipped at all times. However, effective pooling arrangements of the necessary equipment should be made so that, within a geographical area, all units could have access to the needed equipment at regular intervals. Therefore:

30 The Commission recommendsthat the equipment required for training be identified and thatpooling arrangements be made so that units have access ‹o thatequipment on a regular basis.

Attrition

Attrition is a problem in the reserves, especially with the Militia. Obviously, statistics vary from unit to unit, but the typical annual rate of attrition is probably between 25 and 30 percent. The reasons for leaving the Militia are many. According to one study,19 the most frequently cited reasons are conflicts with one's job, educational, and family commitments, and the decision to join the Regular Force (though the latter can hardly be considered a negative). We have also heard that problems with the pay system, lack of guaranteed minimum days of employment, and unclear or unenforceable training obligations are major contributing factors. For the Militia, in contrast to the other reserve components, lack of a defined

role and inadequate training equipment have also been mentioned.

It is difficult to identify what the ``normal" or ``acceptable" rate of attrition is, although we have been told that the Canadian reserves' attrition rate is roughly comparable with that experienced in other countries. We have not been provided with comparable rates of attrition experienced by civilian part-time employers. However, it must be remembered that, in many respects, the Canadian Forces are not like a civilian employer and that an attrition rate which is slightly higher than that experienced in the civilian business world should not be of concern. Indeed, the investment made to pay a person who stays in the reserves a short time is not lost, since that individual is likely to have a heightened sense of the importance of military service. Thus, he or she will be an emissary to the community at large and will contribute to improving the communication and understanding between the civilian and the military world.

That is not to say that the attrition rates cannot be reduced. The Commission has made several recommendations in this report which should enhance the attractiveness of the reserves. They range from increased flexibility in offering training courses to some form of job protection legislation, and their effect should be to improve the retention rate in the reserves. Nonetheless, we believe that bonuses for reservists should also be considered as a means to reduce attrition further.

It costs approximately $20,000 to give a Militia recruit his or her basic military training. Costs in the other services are similar. As we have noted, attrition rates are fairly high, and one of the primary goals of the reserves must be to increase the retention rate of trained recruits so that units can move into more advanced and collective training. The Commission believes that one step towards this end would be to offer reservists a bonus when they complete their term of engagement. Thus, when a reservist completes, say, a three-year term, he or she would receive a lump sum of $2000. The United States has a similar and more generous system. For students and unemployed reservists, the bonus obviously would be most useful; for the employed reservist, it would be some recompense for the inconveniences suffered through giving up holiday time for reserve service. For the Canadian taxpayer, it would be a clear saving: the cost of the bonus is substantially less than the cost of training a new recruit. Therefore:

31 The Commission recommends that the Department of National Defence establish a trial program of engagement bonuses for a three-year period. The effect of the bonuses on recruitment and attrition rates should be carefully monitored.

Footnotes:

16 This check includes, for instance, determining whether a potential recruit has a criminal record.

17 See chapter 5, pp. 36-38.

18 See chapter 6, p. 40.

19 DND Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, ORAE Project Report No. PR415,``A Sociological Study of the Reserves: Phase Two - Factors Influencing Attrition" (April 1987).

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11 PERMEABILITY BETWEEN THE REGULAR AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

As they now exist, the Regular and the Reserve Forces are impermeable, or virtually so, one to the other. There can be no doubt that this situation helps perpetuate ``two cultures" within the Canadian Forces, and especially in the Land Force, and thus is harmful to the implemen- tation of Total Force and the national interest. It is now very difficult, thanks to administrative inertia, for a Regular Force member, retiring or leaving the service for any reason, to join a reserve unit. Until very recently, it was equally difficult for a reservist, especially an officer, to move into the Regular Force. This is neither sensible nor cost effective.

Nonetheless, the situation exists. Some reserve units look coldly on regulars seeking entry, fearful that scarce positions, in a time of extreme financial constraints and pending reductions in establishment, will go to someone not raised in the unit's traditions. Many Militia units, however, turn to the regulars for commanding officers when they are unable to find suitable candidates within their own ranks. For their part, regular units fear that reservists will not have earned their ranks and will endanger unit efficiency and morale. Although there may have been some truth to these reactions in the past, the urgent necessities of Total Force and the improved training now offered to reservists (such as the Warrior Program in Ontario and the RESO officer training program) are making the two forces more comparable and, we suggest, more compatible. To complete the process, the identical recruiting Standards for the Regular and the Reserve Forces which now exist, and the effort to move towards identical training Standards, in process now, must be maintained. We appreciate, however, that even if civilian equivalency is factored into reserve training, it will likely take more time for a reserve member to complete his or her training.

A Regular Force member who, for family, educational, or other reasons, wanted to reduce his or her commitment to the Canadian Forces for a defined period might be obliged to serve in the reserves in order to maintain his or her skills. Although there are some obvious administrative difficulties in maintaining positions on hold, in both the Regular and the Reserve Forces, while members move from one component to another, it must become possible to permit greater freedom of movement. In fact, a career path in the Canadian Forces should be a continuum, whereby an individual can switch from

the Reserve Force to the Regular Force and vice versa, with no interruption in military service, to suit his or her needs from time to time. Therefore:

32 The Commission recommends that the administrative membrane that divides the Regular and the Reserve Forces be made more permeable so as to allow consecutive and uninterrupted service between the Regular and the Reserve components of the Canadian Forces.

While the initiative to move from one component to the other should rest with the individual, the needs of the service must be the deciding factor. Nonetheless, the Commissioners believe that increased permeability between the Regular and the Reserve Forces would enhance Total Force, make the best use of scarce human resources in a time of shrinking budgets and force strength, maximize the effectiveness of training dollars, and serve national and individual needs far better than the present rigid separation.

For the concept to work, there must be full equivalency of training, qualifications, and benefits between the components. This arrangement is possible and is the ultimate answer to Total Force. Besides a

change of culture in both components, this concept would require:

Identical recruiting Standards: the integrated recruiting program, now in effect, has significantly increased the quality of recruits in the reserves.

Identical training Standards: even with civilian equivalency, it is reasonable to expect that it would take a reservist on part-time ser vice much longer to acquire the necessary level of qualifications; however, each component would be equally credible, although the Regular Force would be at a higher state of collective readiness.

Identical qualifications: in terms of training, experience, and time in rank, it is obvious that, if one aspires to senior rank, long periods of part-time service may reduce opportunities.

Identical benefits: universality of service should entitle each member to the same social and employment benefits, including participation in the *Canadian Forces Superannuation Act*.

The issues of recruiting and training Standards and of qualifications have already been touched upon in this report.20 The matter of equivalency in pay and benefits is addressed in the next chapter.

Footnotes:

20 See chapter 10, pp. 52-55.

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12 TERMS AND CLASSES OF SERVICE

Obligation to Serve

This is the only job where you can show up for work only if and when you want to...

A Reserve NCM, roundtable discussion, MTSC Meaford

During the course of our hearings, we heard several times, from both Primary Reserve unit COs and other reservists, that one of the principal problems affecting the reserves was the ease with which one could, with impunity, avoid attending regular training sessions or, alternatively, simply leave the reserves after a short period of time. In other words, there was a perceived lack of commitment from some reservists which significantly contributed to inefficient training, particularly in the Militia. In some units, attrition was so severe that recruit training had to be conducted repeatedly, with the result that there was little or no time for more advanced training.

We have observed elsewhere that there are many factors affecting attrition, including lack of equipment and pay system problems.21 However, it is clear to us that the absence of a well-understood obligation to serve and an effective enforcement mechanism are also contributing factors.

To understand the attrition problem, it is important to summarize briefly the nature of the obligations of a primary reservist. Service can be consensual or obligatory. Thus, with his or her consent, a member of the Primary Reserve may be employed with another subcomponent of the Reserve Force or with the Regular Force.22 For example, reservists serving in the former Yugoslavia are on active service, but on a voluntary or consensual basis.

Obligatory service and training can occur in the following circumstances:

Active service: The Governor-in-Council may place a member of the Primary Reserve on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time by reason of an emergency for the defence of Canada or in consequence of international obligations undertaken by Canada.23

National disaster: When the Governor-in-Council declares that a national disaster exists or is imminent, Primary Reservists are liable to be called out for that purpose.24

Aid to civil power: The Primary Reserve is liable to be called out in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or a disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress. In such event, a provincial Attorney General must formally requisition the aid of the reserve in writing to the Chief of Defence Staff or his designate.25

Training: An officer or NCM of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train in each training year on Class B Reserve Service for a period not exceeding 15 days, and on Class A Reserve Service for a period not exceeding 60 days.26

Other circumstances: Members of the Primary Reserve are required to serve without their consent in circumstances other than those previously mentioned. Pursuant to section 33(2) of the NDA, the Primary Reserve may be called out to perform any military duty other than training at such time and in such manner as prescribed by the Governor-in-Council.27

As stated earlier, it is principally the obligations with respect to training that cause difficulty. Currently, if a primary reservist should refuse to train, that person could be dismissed from the force or charged with an offence and tried in the civil courts pursuant to section 294 of the NDA. We have been told, however, that these powers have rarely, if ever, been used, as they are seen as too drastic and impractical. It has been suggested as an alternative that a contractual document be signed at the outset of the relationship between the reservist and the Canadian Forces which would spell out clearly the obligations of both parties.

The Commission believes that there is considerable merit to this suggestion. Although it is not certain that a contract of this nature would, strictly speaking, be enforceable to compel attendance, the Commission is of the view that spelling out the reservists' obligations would have the force of moral suasion and would make much clearer than they appear to be now the moral and legal obligations of primary reservists in respect of their training. Such a contract should also specify the duration of the enrolment - for example, three years. It could also provide that, as an incentive to the reservist to comply with his or her training obligations, a certain percentage of pay would be withheld until completion of basic training requirements.

Most recruits ... are students who rely on summer employment/courses and unit training during the year to earn enough money to pay for their education. If their unit cannot confirm such employment ... they will find [it] elsewhere.

CWO R.J. Duncan and CWO D. Luberti

A closely related issue is that of the number of training days that can be given to reservists. While the per diem rate of pay may not be a significant factor in retention, the total pay based on the number of days of training that the reservist will undergo is a prime consideration in leaving or staying. Reservists are willing to be paid at a lesser rate than for alternative employment, but most of them want to be assured of a minimum number of training days per year. Given the recommendations made in respect of the budgeting process, the Commission believes that reserve units will be in a position to guarantee a minimum level of employment. Therefore:

33 The Commission recommends that, on being recruited, a reservist be made to sign a clearly worded contract, setting out his or her training and other obligations and the effect on pay if these obligations are not fulfilled, and providing a commitment on behalf of the Canadian Forces to guarantee a stated minimum number of training days.

Classes of Service

Primary reservists do not all serve on the same basis. In fact, we have found that the classification system

is quite complicated, unnecessarily so. Four main classes of service currently exist:

Class A service is that of a member performing training or other duty in circumstances other than those prescribed for Class B and Class C and includes attendance at local parades, local demons-trations, or local exercises. It is usually used for short periods of reserve service with a maximum of 12 consecutive days of paid service. The member is paid a *per diem* rate from the reserve budget.

Class B service is performed by a member serving for a duration of 13 or more consecutive days of paid service in support of the Reserve Force, the Cadets, or the Regular Force. The work involved is usually in a temporary position on the instructional or administrative staff of a school conducting training, or when a member proceeds on such training or is on duties of a temporary nature when it is not practical to employ members of the Regular Force on those duties. This service is also used to provide continuous support to Reserve Headquarters units and to the Regular Force. The reservist on Class B is paid at the same rate as that which applies to Class A service, and from the same budget.

Class B annotated ``A" service involves service in established positions in support of Primary Reserve or Cadet activities. The annotation ``A" indicates that these positions must be filled by reserve personnel and that they are authorized for continuous service 365 days per year. These members are paid on the same basis as Class B reservists.

Class C service is for a member of the reserves who is on full-time service and is serving in a Regular Force position or is supernumerary to the Regular Force establishment. Members on Class C service are not restricted in the length of time they may serve, so long as the position is vacant, funding is available, and filling the position can be justified. The governing factor for Class C is the non-availability of a Regular Force member to fill the position. Class C reservists are paid at the Regular Force rate of pay from the Regular Force budget.

Despite receiving technical briefings on these matters, the Commission has not been persuaded that these distinct classes of service are necessary. They appear to have grown through historical accident and may no longer be justified. Indeed, a proposal has been made by the Director General Personnel Policy to replace these complicated classes of service with two: Periodic Reserve Service and Continuous Reserve Service. While not specifically embracing this particular proposal, the Commission supports the move to simplify the conditions and terms of service for reservists as much as possible. In particular, the Commission does not see why it should be necessary to do any more than distinguish between part-time service (reservists) and full-time service (regulars).

Pay and Benefits

There is a common perception among reservists that their benefits are significantly out of step with those afforded regular members of the Canadian Forces. In fact, for the most part, the benefits packages are comparable, although there are a few instances in which they are not. For example:

Reservists are not entitled to participate in the *Canadian Forces Superannuation Act*, and therefore even those who accu-mulate considerable periods of continuous service are not eligible for a pension.

A reservist who joins the public service, unlike a regular, can get his or her reserve service recognized for the purpose of elective contribution to the pension plan only if he or she has had a period of continuous service for at least six months.

A Reserve Force retirement allowance, similar to the Regular Force severance pay, was approved by the Treasury Board, but its implementation has been delayed by the federal wage restraint legislation.28 This is unfortunate, particularly as we are advised that a pension plan for part-time public service employees was implemented notwithstanding this legislation.

There is no vacation pay for Class A service, contrary to the practice for part-time workers in the public service and the private sector.

In our view, the personnel policies of the Total Force should ensure fair and equitable treatment of the members of each component. Therefore:

34 The Commission recommends that, everything else being equal, reservists should receive identical or equivalent benefits to those provided to regulars.

Apart from the issue of benefits, the amount of reservist pay remains a problem. Students faced with rising tuition costs need more money and, in a troubled economy, unemployed Canadians often use the reserves as a source of much needed income. Unfortunately, government legislation precludes us from recommending a raise in reserve pay until 1997. Even so, there are inequities in the reserve pay scales that cry out for immediate correction. The Department of National Defence states that reservists should be paid at 85 percent of the regular rate for their rank, a differential we accept given the ``unlimited liability'' that regulars face and NDHQ's right to post them anywhere without their consent. But some ranks, especially junior NCMs, are paid substantially less. A corporal, for example, receives 67.7 percent of the Regular Force basic rate of pay, while a 2nd Lieutenant gets only 72.7 percent. On the other hand, entry level reserve privates are paid substantially more than their regular counterparts, ostensibly because this incentive is necessary to compete with civilian part-time employers. We cannot comment on the necessity or wisdom of paying some reservists more than the 85 percent level discussed above, but we believe that so doing should never result in reductions below that level for the other reserve ranks. Therefore:

35 The Commission recommends that the Department of National Defence take immediate steps to establish reserve pay at a minimum of 85 percent of the regular pay scale for each rank.

One final point about reservist pay. We mentioned above that reservists were unhappy that they were ordinarily reduced a rank on peacekeeping duties; there is little doubt that the reduction in pay involved in rank reduction compounded the hurt. There is, however, a rationale for such reductions based on lack of experience to fill a particular position compared with regulars. There is no such rationale for rank reduction for Class C service in Canada by reservists. The Commission has learned that this reduction frequently occurs - for example, at NDHQ. Such reductions constitute rank discrimination, in both senses of the phrase, and are completely unacceptable if Total Force is to mean what it must. Therefore:

36 The Commission recommends that reservists on Class C service within Canada should not serve at or be paid less than their Reserve Force rank when they fill a position appropriate to that rank.

Increased Commitment for RETP Graduates

Although it has been in abeyance while the Royal Military College (RMC) absorbs cadets from the Collège Militaire Royal and Royal Roads, both now shut down, the Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP)

is a most worthwhile scheme that permits young men and women to attend RMC by paying a small tuition fee (in its last year of operation, $1631 a year). RETP cadets pay $425 a month for rations and quarters, and are paid during their summer training periods at a rate of $58 per day. These cadets sign an undertaking to serve in the Primary Reserve for five years after graduation or, if unable to serve for unforeseen reasons, to transfer to the Supplementary Reserve and to remain available for Primary Reserve service. We have been advised that many, but far from all, do so serve. We have also learned that some reserve units, either because their officer positions are at full strength or for other more parochial reasons, prove unreceptive to applications from RETP graduates.

Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) graduates are required to serve for five years in the Regular Force. They pay no tuition at RMC or other universities (where the average annual cost for tuition and books is $3000), are paid $30 a day, and are charged $260 a month for rations and quarters during their time in the ROTP. Those who complete their service then have no obligation to serve in the Primary Reserves.

The Commissioners believe that RETP graduates, individuals who have benefited from increasingly expensive, first-class educations, largely at public expense, should be required to serve in the Primary Reserve. The Commissioners also believe that such a requirement will enhance the capabilities of the reserves by infusing them with individuals with hard-earned skills.

The Commissioners further consider that ROTP cadets who exercise their option to leave the Canadian Forces after five years of Regular Force service should be *encouraged as strongly as possible* to join the Primary Reserves. We have recommended elsewhere that retiring Regular Force personnel be required to join the Supplementary Ready Reserve; this will, of course, also apply to ROTP graduates.

We realize that there will be administrative difficulties aplenty in ensuring that places can be found in useful reserve naval, air, and Militia employment for RETP and ROTP graduates. It is also impossible to require that RETP graduates reside in a location with or near a reserve unit that can make use of their services. We are sensitive to these arguments, but we nonetheless believe that both the cost and the value of a university education in the 1990s is continually increasing, that RETP candidates received good pay in training and heavily subsidized university education, and that the military skills acquired by RETP graduates ought not to be lost to the nation and the Canadian Forces. Therefore:

37 The Commission recommends that, for RETP graduates, the required term of Primary Reserve service ought to be five years in the first 10 years after graduation. If such service is not secured, then all the real cost of the education received should be treated as a repayable loan.

The Commission believes that other valuable and expensive training provided by the Canadian Forces should entail an obligation on the part of the reservist who benefits from it to stay in the reserves for an agreed period following these courses. The Commission urges the Department of National Defence to identify the courses which are most likely to be of utility in the civilian community and to consider developing a system whereby service obligations would follow on completion of such courses.

Footnotes :

21 See chapter 10, p.57., and chapter 13, p.66.

22 QR&O 9.05.

23 NDA, section 31(1).

24 NDA, section 34(2).

25 NDA, sections 275 and 277.

26 NDA, section 33(2)(b), and QR&O 9.04(2).

27 NDA, section 33(2), and QR&O 1.02 and 9.04(3)

28 Public Sector Compensation Act.

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13 RESERVE PAY SYSTEM

The most pervasive, oft-repeated complaint we heard during the public hearing process had nothing to do with reserve structure or military roles. Indeed, it related to a fundamental problem that demands immediate and practical solutions: the pay system for the reserves.

Over and over again, the Commission was told that reservists frequently went unpaid for many months or, that when they were paid, the amount was inaccurate and had to be reprocessed. This problem apparently has prevailed for several years. At present, two pay systems are operative and a third is being developed:

The Reserve Data System (RDS)

> While the RDS is a proven pay system, it does not provide the necessary budget control information and is so unresponsive to changes that it is not unusual for recruits and transferred personnel to be paid months in arrears. It is labour intensive, antiquated, and the manufacturer has announced that he will no longer be able to maintain the system in the near future. RDS is currently used in all areas of the country except the Atlantic provinces.

The Interim Reserve Pay and Personnel System (IRPPS)

> The development of this system was initiated in 1990, but was not implemented until 1994. It was designed around an ``off the shelf'' commercial pay system as a quick fix to manage reserve pay and personnel information, pending the development of a permanent replacement for the RDS. The IRPPS has been plagued by software development and other problems that have caused major delays in its implementation. When it was finally fielded in LFAA in 1994, the resulting inaccuracies had such a negative effect on morale that field commanders recommended that the system bediscarded.

The Reserve Integrated Information Program (RIIP)

> RIIP is a major project aimed at providing the reserves with an automated information system to manage training, administration, personnel, pay, and logistics. It is expected that the system will significantly enhance the efficiency of the reserves by freeing personnel from manual, paper-based processes and will save valuable manpower and resources. The project appears to be managed by a strong team that is confident it can meet its target of fielding the project by mid-1998.

Although the Commission spent many hours hearing evidence on the pay system and benefited from technical briefings i its effort to ascertain the causes of the problems, it could not obtain a complete answer as to why the IRPPS system could not be fixed. It appears that some of the initial software design was inappropriate, and it has not been possible to resolve the resulting difficulties completely, notwithstanding the obvious efforts that have been made since the inception of IRPPS. Part of the problem with IRPPS is that, instead of being limited to pay issues, it is also being used as a personnel information management system.

The Commission strongly believes that this situation is completely unacceptable. Indeed, it is incomprehensible that the Canadian Forces cannot, in 1995, pay its people in a timely and accurate

manner. We know that many multinational organizations throughout the world have thousands of part-time employees and yet are able to pay them properly. Similarly, we have been told that Australian reservists are paid on time, notwithstanding challenges of geography and dispersion similar to Canada's.

Of all the factors that contribute to attrition and dissatisfaction in the reserves, the Commission is convinced that the consistent inability of the forces to pay reservists accurately and in a timely way is one of the most important. Given the inherent lack of predictability in reserve employment, the problem is exacerbated when new recruits are told that they cannot be sure of the number of days they might be employed during the year, and that it is not certain they will be paid correctly on time.

The Commission is of the view that a solution must be found to this problem *immediately*. To do so, it may be necessary to make special arrangements with banks or, alternatively, to give unit commanders authority to pay their troops directly by hand until the appropriate software can be devised and tested. If, for any reason, this solution should entail new costs, the Commission believes that they should not be defrayed out of the budget allocated to the reserves. Therefore:

38 The Commission recommends that a revised pay system be implemented immediately, and that any incremental funds required to do so not be drawn from the reserve budget.

It is imperative that the RIIP system become available as soon as possible. Yet its speedy development has been stymied by recurring uncertainty about its ongoing funding. In our view, it is critical that appropriate funding be confirmed, assuming, of course, that the viability of this system continues to justify it. Whenever RIIP is ready to be implemented, it must be introduced without jeopardizing the necessity of paying reservists regularly and accurately. Accordingly, before implementing RIIP:

39 The Commission recommends that the revised pay system be continued in parallel, until it is proven that RIIP operates satisfactorily.

Moreover, in the context of Total Force, the Commission believes that distinct pay and personnel systems unnecessarily contribute to the ``two cultures" we discussed earlier. When reservists see that regulars are not affected by the same pay problems they experience, the differences between the two components are exacerbated. Therefore:

40 The Commission recommends that NDHQ consider totally integrating the pay and personnel systems for the Reserve Force and the Regular Force.

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14 JOB PROTECTION LEGISLATION

During World War II, job protection was first provided by an order-in-council enacted pursuant to the *War Measures Act* in 1941. There followed various other Acts and Orders-in-council, and they were all replaced by the Civil Employment Act of 1946. During the Korean War, an order-in-council was passed which was subsequently replaced by the *Veterans' Benefits Act*, 1951, which made the reinstatement provisions of the *Civil Employment Act*, 1946, applicable to Korean veterans.

Today, however, Canada has no standing job protection legislation for reservists who serve in the military, either in respect to their normal training duties or when they voluntarily choose to assist in Canada's international commitments, or even if they are called out for the reasons permitted under the *National Defence Act*. This stands in stark contrast, for example, to the situation that prevails in the United States.29

The need for job protection legislation figured prominently throughout the public hearings held by the Commission. Such legislation was essentially understood to permit a reservist some time off (in addition to his or her vacation and sick leave) to attend to Reserve Force training commitments and, with respect to longer absences, to be guaranteed the same job or a similar job on return to employment.

In the current environment, the issue arises in two basic contexts. First, reservists who have full-time civilian employment are typically obliged to use their allotted holidays for their regular training duties in the summer or to attend courses to progress through the ranks of the reserves. Secondly, reservists who might wish to go on a UN tour of duty, a commitment that requires one year in time, obviously have to secure their employer's permission to absent themselves from work - and this approval is often very difficult to secure.

Concerns were expressed, notably by the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CFLC), that job protection legislation may not be necessary and, indeed, might be detrimental. The CFLC was formed a few years ago, with financial support from the Canadian Forces, to encourage employers on a voluntary basis to support the activities of the reserves. The work done by the CFLC is considerable and has been of great assistance. The CFLC and others insist that, as there is no shortage of reserve applicants, legislation is not required. It is also suggested that the enactment of job protectio n legislation could lead to indirect discrimination at the time of hiring, as an employer, faced with two similarly qualified candidates, would tend to choose the one without reserve obligations.

The Commission has heard, however, that the reach of the CFLC in the employer community is relatively limited. In particular, the actual employers for whom the majority of reservists work have not been reached, and in the Atlantic provinces and in the West, the CFLC apparently has made little headway. Indeed, while the CFLC states that it has more than 1800 ``known supporters," only 195 of these have filed their military leave policies with the CFLC. It is obvious, therefore, that relatively few Canadian employers can actually be counted on to permit reservists time off to train and/or participate in long-term operations.

The Canadian reservist, unlike his American counterpart or a pregnant mother, has almost no protection for his job, so that he will usually be taking a big risk employment-wise when he serves his

country.

Certain Officers and NCMs of The Royal Montreal Regiment

Another weakness of the present purely voluntary system is that if the CFLC or a unit CO fails to persuade an employer to release an employee for the requisite period of time, there is no redress mechanism for the reservist involved: his or her only choices are to quit the job, abandon the Reserve Force, or forgo the appointment.

The Commission views the desire to join the Reserve Force more in the nature of a right than a whim. In that light, we do not consider that a reservist's ability to join the reserves or fulfil his or her military commitments should depend on the size of the company or on whether the employer has joined the CFLC - matters that are totally outside an employee's control.

In the Commission's view, the purpose of job protection legislation is twofold. First, it would send a message to all employers in Canada, regardless of their size, that reserve service is valued by Canadians as a whole and is a national interest worth enhancing. In this regard, it is no different from society's interest in the family, for example, which is protected by statutorily mandated pregnancy leave legislation across the country.

Another example is the legislative protection afforded employees called to perform jury duty. Thus, the *Juries Act* in Ontario requires an employer to allow an employee chosen for jury service to fulfil that obligation. Indeed, it is an offence for an employer to penalize an employee in any fashion whatsoever as a result of jury service. Further, an employer must reinstate the employee in his or her original job with the same wages or, if that job no longer exists, in a comparable position. This obligation applies, regardless of the size of the employer.

The second and most important purpose of job protection legislation is to make it possible for working Canadians to become members of the reserves. We have noted, as did the Auditor General in his 1992 report, that a significant number of reservists are students or unemployed. The Commission believes that it is important to encourage as many people who have full-time employment as possible to join the reserves. This could bring to the reserves more persons with valuable skills and talents, be they leadership, management, or technical.

With regard to the fear of discrimination, the Commission has heard no evidence to suggest that it is warranted, although it concedes that the possibility may exist. In any event, this possible problem may be readily addressed by making it an offence to discriminate on that basis, as is commonly done when the fear of discrimination on any ground exists. In this context, the Commission notes that, with virtual unanimity, reservists supported the enactment of job protection legislation regardless of the possibility of discrimination.

Accordingly, the Commission believes that job protection legislation should be enacted. Such legislation, however, should not be conceived as being coercive only. Indeed, the Commission believes that mechanisms should be put in place to assist employers in complying with the legislation's provisions. For example, employees ought to be obliged to give as much notice as possible of the need to absent themselves from work; if any differences occur between the employee and the employer, a mediator could be used to resolve the differences. In this regard, the CFLC, or a similar organization, could be

appointed under the aegis of the legislation to mediate the differences.

Further, the financial liability of employers should be strictly limited. Thus, while the Commission is of the view that an employee should not have to use his or her holiday to attend summer training, thus sacrificing valuable family time, it may not be reasonable to force the employer to fund an additional two weeks for this purpose. It would seem to us more reasonable that an employer be obliged to allow an additional two weeks per year without pay or, possibly, with pay, in return for some form of compensation from the government, perhaps by way of tax credits.

With regard to longer-term absences, such as UN tours of duty, the Commission understands that for some (particularly small) employers, it may be impossible to part with a valuable employee and, therefore, that it would be unreasonable to include inflexible obligations to allow for term leaves of absence. But the obligation should and can exist requiring the employer to demonstrate that, on reasonable notice from the employee, he or she has taken all reasonable measures to accommodate the reservist's request. Similar duties of accommodation already exist in human rights legislation across the country.

In practice, job protection legislation would not affect many employers across Canada, because the reserves are relatively small: there are only a few thousand reservists with full-time employment. While this number, we hope, will increase as a result of such legal reform, it is unlikely to reach anything beyond a small percentage of our working population. This means that, on the whole, the disturbance to employers would be relatively minor.

The Commission notes that there may be a question of the federal Parliament's constitutional authority to enact such legislation for all Canadians and that, therefore, discussions with provincial representatives may be appropriate. However, the federal Parliament should at least set the example and adopt job protection legislation to cover all employees over which it clearly has jurisdiction. In this connection, we note that we have frequently been told that the federal government has often been recalcitrant in voluntarily affording time off to those of its employees who wished to serve in the Reserve Force, despite the existence of policies supporting the reserves. We think this attitude is completely unacceptable and urge the government to exhort all its departments to support the reserves unconditionally, pending the adoption of job protection legislation.

Finally, we believe that a debate on job protection legislation for reservists, regardless of its ultimate outcome, would at least engage the public in a most important, yet too often ignored, aspect of our collective lives - namely, the invaluable contribution reservists make to this country's current and future well-being. Therefore:

41 The Commission recommends that job protection legislation be drafted and presented to Parliament as soon as possible. The bill should address, at a minimum, providing additional time (with or without pay) for reserve training, as well as obliging an employer to accommodate, if reasonably possible, a reservist's request for longer-term leave (without pay) for the purpose of participating in Canadian Forces operations.

Footnotes:

29 Pursuant to the Uniformed Service Employment and Re-employment Rights Act of 1994, individuals

may be absent for military duty for five years and retain ``re-employment rights" - that is, to be re-employed in the job that they would have attained has they not been absent on military service, with the same seniority, status, and pay, as well as other rights and benefits determined by seniority.

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AFTERWORD

The Commissioners are convinced that if the Reserve Forces are to survive, as they must, then the changes we propose are absolutely necessary. The reserves have an important role in Canada and that role must be protected. The changes in structure and organization we have recommended will, we firmly believe, do just that. They should also enhance operational effectiveness for present-day demands, maintain the presence of the military across the land, and provide a firm base from which any future mobilization can be launched and sustained.

The Commissioners understand all too well that some historic and honoured units may face wrenching changes and that armouries may be closed as a result of our recommendations. We regret the fiscal and operational necessities that have led us to these conclusions, but they could not be avoided.

Change is never easy at the best of times, and these are not the best of times. We know that the Naval Reserve, the Militia, the Air Reserve, the Communication Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Canadian Rangers, and the Cadet Instructor Cadre will continue to function as much valued components of the Canadian Forces. Within the guidelines given to us, our task was to ensure that they can do so.

To this end, we believe that the implement-ation of the recommendations contained in this report should be closely monitored. First, it might well be useful for a senior officer, serving or retired, to be given responsibility for pressing the recommendations forward. There should also be a monitoring group, located in the Chief of Reserves and Cadets' office and responsible to him, to verify the application of policies, to facilitate coordination between components and staffing agencies at NDHQ, and to bring problems to the attention of the appropriate commands. The present Directorate of Reserves, if reorganized on a functional basis and staffed with recently retired unit COs, could fill this role.

Ultimately, however, the real test of the recommendations in this report will be the response they receive from reservists, junior and senior. Taken as a whole, the Commission's report has tried to deal with the situation we found in the various components of the Canadian Forces, to treat the problems, and to reinforce the successes.

At the conclusion of our task, we have come to this realization: broad as it was, our mandate was also in a sense too narrow. Indeed, so intertwined are the regular and reserve components of the Canadian Forces (not to mention the complex relationship between the Canadian Forces and the civilian establishment of the Department of National Defence) that at times we felt we were studying only one slice of a much larger and costlier apple. Certainly, reservists seemed to agree with this view. In the context of Total Force, it seems to us somewhat incongruous to study one component of the Canadian Forces and to recommend fundamental changes to its structure, as if they would have no impact on the Regular Force, or as if changes now under way in the Regular Force might not affect the reserves. Accordingly, we urge the Minister of National Defence to consider the creation of a special commission with the widest possible mandate to examine the administration and structure of the Canadian Forces and the civilian component of the Department of National Defence.

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CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 3: FUNDAMENTAL ROLES OF THE PRIMARY RESERVE

Augmentation

1 The Commission recommends that Militia units selected by Area commanders be asked to provide formed platoons and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Force units proceeding on peacekeeping duties.

2 The Commission further recommends that, on United Nations and other operations, junior Militia officers, wherever practical, be employed in command of troops rather than as liaison officers or in other staff positions, as now frequently occurs.

3 The Commission recommends that all reservists returning from overseas service be entitled to an immediate disembarkation leave of two weeks, as at present, followed by six weeks of paid employment and screening with the unit with which they served.

Basis for Mobilization

4 The Commission recommends that a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.

5 The Commission recommends that the definition of stages 3 and 4 in the four-phase mobilization scheme set out in the 1994 White Paper on defence be amended immediately to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment, training, and the provision of formed units required in the event of a major conflict.

CHAPTER 5: THE MILITIA

Revised Structure

6 The Commission recommends that the Districts be eliminated and that they be replaced by seven Militia brigade groups, each commanded by an officer in the rank of Colonel.

7 The Commission recommends that the four existing Area Headquarters be retained, but reorganized as and renamed Divisional Headquarters.

Organization

8 The Commission recommends, in determining the relative viability of existing Militia units, that the following factors, to be applied in the context of the reduced Militia paid ceiling of 14,500 and the revised Militia structure incorporating seven brigade headquarters, must be taken into account in this order of priority:

(a)Operational Requirements
While the unit must be prepared to meet its mobilization tasks in phases 3 and 4, it must also be

prepared - and have demonstrated its capability - to provide augmentees to meet the demands of the present situation.

(b)Capacity to Recruit and Retain Effective Strength
Over time (say, the last five years), the unit must have demonstrated its ability to recruit effectively and to retain its personnel at or near its paid ceiling. In demographic terms, it must also have access to a nearby pool of potential recruits or be willing to relocate.

(c)Capacity to Train Individually and Collectively
The unit must have demonstrated that it can train effectively and that its personnel can qualify in high percentages on the Individual Battle Training Standards and perform with reasonable effectiveness in collective (platoon and company) exercises.

(d) Regular Force Support
The unit must have demonstrated its ability to make effective use of Regular Force support in training.

(e) Cost Effectiveness
The unit must have demonstrated the ability to manage its personnel, operating, and maintenance budgets effectively.

(f) Historical Performance and Battle Honours
The unit record in war and peace should be considered, so as to reinforce success.

(g) Footprint and Link to the Community
The unit must be geographically located so as to serve as a link between the military and the general population. It must also enjoy the support of the community in which it functions.

9 The Commission recommends that Total Army Establishment be put in place, and that LFC Headquarters make every effort to disseminate information to units in order to correct the misinformation that surrounds this project.

Restructuring Process

10 The Commission recommends the following restructuring process:

That LFC direct the Area Commanders to plan their internal restructuring using the following guidelines:

(1) Each Land Force Area will cut its paid ceiling by approximately 25 percent, so as to move from the current paid ceiling to a new paid ceiling of 14,500 by April 1, 1999.

(2) Militia brigade groups, in terms of numbers of units, will be organized with some discretion within each Area.

(3) Units will be structured to conform to Total Army Establishment with a minimum of overhead. Each unit must constitute an effective training vehicle.

(4) Existing units that might be amalgamated or relegated to the Supplementary Order of Battle in this restructuring process should be, wherever practical, assigned a role in phase 4 of the mobilization

plan.

(5)The number of armouries will be reduced to the minimum required to support the new Militia structure, with due regard being paid to cost-benefit analyses, heritage properties, sale of land and buildings where this can be done advan-tageously, and the urban transportation networks in the large cities. The armoury reductions might necessitate sharing of facilities by units and even by different elements of the reserves, wherever this use proves economical.

(6) The restructuring process will commence no later than the beginning of April 1996.

(7) Currently serving reservists will be direct and effective participants in the formulation of the Area plans for restructuring. The Militia, in other words, must be actively involved in determining which units remain.

LFC HQ will review the Area submissions, and present its recommendations to Armed Forces Council and the Defence Council for approval no later than July 1, 1996.

Budgeting Process: Personnel, Operations and Maintenance

11 The Commission recommends that every Militia unit should be guaranteed funding of four days per month for each of its effective members to receive the required training for the September-to-May period. The unit must devote these funds entirely and directly to training its members.

12 The Commission also recommends that the level of funding necessary to exercise command, control, and administration of units be quantified, and that units be funded accordingly.

13 The Commission further recommends that any delegation of tasks to units (such as collective training) be accompanied by the funds necessary to execute the tasks.

14 The Commission recommends that increased authority and flexibility be delegated to reserve units to manage the operations and maintenance costs of their units and their infrastructure.

CHAPTER 6: THE AIR RESERVE

Contingency Support Wing

15 The Commission recommends that the establishment of new Contingency Support Wing units be reviewed so that redundant Militia units, if properly sited or willing to relocate, can be considered for CSW roles.

CHAPTER 7: THE COMMUNICATION RESERVE

Militia Signals

16 The Commission recommends that command and control over the recreated Militia field signals units be returned to Land Force Command at the earliest possible time.

CHAPTER 8:THE SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE

17 The Commission recommends that it be a condition of joining the Canadian Forces that all trained personnel, officers, and NCMs, regular or reserve, will be enrolled in the Supplementary Ready Reserve on leaving the Canadian Forces. After five years or at age 55, whichever is earlier, to take into account the process of aging and the ephemeral nature of military skills, all enrollees should be placed on a restructured Supplementary Holding Reserve List where they will remain until age 65. Other than the possibility of being put on active service by the Governor-in-Council, Supplementary Ready Reserve members, like those in the Supplementary Holding Reserve, have no obligation placed upon them. If a member volunteers for service, he or she is subject to the usual terms of service.

18 The Commission further recommends that personnel honourably released from the Canadian Forces retain their service uniforms.

CHAPTER 9: THE CANADIAN RANGERS AND THE CADET INSTRUCTOR CADRE

The Canadian Rangers

Enhancement of the Program

19 The Commission recommends that the Canadian Rangers Program be continued and enhanced.

20 The Commission recommends that the Bold Eagle Program be continued for two more years and then a decision be made on its continuance. If the Bold Eagle Program is discontinued, the Commission recommends that the Canadian Rangers Program (with its concept of operations and terms of service unchanged) be expanded to absorb the Bold Eagle scheme.

The Cadet Instructor Cadre

Structure and Roles

21 The Commission recommends that the Cadet Instructor Cadre remain a component of the Reserve Force, and that the desirability of expanding the CIC with an NCM component be seriously considered.

22 The Commission recommends that the modest increase in financial support for the Cadet Program indicated in the 1994 White Paper on defence remain departmental policy.

23 The Commission recommends that the issue of command and control as it affects the Cadet Program be reviewed.

CHAPTER 10: ADMINISTERING THE RESERVE FORCE

Recruitment

24 The Commission recommends that conditional enrolment be considered, before the completion of reliability checks. It also recommends that all necessary measures be implemented to modernize and to

speed up the processing time required for enrolment in the Canadian Forces, a process that should be completed within one month.

25 The Commission recommends that the Regular Force first attempt to meet its specialist needs by considering the availability of such individuals from the Reserve Force, and contract directly with civilians only if it has been determined that the appropriate persons cannot be found in the reserves.

26 The Commission recommends that all necessary steps be taken to assist reserve units to recruit the specialists that may be needed from time to time, including maximizing the harmonization of civilian and military qualifications.

Administrative Burden

27 The Commission recommends that Operation Red Tape be extended to the Primary Reserve.

Training and Equipment

28 The Commission recommends that training courses be made, insofar as possible, accessible to reservists by carving them into segments of two to three weeks.

29 The Commission recommends that reservists and regulars should serve in each other's units and formations; that regular officers should at some point in their career serve with the reserves; and that the staff colleges should provide places for reservists as well as an appropriate curriculum dealing with reserve and mobilization matters.

30 The Commission recommends that the equipment required for training be identified and that pooling arrangements be made so that units have access to that equipment on a regular basis.

Attrition

31 The Commission recommends that the Department of National Defence establish a trial program of engagement bonuses for a three-year period. The effect of the bonuses on recruitment and attrition rates should be carefully monitored.

CHAPTER 11: PERMEABILITY BETWEEN THE REGULAR AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

32 The Commission recommends that the administrative membrane that divides the Regular and the Reserve Forces be made more permeable so as to allow consecutive and uninterrupted service between the Regular and the Reserve components of the Canadian Forces.

CHAPTER 12: TERMS AND CLASSES OF SERVICE

Obligation to Serve

33 The Commission recommends that, on being recruited, a reservist be made to sign a clearly worded contract, setting out his or her training and other obligations and the effect on pay if these obligations are not fulfilled, and providing a commitment on behalf of the Canadian Forces to guarantee a stated

minimum number of training days.

Pay and Benefits

34 The Commission recommends that, everything else being equal, reservists should receive identical or equivalent benefits to those provided to regulars.

35 The Commission recommends that the Department of National Defence take immediate steps to establish reserve pay at a minimum of 85 percent of the regular pay scale for each rank.

36 The Commission recommends that reservists on Class C service within Canada should not serve at or be paid less than their reserve force rank when they fill a position appropriate to that rank.

Increased Commitment for RETP Graduates

37 The Commission recommends that, for RETP graduates, the required term of Primary Reserve service ought to be five years in the first 10 years after graduation. If such service is not secured, then all the real cost of the education received should be treated as a repayable loan.

CHAPTER 13: RESERVE PAY SYSTEM

38 The Commission recommends that a revised pay system be implemented immediately, and that any incremental funds required to do so not be drawn from the reserve budget.

39 The Commission recommends that the revised pay system be continued in parallel, until it is proven that RIIP operates satisfactorily.

40 The Commission recommends that NDHQ consider totally integrating the pay and personnel systems for the Reserve Force and the Regular Force.

CHAPTER 14: JOB PROTECTION LEGISLATION

41 The Commission recommends that job protection legislation be drafted and presented to Parliament as soon as possible. The bill should address, at a minimum, providing additional time (with or without pay) for reserve training, as well as obliging an employer to accommodate, if reasonably possible, a reservist's request for longer-term leave (without pay) for the purpose of participating in Canadian Forces operations.

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APPENDIX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE SPECIAL COMMISSION FORMED TO STUDY THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE RESERVES

BACKGROUND

Changes in the global strategic environment have dictated a number of changes in Canada's defence posture. The recent Defence White Paper provided the policy basis for many of the initiatives that will be needed, while details and program amendments will emerge as part of Budget 95 and in other Departmental documents. One of the most pressing problems noted in the White Paper is the need to restructure Canada's Reserve Forces, notably the Militia, with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to the requirements of the new global strategic environment. The White Paper noted:

the need for a greater proportion of the Reserve's resources to go towards improving operational capability and availability;

the need to consider assigning more service support roles to the Reserves; and

the need to maintain the traditions of Reserve Forces and their links to community and history that make them so important a bridge between the Canadian Forces and the people they serve.

In addition, studies by the Auditor General and others have indicated that shortcomings exist in the organization and management of the Reserves and that, in the view of many, the Department of National Defence does not get full ``value for money'' for the funds spent on Primary and Supplementary Reserves. Given the difficult state of the nation's finances, it is essential that inefficiencies are eliminated and that Reserve funding, like other defence expenditures, be carefully reviewed to ensure its continued value and relevance.

This is not to say that the Reserves are not contributing to the operational effectiveness of the CF. Many managerial improvements have been made since the report of the Auditor General, and additional administrative efficiencies are being implemented. Reservists are serving overseas in large numbers and proving to be excellent servicemen and servicewomen. Nevertheless, the scope of changes in defence policy and resource allocations dictate that all elements of the CF, including the Reserves, be subject to a searching review.

To ensure a broad based study of the future Reserve posture, the Minister of National Defence (MND) recently announced his decision to convene a special Commission on the Reserves, to be chaired by a civilian. The Commission, to which these Terms of Reference apply, is charged with developing and recommending the Government's options for adapting the structure and employment of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves to changed circumstances, and making recommendations to the MND. Before taking a decision, the MND will refer the report to the House of Commons through the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs. Recommendations regarding enhancements to the Cadet program and the Canadian Rangers are not part of the Commission's specific mandate; however, neither is the Commission precluded from commenting in these areas should it deem this appropriate.

MOBILIZATION POLICY

The White Paper announced the Government's intention to introduce a new four-stage framework for mobilization planning, a change which will provide for a graduated and orderly transition from peacetime operations to higher levels of involvement, and ultimately to total national mobilization. Mobilization plans are being revised in accordance with the new conceptual framework and the Reserve structure and tasks will need to be adjusted to conform with these new plans. The four-stage framework envisaged in the new policy is as follows:

Force Generation. The first stage of a response to any crisis or emergency will involve ``force generation" - that is, all measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake new operational tasks, and to sustain and support them. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces. They will include the training and preparation of volunteer reservists to augment the Regular Force.

Force Enhancement. The second stage, ``force enhancement", will involve the improvement of the operational capabilities of the existing forces through the allocation of more resources. Such action will be undertaken without permanent change in the structure or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements may prove necessary. This level of mobilization would be similar to action taken in response to the 1990 war in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments.

Force Expansion. The third stage, ``force expansion", will involve the enlargement o the Canadian Forces - and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence - to meet a major crisis or emergency. It will likely involve permanent changes in the roles, structures and taskings of the Canadian Forces and could call for the formation of new units, the enhancement of existing facilities and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage is similar to the structural and role changes undergone by all elements of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence in 1950-1952, when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations' multinational force in Korea, and to the then newly formed NATO in Europe.

National Mobilization. Finally, while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready ``no-cost" plans for total national mobilization. This fourth stage could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a war emergency under the Emergencies Act.

TOWARDS A NEW RESERVE POSTURE

The overriding criterion for review and restructuring the Reserves must be to maximize operational and cost-effectiveness. The roles, missions, tasks and structures of both the Primary and Supplementary Reserves must be revised to complement the force structure, missions and tasks of Regular Force elements, while maintaining a community- based posture. The general restructuring guidelines are as follows:

Reservists are essentially part-time servicemen and servicewomen.

The Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve are to be structured to provide a greater contribution to existing operational commitments. The various elements of the Primary Reserve support different Regular Force missions, and hence different organizational and managerial approaches may be necessary.

The structure of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve is to be fully compatible with the new mobilization concept. However, given resource limitations, any capability beyond that required for ``force enhancement" will have to be achieved at nominal cost.

The review must address ways whereby the Primary Reserve command, control and admin-istrative and support ``overhead" can be reduced. Command and control elements are to be streamlined and officer/NCM ratios reviewed, with the goal of reducing command and control elements to the level consistent with operational and administrative requirements.

The new Reserve structure must be compatible with the Total Force concept.

Consideration is to be given to the idea of assigning to the Primary Reserve, selected Regular Force service support tasks such as medical, logistics, communications, information services and transportation, where this makes operational and economic sense.

Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency are to be sought in all aspects of the operations and the structure of the Primary Reserve, including rationalization of infrastructure, consolidation of units and the elimination of any redundant elements or sub-components.

The strength of 23,000 for the Primary Reserve noted in the White Paper is the maximum (ceiling) to be funded in the immediate future. The revised structure must be designed to ensure that the majority of Reserve funding available is used to engage the maximum number of reservists, consistent with operational requirements and the training and employment opportunities available to Reserve personnel.

Although unit traditions, heritage, socio-economic factors and regional sensitivities are to be considered in restructuring options, the overriding criteria will be CF operational requirements: unit effectiveness and efficiency, the demographic distribution of reservists, available infrastructure and the location of Regular Force bases and units.

Consideration is to be given to establishing differing levels of ``readiness" for the various elements of the Reserves.

COMMISSION MANDATE

The Commission will examine and make recommendations concerning the role, structure and employment of the Canadian Forces Reserve Force and options for restructuring the Force, notably the Primary and Supplementary Reserve sub-components thereof, to maximize their operational and cost effectiveness and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the following matters:

The most suitable roles, missions, tasks and structure for each element of the Primary Reserve and of the Supplementary Reserve under the new mobilization concept.

The most suitable command and control arrangements to achieve an effective and efficient use of scarce Reserve resources.

The level of training required within all components of the Primary Reserve to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

How the elements of the Primary Reserve can contribute more effectively and efficiently to Canada's defence commitments, and support other government departments and agencies.

Specialist functions, if any, that could be effectively performed by elements of the Primary Reserve.

The options available to the government on the organization and control of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves.

Ways and means whereby the responsiveness and productivity of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves can be enhanced.

Methods to reduce overhead in the Primary Reserve structure and program.

Changes in regulations, orders, procedures or administrative approaches to implement the recommended Primary Reserve structure.

The Canadian Forces Cadet Program and the Canadian Rangers are not part of the Commission's specific mandate; however, the Commission may comment on these subjects should it consider it appropriate.

PROCESS

The Commission will start work in April 95, and submit a final report, by 30 October 95, to the Minister of National Defence. The Minister will then refer the Commission's Report to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) early in the new year. After consideration of the Commission's recommendations, and the report of the SCONDVA, the Minister will institute implementation of a revised Reserve posture starting in April 96.

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Appendix B

APPENDIX B

Minister of National Defence / Ministre de la Défense nationale

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2

ORDER

1. I, David M. Collenette, the Minister of National Defence, hereby establish an external review committee to be known as the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves and appoint:

   a. The Right Honourable Brian Dickson, PC, CC, CD, as Chairperson; and

   b. Lieutenant-General Charles J. Belzile, CMM, CD (Ret);

   c. Dr. Jack L. Granatstein, FRSC as members.

2. The Terms of Reference of the Special Commission are set out in Annex A to this Order.

3. The Special Commission is authorized:

   a. to sit at such time and at such places in Canada as it may from time to time decide;

   b. to adopt such procedures and methods as it may from time to time consider expedient for the proper discharge of its mandate;

   c. to have, subject to law, complete access to personnel and information relevant to the Reserve Force in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;

   d. to be provided, from within the resources of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, with adequate working accommodation and clerical assistance; and

   e. to be provided with or to engage the services of such staff and other advisers as it considers necessary to aid and assist in the inquiry, at such rates of remuneration and reimbursement as may be approved by the Treasury Board.

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Canada

4. The Special Commission is required to:

   a. report in both official languages to the Minister of National Defence by October 30, 1995; and

   b. deposit its records and papers with the National Archives of Canada as soon as is reasonably possible after the filing of its report.

Dated at Ottawa, Ontario, this 5th day of April 1995.

The Honourable David M. Collenette
Minister of National Defence

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Appendix C

Commission and Staff

Chairman
The Right Honourable Brian Dickson, PC, CC, CD

Commissioners
Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, CMM, CD (Retired)
Professor Jack L. Granatstein, FRSC

Canadian Forces Advisors

Major-General T.F. de Faye, CMM, CD, SBStJ, Chief Force Development
Major-General E.W. Linden, CD, Chief Reserves and Cadets

Legal Counsel
Guy Pratte

Commission's Staff (including temporary staff)

Chief of Staff	Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bérubé, CD	Regular Force - Land
Deputy Chief of Staff	Major W.R. Gemmell, CD	Regular Force - Land
Aide-de-Camp	Lieutenant (Navy) J.A. Bell	Naval Reserve (April-June)
Public Information Officers	Lieutenant L. Gaudet	Regular Force (May)
	Lieutenant (Navy) J.G.E.J. Fauteux, CD	Regular Force (May-October)
Administrative Assistant	Deborah Melanson	
Secretary	Claire Sigman	
Hearing Officers	Captain J.R. Forgrave, CD	Militia
	Captain L. Levesque	Air Reserve (May-August)
Analysts	Major I.G. McIntyre, MMM, CD	Regular Force - Air (July-October)
	Lieutenant-Commander E. Marshall, CD	Naval Reserve (July-August)
	Lieutenant (Navy) D. MacArthur, CD	Naval Reserve
	Captain C.R. Ouimet	Militia
	Captain T. St-Denis, CD	Militia
Chief Clerk	Sergeant F. Fontaine, CD	Regular Force - Air
Admin Clerks	Petty Officer Second Class N. Martel	Naval Reserve
	Master Seaman B. Southern	Naval Reserve (Apr-May, Sept-Oct)
	Leading Seaman B. Bicknell	Naval Reserve (June-September)
Fin Clerks	Corporal P. Hanson	Air Reserve (April-May)

	Corporal J.L.P.D. Vézina, CD	Regular Force - Land (September-October)
Driver	Corporal B. Sénécal, CD	Air Reserve
Editors (English)	Shipton, McDougall Maude Associates	
Translators	R. (Louie) Fournier, CD	
	Jean-Claude Allard, CD	

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Appendix D

Technical Briefings

Where the subject of the briefing is not obvious from the title of the briefer, it has been included uncapitalized in square brackets.

J.L. Adams, CMM, CD, P Eng, Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment)

Lieutenant-General P.G. Addy, CMM, CD, Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel)

Major-General C.J. Addy, OMM, CD, Commander Land Force Western Area [training and structure]

Major M.E. Arnett, CD, Staff Officer Accounts & Finance 5, Air Command Headquarters

Brigadier-General E.B. Beno, OMM, CD, Director General Manpower Utilization [structure and budget]

Major-General J.L.M. Bourgeois, CMM, CD (Retired), National President, Air Reserve Association [equipment, training and structure]

Brigadier-General P.G. Boutet, CD, Judge Advocate General [legislation]

K.J. Calder, PhD, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications)

Lieutenant-General G.S. Clements, CMM, CD, Commander Air Command [force structure, establishment, orders, policy, and legislation]

Major L.D. Cook, CD, Director Information Services Operations and Training 4-2, NDHQ

Brigadier-General J.S. Cox, OMM, CD, Director General Land Force Development

Brigadier-General B.M. Curley, CD, Senior Communication Reserve Advisor [roles, tasks, structure, and training]

Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Davidson, CD, J3 Plans Coord, NDHQ

General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, CMM, OC, CD, Chief of the Defence Staff [terms of service]

Major-General T.F. de Faye, CMM, SBStJ, CD, Chief Force Development, NDHQ [force structure and establishments]

Major-General A.M. DeQuetteville, CMM, CD, Management Command and Control Re-Engineering Team, NDHQ [administration]

W.B. de Schneider, Director Compensation and Benefits Administration, NDHQ [compensation and benefits]

Brigadier-General P.L. De Smedt, CD, (Retired), National President, Air Force Association of Canada

Colonel D.C. Dunlop, OMM, CD, Director Budget, NDHQ [budget and costs]

Colonel A.F. Fenske, CD, Deputy Judge Advocate General, NDHQ [terms of service]

Captain (N) J.Y. Forcier, CD, Deputy Commander, Naval Reserve

Commander R.K. Gellner, CD, Director Individual Training, NDHQ [training]

Major N.A. Kaduck, CD, G3 Ops/Plans 3, Land Force Command HQ [operations, command and control]

Rear Admiral B.M. Keeler, CD, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services)

Major L.U. Lafaut, MMM, CD, Director Recruiting and Selection 4, NDHQ

Major-General J.G. Leech, CMM, CD, Assistant Deputy Minister (Defence Information Services)

Major-General E.W. Linden, CD, Chief Reserves and Cadets, NDHQ [total force]

Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. Lock, CD, Director Personnel Policy and Conditions of Service, NDHQ [terms of service]

Major-General J.A. MacInnis, CMM, CD, Commander, Land Force Atlantic Area [training, command and control]

Lieutenant-Colonel J.K. Mahaney, CD, Director Pay Policy and Development

A. Maia, Director Public Policy - Policy Training, NDHQ

Vice-Admiral L.G. Mason, CMM, CD, Commander, Maritime Command

Major R.M. McAlpine, OMM,CD, Commanding Officer, Milita Training Support Centre Meaford

J.D. McLure, Acting Deputy Minister

Major L.M. Mosher, CD, Canadian Forces Recruiting Education and Training System

Major M.R. Mosher, CD, Director Recruiting and Selection 2, NDHQ [recruiting, retention, roles, and tasks]

Vice-Admiral L.E. Murray, CMM, CD, Commander, Maritime Command [budget and structure]

Commodore J.C. Michaud, CD, Commander, Naval Reserve

Brigadier-General J.K. Oakley, CD, Chief of Staff (Reserves), Air Command Headquarters

Lieutenant-General P.J. O'Donnell, CMM, CD, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff [structure, budget, and costs]

Colonel K. Quinn, CD, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Land Force Western Area

Lieutenant-General G.M. Reay, CMM, MBE, CD, Commander, Land Force Command [structure, budget, and costs]

Major A. Rigby, CD, Director Manpower Planning 2-7-3, NDHQ [budget and costs]

Lieutenant-Colonel D. Rivard, CD, Director Recruiting and Selection, NDHQ

W.D. Roberts, Director Service Income Security Insurance Plan, NDHQ

Major G. Stark, CD, J3 Plans Coord 4, NDHQ [operations, effectiveness, and legislation]

Major-General B.E. Stephenson, CD, Commander, Land Force Central Area [budget, structure, and training]

Commander B.A. Stoddart, OMM, CD, Deputy Chief of Staff Finance, Maritime Command HQ

Major-General M. Terreau, CMM, CD, Chief Review Services, NDHQ [total force, costs]

E. Thornhill, CD, Directorate Compensation & Benefits Administration, NDHQ [compensation, pay, and benefits]

C. Trimm, Director General Policy Coordination / Policy Projects Section, NDHQ

Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. VanTassel, CD, A/Comptroller, Land Force Command HQ

Brigadier-General C. Walker, CD, Deputy Commander, Land Force Western Area [structure, roles, tasks, and administration]

Commander B.M. Weadon, CD, Director Costing Services 5-2, NDHQ

Lieutenant-Colonel M.P. Zuwerkalow, CD, Commanding Officer, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle School

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APPENDIX E

Witnesses

HALIFAX 29 May 1995

Brigadier-General E.A.C. Amy, DSO, OBE, MC, CD, The Halifax Rifles Armoury Association

Lieutenant-Colonel J.R.J. Comeau, CD

Rear Admiral F.W. Crickard, CD, Vice President, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Major G.K. Foster, CD, The Halifax Rifles Armoury Association

M. Nash Kelly

Lieutenant-Colonel D. MacLeod, CD, Senior Staff Officer Reserves, Maritime Air Group Headquarters

Lieutenant-Colonel P. Voynovich, CD, Commanding Officer, 35 (Sydney) Medical Company

Colonel R.B. Wark, CD, Commander, Nova Scotia District

G. Withall, Research Associate, Maritime Affairs Division, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

SAINT JOHN 31 May 1995

D. Chase, Deputy Mayor, The City of Saint John

Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Gallop, CD, Commanding Officer, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Lieutenant-Colonel M.I. Graves, CD, Commanding Officer, 31 (Saint John) Service Battalion

Lieutenant-Colonel I.A. Kennedy, CD, former Commanding Officer, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel A.R.W. Lockhart, CD, Vice President (Canada), Confédération interalliée des officiers de réserve

Honorary Colonel R.E. Logan, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton & York)

Her Worship S.A. McAlary, Mayor, The City of Saint John

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel E.N. McKelvey, OC, CD, QC, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Captain (N) W.F. O'Connell, CD, President, Maritime Defence Association of Canada

Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Pollock, CD, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, The Royal New

Brunswick Regiment (Carleton & York)

Honorary Colonel J.H. Turnbull, OMM, KStJ, CD, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

CHARLOTTETOWN 1 June 1995

Master Corporal G.J. Craig, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC)

Colonel E.W.D. Goodwin, CD, Commander, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island District

Captain T.N. Jain, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC)

Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. MacArthur, CD, Commanding Officer, 721 (Charlottetown) Communication Regiment

Colonel J. D. Murray, CD (Retired), Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, 32 (Moncton) Service Battalion

Brigadier-General J.E. Ready, CD (Retired)

Colonel J. Spears, CD, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Land Force Atlantic Area

Lieutenant-Colonel C.D. Thomas, CD, Commanding Officer, The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC)

OTTAWA 9 June 1995

Major-General S. Golding, RFD, Assistant Chief of the General Staff Reserves - Army, Australian Defence Force

Major-General D.R. Luttrell, Assistant Chief of the Defence Force - Reserves, Australian Defence Force

WINNIPEG 12 June 1995

M. Burt, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

Honorary Colonel G. Cook, The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment

Colonel J. Jeffries, CD, Commander, Manitoba-Lakehead District

Brigadier-General J. Law, CD, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel K.W. Langridge, United Services Institute of Manitoba

Honorary Colonel G. Ludlow, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

Lieutenant-Colonel C.V. MacIntyre, CD, Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron

Right Honourable J. MacKay, former Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba

Major R. Maier, CD, 402 Squadron

G. Mann, President, Aboriginal Veterans' Association

L.H. Reynolds, Commissioner of Protection, Parks and Culture, The City of Winnipeg

M. Swan, Bold Eagle Coordinator

Lieutenant-Colonel D. Tabbernor, CD, Commander Designate, Manitoba-Lakehead District

Captain H. Verwey, 402 Squadron

REGINA 13 June 1995

Honorary Colonel C. Ashfield, CD, 10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Lieutenant-Commander W.T. Bowes, CD, Commanding Officer, HMCS QUEEN

Commander J.O. Burgess, CD, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Lieutenant-Colonel R.V. Cade, CD, Royal United Services Institute of Regina

Colonel R.W. Chisholm, CD, Commander, Saskatchewan District

Major D. Green, CD, Royal United Services Institute of Regina

Brigadier-General O.J. Keehr, KStJ, ED, CD (Retired), The Royal Regina Rifles

P. Megaw, Regina Peace Council

Lieutenant-Colonel J. O'Kane, CD, Royal United Services Institute of Regina

Corporal C.J. Short, 16 (Saskatoon) Medical Company Detachment

Brigadier-General C. Walker, CD, Deputy Commander, Land Force Western Area

EDMONTON 14 June 1995

Corporal T.A. Andrews (former Military Police)

Lieutenant-Colonel W.J.G. Bewick, CD, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (4 PPCLI)

J.W. de Bruijn, Edmonton United Services Institute

Honorary Captain (N) L.D. Hyndman, OC, QC (Retired)

Major D. Lamb, CD

Commander D.B. Logan, CD, Vice President, Edmonton Branch, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

M. McConnell, Edmonton United Services Institute

Major P. McNaulay, CD, G3 Operations & Training, Land Force Western Area HQ

Captain (N) G.E. Power, CD

L. Rossetto, Edmonton United Services Institute

CALGARY 15 June 1995

Alderman D. Bronconnier, Calgary City Council

Master Corporal K.N. Carter, CD, 14 (Calgary) Service Battalion

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel R. Gibson, 15 (Edmonton) Medical Company

Major W.J. Gray, CD, Federation of Military United Services Institutes of Canada

Colonel P. Hughes, CD, Alberta Militia Society

J.D. Kovacs

R.R. McDaniel

Major D.E. McKenzie, CD, Federation of Military United Services Institutes of Canada

Colonel R.S. Millar, OMM, CD, Commander, Alberta District

Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Moffat, OMM, CD (Retired)

W. Van der Schee

VANCOUVER 17 June 1995

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bell-Irving, CD, Commanding Officer, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

Major M.A. Casey, CD

Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Dow, CD, 6th Field Engineer Squadron and Honorary Officers' Association of British Columbia

Honorary Colonel D.I. Fairweather, CD, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

The Honourable J.A. Fraser, PC, QC, Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

His Worship Mayor G. Halsey-Brandt, The City of Richmond

Colonel R.G. Johnson, CD, Commander, British Columbia District

Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. Lane, CD, Honorary Officers' Association of British Columbia

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Turner, CD, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

Colonel G.M. Urquhart, CD (Retired)

VANCOUVER 19 June 1995

Colonel A.C. Cameron, CD (Retired), Gang of 2 + 5

Captain S. Cselenyi, The Royal Westminster Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. French, CD, Commanding Officer, 12 (Vancouver) Medical Company

Lieutenant-Colonel K. Frier, CD (Retired), Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel A.V. Grasset, 12 (Vancouver) Medical Company

A.F. Joplin, OStJ, Air Force Officers' Association

Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Lee, CD, Commanding Officer, The Royal Westminster Regiment

Brigadier-General S.T. McDonald, CD (Retired)

Second Lieutenant G.T. McNabb, The Royal Westminster Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel C.C.I. Merritt, VC, ED (Retired), Gang of 2 + 5

Major-General R. L. Mortimer, CD (Retired), Air Force Officers' Association

Honorary Captain (N) P.C. Newman, CC, CD

Brigadier-General T.H.M. Silva, CD, Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver

J.E. Vernon, CD, Air Force Officers' Association

VICTORIA 20 June 1995

Commander J.J. Bennett, CD, Commanding Officer, HMCS MALAHAT

Brigadier-General D.R. Coell, CD, Honorary Colonel, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)

Lieutenant-Colonel G.D. Corry, CD, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Harris, CD (Retired), General Support Force

Chief M.E.H. Heppell, Victoria Fire Department

Lieutenant-Colonel L. Johnson, CD (Retired), B.C. Member of The Canadian Infantry Council

Brigadier-General C. de L. Kirby, CD (Retired)

Major A.J. Lavoie, CD, G3 General Support Force Pacific

Captain (N) McRae, CD

J. MacMillan-Murphy, CD, President, Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans' Association

Corporal T. Middleton, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Scott, CD, President, Defence Medical Association

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Swan, CD

Captain (N) P. Yans, CD (Retired), Vancouver Island Royal United Services Institute

OTTAWA 22 June 1995

Colonel G. Addy, CD, former Honorary Colonel, Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)

Colonel S.E. Blakeley, CD, Conference of Defence Associations

Lieutenant-Colonel K.D. Brigden, CD, Commanding Officer, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

C. Brown, Reservist Association of Canada

M.E. Butler, former official in the Privy Council Office

Sergeant K.D. Clapham, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

N. Clegg

Honorary Colonel G. De Merlis, CD, Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)

S. Dromisky, Member of Parliament for Thunder Bay-Atikokan

D. Gladstone

Honorary Colonel K. Gillespie, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

Sergeant Gobeil, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Master Corporal M.D. Gray, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

Lieutenant M.W. Grills, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Colonel A.S. Henry, CD, Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations

G. Knutson, Member of Parliament for Elgin-Norfolk

Colonel H.A. Langlois, CD, Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)

J. McKay, Reservist Association of Canada

J. Maloney, Member of Parliament for Erie

Master Warrant Officer I.R. Marrs, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

M.J. McCloskey, Executive Director, Reservist Association of Canada

Major I. McIntyre, MMM, CD, NDHQ

Lieutenant-Colonel D.S. Morkem, CD, Commanding Officer, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

A.G. Newsbacher, Head of Research, Reservist Association of Canada

Major-General W.B. Vernon, CD, Deputy Director, Op Renaissance, NDHQ

OTTAWA 23 June 1995

B. Barber

Colonel D. Campbell, CD (Retired) Councillor, City of Brockville

S. Darling, former Member of Parliament

His Worship J.W. Doran, Mayor of Brockville

Honorary Colonel D.W. Einarson, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Commander J. Freill, CD (Retired), Navy League of Canada

Captain F. Kannemann (Retired)

C. Kilburn, National Council for Crime-Free Canada

P. L. Killeen, Association of Canadian Community Colleges

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. McQueen, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

J. McGee, President of Sinclair College, Association of Canadian Community Colleges

Staff Sergeant R.G. Muir, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

R. Mungall

T. Norton, President, Association of Canadian Community Colleges

Colonel W. Pettipas, CD (Retired), Canadian Defence Preparedness Association

N.R.A. Smyth, President, Canadian Defence Preparedness Association

P. Vaillant

Honorary Colonel W. S. Watson, The Brockville Rifles

TORONTO 26 June 1995

Brigadier-General G.G. Bell, OC, MBE, CD (Retired), former Colonel Commandant, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps

Honorary Colonel A.R.C. Butson, GC, OMM, CD, 23 (Hamilton) Medical Company

V. Chute, Warden of Elgin County

M. Dawson, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

Honorary Colonel R.M. Dillon, MC, CM, ED, Colonel of the Regiment, The Royal Canadian Regiment

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel The Honourable E.A. Goodman, PC, OC, QC, Ontario Armoured Corps Association

R. Gorman, President, The Elgin Regiment Association

Brigadier-General J.I. Hanson, CD, Eng Cert, MA, CET

Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Hubel, CD (Retired), Toronto Artillery Officers' Association

Colonel B.S. MacDonald, CD (Retired), Toronto Artillery Officers' Association

Lieutenant-Colonel D. McAndless, CD, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

M. McDonald, Administration Clerk for the County of Elgin

Lieutenant-Colonel R.F. McKee, CD, Regimental Council, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. McKenna, CD (Retired), Toronto Artillery Officers' Association, and Friends of the Militia

Lieutenant-Colonel D.G.A. McKenzie, CD, Commanding Officer, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

Major G.L. Pearce, CD (Retired)

Professor W.J. Perchal, PhD

His Worship S. Peters, Mayor of the City of St Thomas, Ontario

Major H.K. Reid, CD, Regimental Council, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

M. Saldov, PhD, Associate Professor, Memorial University

N. Stetham, Canadian Airborne Forces Association & Royal Canadian Military Institute

Lieutenant-Colonel M.A. Stevenson, CD, Regimental Council, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

G. Taylor, Regimental Council, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

TORONTO 27 June 1995
Round Table Discussion

Master Warrant Officer S.D. Armstrong, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment

Warrant Officer W.D. Bentley, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Corporal J.H. Bland, 2nd Field Engineer Regiment

Sergeant D.A. Boyne, Toronto District Headquarters

Corporal C.P.W. Campion, 26 (North Bay) Service Battalion

Master Corporal A.M. Dilworth, The Royal Regiment of Canada

Lieutenant J.D.F. Fraser, The Canadian Grenadier Guards

Warrant Officer R.J. Hartwell, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC)

Master Corporal J.J. Hunter, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal S.M. McIlroy, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Captain M.T. Poland, 1st Hussars (RCAC)

Gunner J.A. Shrighley, 49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Sergeant P.M.R. St. Denis, The Highland Fusiliers of Canada

Warrant Officer M.R. Wisotzki, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

Captain A.S. Zalvin, 25 (Toronto) Service Battalion

Public Hearings

J. Bosso, Association of Reservists for an Effective Army

Major-General J.M.L. Bourgeois, CMM, CD (Retired), Air Reserve Association

J. Brown, Association of Reservists for an Effective Army

Colonel B. Douglas, CD, Friends of the Militia

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Foy, CD, Air Reserve Association

Wing Commander G. Georgas, Air Reserve Association

Honorary Colonel J.W. Gibson, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)

Major-General N. Hall, CD, Friends of the Militia

M. Hoddinott, The Hoddinott Group

C. Jennings, Editor, Militia Monitor

C. Knoblauch, Dominion of Canada Rifle Association

Wing Commander E. Lane, Air Reserve Association

Major-General R.W. Lewis, CMM, CM, ED, CD (Retired)

Lieutenant-Colonel K. McBey, CD, Ontario Branch, Canadian Infantry Association

Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Richardson, OMM, CD, Air Reserve Association

Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Rodaway, CD (Retired), Ontario Branch, Canadian Infantry Association

E. Rogacki, Polish Combatants Association

R. Rogacki, Polish Combatants Association

Lieutenant-Colonel M. Stephenson, CD, Friends of the Militia

Dr. J.C. Thompson, Dominion of Canada Rifle Association

J. Thompson, Mackenzie Institute

Colonel J.G. Wasteneys, CD, Friends of the Militia and Army Cadet League of Canada

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel K. Willcocks, The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment

Colonel R. Yorke, CD, Ontario Branch, Canadian Infantry Association

MONTREAL 28 June 1995

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel S.F. Angus, CD, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

Honorary Captain (N) C.P. Beaubien, Honorary Commander, Maritime Operations Group One and Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Brigadier-General P. Boucher, CD, Honorary Colonel, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and The Council of Honorary Colonels

Colonel J.G. Bourne, CVO, ED, CD (Retired), Chairman of Advisory Board, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

R. Côté, Municipal Councillor, City of Montréal

Brigadier-General C. Couture, CD, Commander, 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

Major W.B. Cowan, CD, MSc, pmsc (Retired)

Honorary Colonel M. Gaulin, CD, Honorary Colonels Council and 12e Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice)

Colonel R.J. Gervais, CD, Commander, District No. 1

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel G. Huot, 4th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (Châteauguay) and The Council of Honorary Colonels

Colonel J.W. Knox, MBE, ED, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

Major G.T. Lusk, CD, Deputy Commanding Officer, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

Lieutenant-General D.A. McAlpine, CMM, KStJ, CD, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

Honorary Colonel T.E. Price, CD, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

Honorary Colonel P. Richard, EM, CD, 51 (Montreal) Service Battalion and The Council of Honorary Colonels

Lieutenant-General A. Roy, CMM, CD, Commander, Land Force Quebec Area

Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Séguin, CD, 12e Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice) and The Council of Honorary Colonels

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. Wolfe, CD, CME, 3rd Field Engineer Regiment

MONTREAL 29 June 1995

Brigadier-General J.L. Bombardier, CD, Canadian Infantry Association

Sergeant N. Brazeau, The Royal Montreal Regiment

Colonel P. Carver, CD (Retired), National Vice-President, Air Reserve Association

Lieutenant-Colonel G. de V. Domville, CD, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association

Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. Dorfman, CD, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association

Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Finestone, CD, The British Columbia Dragoons

Sergeant K. Fokoefs, 1st Support Tactical Wing

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Guimont, CD, 1 Wing St-Hubert Branch, Air Reserve Association

Sergeant R. Hargassner, The Royal Montreal Regiment

D.F Hudson, CD, MBA

Lieutenant-Colonel K.H. Kramell, CD, The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)

Lieutenant-Colonel Y.A. Martin, OStJ, CD, AdeC, Montreal Branch, Air Reserve Association

S.J. McDougall, formerly of The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)

Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.K. McCuaig, CD, Canadian Infantry Association

Major R. Mehran, CD, The Royal Montreal Regiment

Major R. Nadeau, CD, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve

Major G. Petrolekas, CD, The Royal Montreal Regiment

Captain M. Proudman, The Royal Montreal Regiment

Captain T.B. Reid, The Royal Montreal Regiment

ST JOHN'S 4 July 1995

Commander R. Andrews, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

D.R. Baird, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

His Worship W. Blackmore, Mayor of Grand Falls-Windsor, Newfoundland

Captain F.A. Brennan, 1st Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel D.C. Bondurant, CD, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment

Captain H. Chafe, Newfoundland District Headquarters

Honorary Colonel A. Cowan, 36 (Newfoundland) Service Battalion

J.K. Crummey

Major P. Grandy, CD

Lieutenant-Colonel M.J. Hynes, CD, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel B. Mackay, CD, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment Advisory Council

His Worship J. Murphy, Mayor of St John's, Newfoundland

E. Reid, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Colonel E.P. Ring, CD, Commander, Newfoundland District

Commander E.D. Stack, MMM, CD, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Major D.G. Twining, CD, Acting Commanding Officer, 36 (Newfoundland) Service Battalion

Dr. E. Williams, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

QUEBEC CITY 6 July 1995

Honorary Colonel J.E. Amiot, EM, CD, AdeC, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent

Lieutenant-Colonel B. Bastille, CD, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent

Major H. Bélanger, CD, Commanding Officer, 713 (Beauport) Communication Regiment

Brigadier-General M.A. Bélanger, CD (Retired), former Commander Eastern Area

Major A. Boisvert, CD, 62nd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Sergeant D. Boulet, CD

Colonel H. Cliche, CD, former Commanding Officer, 713 (Beauport) Communication Regiment

J.C. Eaton, Chairman, Canadian Forces Liaison Council

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Gendreau, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent

Honorary Colonel G. Javornick, The Royal Montreal Regiment

F.P. Mannix, former Honorary Colonel, The Calgary Highlanders

Lieutenant-Colonel S. Méneault, CD (Retired), former Commanding Officer, 713 (Beauport) Communication Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel M. Michaud, CD (Retired), former Commanding Officer, 713 (Beauport) Communication Regiment

Honorary Colonel L. Montambault, SbStJ, CD, MD, FRSP(s), 55 (Quebec) Medical Company

L. Naud

Colonel D. Pépin, CD, Deputy Commander, 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

Sergeant S. Picknell

MEAFORD 25 July 1995
Round Table Discussions

Corporal J.W. Basson, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal J. Duin, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal Evans, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment

Sergeant S.D.J. Fawcett, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

Sergeant R.D. Gallant, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment)

Private A.T. Haddac, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal G.T. Horne, The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment)

Corporal O.B. Hughes, 23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion

Private M.A. Ilic, The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)

Trooper J.C. Jackson, The Ontario Regiment (RCAC)

Master Corporal A.G. Johnson, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters

Private J.L. Kay, The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)

Corporal J.D. Lebelle, Reserve Electronic Warfare Squadron

Corporal R.W. Leblanc, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)

Private B.C.A. Longhurst, 1st Hussars (RCAC)

Captain A.J. Lowe, 1st Hussars (RCAC)

Lieutenant C.J. MacDonald, 1st Hussars (RCAC)

Master Corporal C.M. Massie, The Governor General's Horse Guards

Lieutenant J.M.C. McEwen, 48th Highlanders of Canada

Captain B.J. Phillips, 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment

Corporal J. Possamai, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal S.M.L. Rainbow, 28 (Ottawa) Medical Company

Private J.R. Shirran, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)

Lieutenant S.E. Simard, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

Bombardier S.L. Stafford, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

Sergeant J.A. Syer, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada

Master Corporal J.P. Tillapaugh, 1st Hussars (RCAC)

Master Corporal S.M. Trottier, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)

Corporal S.M. Tyrrell, 25 (Toronto) Medical Company

Private J.W. Uher, The Governor General's Horse Guards

Warrant Officer R.M. Weeks, 23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion

OTTAWA 16 August 1995

Lieutenant (N) J.A. Bell, HMCS CARLETON

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bérubé, CD, Director Reserves Coordinator, NDHQ

Captain J.R. Forgrave, CD, The Governor General's Foot Guards

Captain L.M. Levesque, Air Reserve

Lieutenant(N) D. MacArthur, CD, HMCS CARLETON

Captain C.R. Ouimet, The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)

Captain T. St. Denis, CD, Ottawa District Headquarters

OTTAWA 17 August 1995

Brigadier-General B.M. Curley, CD, Senior Communication Reserve Advisor

C.R. Nixon, former Deputy Minister of National Defence

OTTAWA 22 August 1995

Lieutenant-General C.J. Cunningham, Jr (Retired), United States Air Force

OTTAWA 24 August 1995

Colonel D.S. Ethell, OMM, MSC, CD (Retired)

Major-General L.W. MacKenzie, MSC, CD (Retired)

OTTAWA 25 August 1995

Major I. MacIntyre, MMM, CD, NDHQ

OTTAWA 1 September 1995

Brigadier A.P.M.J. Naughten, Defence and Military Advisor, British Defence Liaison Staff

OTTAWA 6 September 1995

Major-General R.W. Lewis, CMM, CM, ED, CD (Retired), Director, The Council of Honorary Colonels

OTTAWA 19 September 1995

Colonel J.C. Eggenberger, OMM, CD, Director of Research, The Council of Honorary Colonels

Major-General J.M.R. Gaudreau, CMM, CD (Retired), former Deputy Commander, Land Force Command

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APPENDIX F

Written Submissions

J.G. Baker

Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Barrette, CD, 1 Air Maintenance Squadron

Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Bassarab, CD, 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment

S. Bata, Honorary Captain (N), 5th Canadian Destroyer Squadron, and Bata Corporation

Captain P.S. Batstone, M.Eng, P.Eng, Supplementary Ready Reserve

M. Bett, CBE, Ministry of Defense (U.K.)

C.A. Billowes

Dr. K. Bindon, Chair, Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces

B.D. Bolton, former reservist

Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Boyle, CD, Vice President, Canadian Forces Logistics Association

Vice-Admiral N.D. Brodeur, CMM, CD (Retired)

G. Bussières, Secretary, National Defence Committee, The Royal Canadian Legion

M.R. Chartier, President, Centre de formation en équipement lourd

Honorary Colonel J. Closson, Le Régiment de la Chaudière

D.E. Code, Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations Institute

D.B. Collins, former reservist

J.L. Comeau, former member of 84th Independent Field Battery, RCA

M.J.P. Connan, former reservist

J. Cooke, National President, Navy League of Canada

Commodore H.A. Cooper, CD (Retired), Vice President, Nova Scotia Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Major G. Coutu, CD, Staff Officer Director General Reserves and Cadets, NDHQ

D.W. Dewar, Head, Policy Planning Team, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy & Communications)

Lieutenant V. Drouin, 713 (Beauport) Communication Regiment

Chief Warrant Officer R.J. Duncan, CD, District Sergeant-Major, Ottawa District Headquarters

Captain D. Elderkin, Director Reserves 4-2, NDHQ

Captain T.P. Ethier, CD (Retired), President, United Services Institute of Nanaimo North Island

Major F.M. Fisher, CD, Chief of Staff, Northern Ontario District Headquarters

His Worship W.R. Fitzgerald, Mayor of Halifax, Nova Scotia

D.M. Fowler, CD, Secretary-Treasurer, Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders Council

The Reverend A.E. Gans, CD, MA, BD, MTh

Lieutenant-Colonel T.P. Gilday, DSO, MID, ED, UE (Retired)

Captain (N) P. Godbout, CD (Retired), RCNR, Ottawa Branch, Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Dr. L. Haeck, KMO, CD, Staff Officer, Air Command Headquarters

Dr. C.P. Handforth

Lieutenant-Colonel L.R. Hillier, CD, Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, The Governor General's Foot Guards

Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Himmelman, CD (Retired)

H. Hole, P. Eng

Major S.L. Holland, CD, Director Reserves 3-3, NDHQ

G. Hollingshead

Major R.P. Honig, CD, Director Military Training and Education 2-4, NDHQ

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel P.W. Hunter, Reserves 2000

Inspection des réserves et de la mobilisation, Ministry of Defence, France

Sergeant V.A.L. Jansen, 17 (Winnipeg) Service Battalion

M. Kavanagh, former member of the Canadian Forces

Lieutenant-Commander P.C. Killaby, CD, Reserve Legal Advisor, Land Force Central Area

A.M. King, MC, CD, P.Eng, former officer of the Canadian Forces

F.H.K. Krenz, Research Associate, Trent University

Sergeant J.M.A. Lacombe, Canadian Forces Recruiting Detachment Trois-Rivières

Colonel J.G.P. Leblanc, CD, Director General Reserves and Cadets, NDHQ

Dr. Y. Leclerc, CD, PhD, former member of Naval Reserve

Colonel M.S. Lee-Brown, British Army

Major-General B.J. Legge, CMM, CM, KStJ, ED, CD, QC, Chairman, The Council of Honorary Colonels

Honorary Colonel S.B. Lerner, OMM, CD, 763 (Ottawa) Communication Regiment

Chief Warrant Officer D. Luberti, CD, Ottawa District Headquarters Sergeant-Major

F.J.A. MacKay

Brigadier-General L. Maes, CD, former Senior Communication Reserve Advisor

Lieutenant-Colonel G.L. Marrotte, CD (Retired)

Colonel R.B. McKenzie, CD, Commanding Officer, South Alberta Light Horse (RCAC)

Lieutenant-Commander G.A. Moore, CD (Retired)

Colonel C.J. Newbould, CBE, United Kingdom, Headquarters Land Command

G.J. Oman, former reservist

D.A. Patterson, reservist (rank unknown)

D.C. Paul, Chairman, Leeds and Grenville County Board of Education

Major J.P. Poirier, CD, Assistant Reserve Adviser, Land Force Command Headquarters

Chief Warrant Officer W.S. Pollak, CD (Retired)

C.J. Pook (former Lieutenant), The Calgary Highlanders

Colonel R.J.L. Rogers, CD, former Honorary Colonel, 8th Field Engineer Regiment

Major-General R. Rohmer, CMM, OC, DFC, KStJ, CD, QC (Retired), former Chief of Reserves, NDHQ

R. Roy, former reservist

I.R. Seymour

Captain R.E. Sibley, G4 Plan 2, Land Force Command Headquarters

B. Speller, Member of Parliament for Haldimand-Norfolk

R.E. Stevens, President, Canadian Air Cushion Vehicles

W.R. Stewart, former member of the Canadian Forces

Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel N.J. Stewart, The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC)

His Worship I.A. Stuart, Mayor, City of Kelowna

Major G.K. Sykes, CD, Staff Officer Reserves 3, Air Command Headquarters

Roch Tanguay, former member of the Canadian Forces

R. Thompson, Fellow, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and former member of the Canadian Forces

Captain K. Tyler, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle School

Major E.J. Vincent (Retired)

Captain W.A. Watson, Flight Commander, Airfield Engineer Flight Lunenburg County

Lieutenant (N) R.A. Watt (Retired)

T. White, Member of Parliament for North Vancouver

Lieutenant-Colonel W.A.S. White, CD, Vice Chairman, Commission 5, Confédération interalliée des officiers de réserve

Lieutenant-Colonel D.S. Wiley, CD, Staff Officer Chief Reserves and Cadets, NDHQ

M.A. Zschoch

(These written submissions were received in addition to those of the witnesses who appeared in front of the Commission. A number of witnesses and persons on this list made multiple submissions.)

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Appendix G

Naval Reserve Divisions

Name	Location	Strength (as of 2 Aug 95)
HMCS BRUNSWICKER	Saint John, NB	147
HMCS CABOT	St John's, Nfld	214
HMCS CARLETON	Ottawa, Ont	289
HMCS CATARAQUI	Kingston, Ont	150
HMCS CHAMPLAIN	Chicoutimi, Que	162
HMCS CHIPPAWA	Winnipeg, Man	169
HMCS DISCOVERY	Vancouver, BC	241
HMCS DONNACONA	Montreal, Que	247
HMCS D'IBERVILLE	Rimouski, Que	127
HMCS GRIFFON	Thunder Bay, Ont	112
HMCS HUNTER	Windsor, Ont	124
HMCS JOLLIET	Sept-Iles, Que	84
HMCS MALAHAT	Victoria, BC	317
HMCS MONTCALM	Quebec, Que	237
HMCS NONSUCH	Edmonton, Alta	129
HMCS PREVOST	London, Ont	104
HMCS QUEEN	Regina, Sask	93
HMCS QUEEN CHARLOTTE	Charlottetown, PEI	86
HMCS RADISSON	Trois-Rivières, Que	160
HMCS SCOTIAN	Halifax, NS	374
HMCS STAR	Hamilton, Ont	240
HMCS TECUMSEH	Calgary, Alta	174
HMCS UNICORN	Saskatoon, Sask	114
HMCS YORK	Toronto, Ont	247

Naval Reserve Headquarters is in Quebec City.
There is a total of 24 Naval Reserve Divisions. The total effective strength is 4341.

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Appendix H

Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of April 1995)
2 armoured units		
The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC)		
HQ & A Squadron	Charlottetown, PEI	144
B Squadron/Band	Slemon Park, PEI	30
8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)		
HQ Squadron	Moncton, NB	64
A Squadron	Gagetown,NB	0
B Squadron	Sussex, NB	44
C Squadron	Sackville, NB	27
3 artillery units		
84th Independent Field Battery RCA	Yarmouth, NS	73
1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Halifax, NS	139
3rd Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 115 Field Battery	Saint John, NB	116
89 Field Battery	Woodstock, NB	35
8 infantry units		
The Princess Louise Fusiliers	Halifax, NS	196
1st Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment	St. John's, Nfld	140
2nd Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment		
HQ & A Company	Corner Brook, Nfld	39
B Company/Band	Grand Falls, Nfld	55
C Company	Stephenville, Nfld	28
1st Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton & York)		
HQ & A Company	Fredericton, NB	165
B Company	Edmundston, NB	65

C Company	Grand Falls, NB	66
D Company	Saint John, NB	38
2nd Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (North Shore)		
HQ & B Company	Bathurst, NB	55
A Company	Newcastle, NB	39
C Company	Campbellton, NB	28
The West Nova Scotia Regiment		
HQ & A Company	Aldershot, NS	103
B Company	Windsor, NS	55
D Company	Middleton, NS	52
1st Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North)		
HQ & C Company	Truro, NS	116
A Company	New Glasgow, NS	63
B Company	Springhill, NS	62
D Company	Amherst, NS	46
E Company	Pictou, NS	78
2nd Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Cape Breton)		
HQ & C Company	Sydney, NS	151
A Company	North Sydney, NS	46
B Company	Glace Bay, NS	39
2 engineer units		
45th Field Engineer Squadron	Sydney, NS	141
56th Field Engineer Squadron	St John's, Nfld	144
5 service battalions		
31 (Saint John) Service Battalion	Saint John, NB	140
Detachment	Gagetown, NB	0
32 (Moncton) Service Battalion	Moncton, NB	115
33 (Halifax) Service Battalion	Halifax, NS	251
35 (Sydney) Service Battalion	Sydney, NS	147
36 (Newfoundland) Service Battalion	St John's, Nfld	174
1 medical company		
35 (Sydney) Medical Company	Sydney, NS	80
33 Medical Platoon	Halifax, NS	38

District Headquarters		
New Brunswick - Prince Edward Island District	Moncton, NB	20
Nova Scotia District	Halifax, NS	20
Newfoundland District	St. John's, Nfld	10
Area Headquarters		
Land Force Atlantic Area	Halifax, NS	35

LFAA covers the four Atlantic provinces. Headquarters is in Halifax.
There are three districts and 21 units with an effective strength of 3648.

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APPENDIX I

Land Force Quebec Area (LFQA) by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of April 1995)
4 armoured units		
Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)	Hull, Que	115
The Sherbrooke Hussars	Sherbrooke, Que	168
12e Régiment Blindé du Canada (Milice)	Trois-Rivières, Que	187
The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal)		
HQ & A Squadron	Montreal, Que	115
B Squadron	St-Hubert, Que	52
3 artillery units		
62nd Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Shawinigan, Que	199
2nd Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Montreal, Que	141
6th Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Levis, Que	104
58 Air Defence Battery	Quebec, Que	68
59 Field Battery	Montmagny, Que	73
12 infantry units		
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada	Montreal, Que	155
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve	Montreal, Que	184
The Royal Montreal Regiment	Montreal, Que	145
The Canadian Grenadier Guards	Montreal, Que	220
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	Montreal, Que	172
4th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (Châteauguay)		
HQ & A Company	Montreal, Que	114
B Company	St-Jérome, Que	80
6th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment		
HQ & A Company	St-Hyacinthe, Que	114
B Company	Drummondville, Que	60
Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke	Sherbrooke, Que	264
Les Voltigeurs de Québec	Quebec, Que	249
Le Régiment du Saguenay	Jonquière, Que	217
Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent		

HQ & B Company	Rimouski, Que	115
A Company	Rivière-du-Loup, Que	85
C Company	Matane, Que	67
Le Régiment de la Chaudière		
HQ & C Company	Lévis, Que	99
A Company	Beauceville, Que	63
B Company	Lac Mégantic, Que	77
3 field engineer units		
9th Field Engineer Squadron (M)	Rouyn-Noranda, Que	88
10th Field Engineer Squadron (M)	Quebec, Que	80
3rd Field Engineer Regiment (M)	Montreal, Que	123
2 service battalions		
51 (Montreal) Service Battalion	St-Hubert, Que	223
55 (Quebec) Service Battalion	Quebec, Que	172
3 medical companies		
51 (Montreal) Medical Company	Montreal, Que	119
52 (Sherbrooke) Medical Company	Sherbrooke, Que	94
55 (Quebec) Medical Company	Quebec, Que	101
District Headquarters		
Quebec District Number 1	Montreal, Que	103
Quebec District Number 2	Sherbrooke, Que	24
Quebec District Number 3	Quebec, Que	33
Area Headquarters		
Land Force Quebec Area	Montreal, Que	78

Covers the province of Quebec. Headquarters is in Montreal
There are three districts and 27 units with an effective strength of 4940.

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APPENDIX J

Land Force Central Area (LFCA) by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of April 1995)
6 armoured units		
The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)	Windsor, Ont	99
The Elgin Regiment (RCAC)	St Thomas, Ont	80
The Governor General's Horse Guards	Toronto, Ont	154
1st Hussars (RCAC)		
HQ & A Squadron	London, Ont	68
C Squadron	Sarnia, Ont	40
The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC)		
HQ & B Squadron	Toronto, Ont	78
Troop	Keswick, Ont	0
A Squadron	Aurora, Ont	58
The Ontario Regiment (RCAC)	Oshawa, Ont	168
6 artillery units		
30th Field Regiment RCA	Ottawa, Ont	97
49th Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Sault Ste Marie, Ont	91
7th Toronto Regiment RCA	Toronto, Ont	130
11th Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 16 & 29 Field Batteries	Guelph, Ont	102
11 Field Battery	Hamilton, Ont	42
56th Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 54 Field Battery	Brantford, Ont	61
10 Field Battery	St Catharines, Ont	33
69 Field Battery	Simcoe, Ont	31
1st Air Defence Regiment (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish) RCA	Pembroke, Ont	81
20 infantry units		
2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of Canada	Sudbury, Ont	98
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada	Toronto, Ont	138
The Toronto Scottish Regiment	Toronto, Ont	145

The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment	Kingston, Ont	143
The Brockville Rifles	Brockville, Ont	83
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders	Cornwall, Ont	78
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa	Ottawa, Ont	147
The Algonquin Regiment		
HQ & A Company	North Bay, Ont	82
B Company	Timmins, Ont	37
4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment		
HQ & S Company	London, Ont	105
T Company	Stratford, Ont	41
The Highland Fusiliers of Canada		
HQ & A Company	Cambridge, Ont	62
B Company	Kitchener, Ont	39
Platoon	Wingham, Ont	0
The Grey and Simcoe Foresters		
HQ & A Company	Owen Sound, Ont	73
B Company	Barrie, Ont	75
Platoon	Collingwood, Ont	0
The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment		
HQ & C Company	Belleville, Ont	105
A Company	Cobourg, Ont	30
B Company	Peterborough, Ont	77
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment)	Hamilton, Ont	160
The Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's)	Hamilton, Ont	154
The Royal Regiment of Canada	Toronto, Ont	202
48th Highlanders of Canada	Toronto, Ont	150
The Governor General's Foot Guards	Ottawa, Ont	160
The Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment		
HQ & A & B Companies	Windsor, Ont	82
C Company	Chatham, Ont	32
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment		
HQ & A & B Companies	St Catharines, Ont	198
D Company Niagara Falls, Ont45		
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment)		

HQ & B Company	Brampton, Ont	98
A Company	Oakville, Ont	43
C Company	Georgetown, Ont	35
2 engineer units		
3rd Field Engineer Squadron	Ottawa, Ont	70
2nd Field Engineer Regiment	Toronto, Ont	110
6 service battalions		
21 (Windsor) Service Battalion	Windsor, Ont	72
22 (London) Service Battalion	London, Ont	80
23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion	Hamilton, Ont	110
25 (Toronto) Service Battalion	Toronto, Ont	109
26 (North Bay) Service Battalion		
HQ & Transport Company	Sault Ste Marie, Ont	69
Maintenance CompanyCFB	North Bay, Ont	33
28 (Ottawa) Service Battalion	Ottawa, Ont	133
3 medical companies		
23 (Hamilton) Medical Company	Hamilton, Ont	77
25 (Toronto) Medical Company	Toronto, Ont	66
28 (Ottawa) Medical Company	Ottawa, Ont	61
District Headquarters		
Northern Ontario District	Sault Ste Marie, Ont	17
London District	London, Ont	32
Toronto District	Toronto, Ont	21
Ottawa District	Ottawa, Ont	26
Area Headquarters		
Land Force Central Area	Toronto, Ont	78

Covers the major part of Ontario; does not include the Lakehead portion of the province. Headquarters is in Toronto. There are four districts and 43 units with an effective strength of 5514.

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APPENDIX K

Land Force Western Area (LFWA) by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of April 1995)
6 armoured units		
The British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own) (RCAC)	Vancouver, BC	101
The British Columbia Dragoons		
HQ & B Squadron	Kelowna, BC	52
A Squadron	Vernon, BC	33
The Saskatchewan Dragoons	Moose Jaw, Sask	61
The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC)	Calgary, Alta	120
The Fort Garry Horse	Winnipeg, Man	130
The South Alberta Light Horse (RCAC)		
HQ & A Squadron	Medicine Hat, Alta	66
B Squadron	Edmonton, Alta	75
7 artillery units		
5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Victoria, BC	100
15th Field Artillery Regiment RCA	Vancouver, BC	122
116th Field Battery	Kenora, Ont	34
10th Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 18 Field Battery	Regina, Sask	51
64 Field Battery	Yorkton, Sask	17
20th Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 61 Field Battery	Edmonton, Alta	51
78 Field Battery	Red Deer, Alta	38
26th Field Artillery Regiment RCA		
HQ & 71 Field Battery	Brandon, Man	88
13 Field Battery	Portage la Prairie, Man	24
18th Air Defence Regiment RCA	Lethbridge, Alta	62
11 infantry units		
The Royal Westminster Regiment	New Westminster, BC	153
The Rocky Mountain Rangers		

HQ & A Company	Kamloops, BC	80
B Company	Salmon Arm, BC	10
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada	Vancouver, BC	91
The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)		
HQ & A & C Companies	Victoria, BC	106
B Company	Nanaimo, BC	54
6 Platoon, B Company	Port Alberni, BC	9
9 Platoon, B Company	Courtney, BC	0
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (4th Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry)	Edmonton, Alta	137
The Calgary Highlanders	Calgary, Alta	167
The Royal Regina Rifles	Regina, Sask	73
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles	Winnipeg, Man	101
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada	Winnipeg, Man	103
The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment		
HQ & 1 Platoon, A Company & B Company	Thunder Bay, Ont	80
2 Platoon, A Company	Marathon, Ont	4
The North Saskatchewan Regiment		
HQ & A & C Companies	Saskatoon, Sask	93
B CompanyPrince	Albert, Sask	32
5 field engineer units		
6th Field Engineer Squadron	North Vancouver, BC	78
44th Field Engineer Squadron	Trail, BC	59
21st Field Engineer Squadron	Flin Flon, Man	27
8th Field Engineer Squadron	Edmonton, Alta	71
33rd Field Engineer Squadron	Calgary, Alta	59
7 service battalions		
11 (Victoria) Service Battalion	Victoria, BC	103
12 (Vancouver) Service Battalion	Richmond, BC	111
14 (Calgary) Service Battalion	Calgary, Alta	154
15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion	Edmonton, Alta	127
16 (Regina) Service Battalion	Regina, Sask	66
Detachment	Saskatoon, Sask	48
17 (Winnipeg) Service Battalion	Winnipeg, Man	85

18 (Thunder Bay) Service Battalion	Thunder Bay, Ont	72
6 medical companies		
11 (Victoria) Medical Company	Victoria, BC	58
12 (Vancouver) Medical Company	Vancouver, BC	66
15 (Edmonton) Medical Company	Edmonton, Alta	114
Detachment	Calgary, Alta	0
16 (Regina) Medical Company	Regina, Sask	33
Detachment	Saskatoon, Sask	27
17 (Winnipeg) Medical Company	Winnipeg, Man	61
18 (Thunder Bay) Medical Company	Thunder Bay, Ont	37
District Headquarters		
British Columbia District	Vancouver, BC	26
Alberta District	Calgary, Alta	32
Saskatchewan District	Regina, Sask	27
Manitoba-Lakehead District	Winnipeg, Man	77
Area Headquarters		
Land Force Western Area	Edmonton, Alta	109

Covers the four western provinces, and includes the Lakehead portion of Ontario.
Headquarters is in Edmonton. There are four districts and 42 units, with an effective strength of 4245.

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APPENDIX L

Air Reserve Personnel by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of August 1995)
Deputy Chief Of Staff Reserves		
Air Command	Winnipeg, Man	53
4 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Cold Lake, Alta	73
3 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Bagotville, Que	60
5 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Goose Bay, Nfld	10
22 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	North Bay, Ont	55
8 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Trenton, Ont	84
Air Command Office Ottawa	Ottawa, Ont	64
9 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Gander, Nfld	29
14 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Greenwood, NS	80
Air Reserve Augmentation Flight Det	Tor Bay, Nfld	29
12 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Shearwater, NS	71
19 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Comox, BC	65
Air Reserve Augmentation Flight Det	Patricia Bay, BC	22
1 Wing	St-Hubert, Que	
401 Squadron		
438 Squadron		165
2 Wing	Toronto, Ont	
400 Squadron		
411 Squadron		149
11 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Gagetown, NB	28
17 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Winnipeg, Man	56
15 Air Reserve Augmentation Flight	Moose Jaw, Sask	31
402 Squadron	Winnipeg, Man	117
Airfield Engineer Flight Lunenburg	Lunenburg, NS	21
Airfield Engineer Flight Gander	Gander, Nfld	5
Subtotal		**1267**
Air Reservists on Air Command Primary Reserve List and supporting other squadrons		202
Total		**1469**
Authorized paid ceiling		**1789**

In addition to those Air Reservists who serve in Air Reserve units, many augment Total Force units or wings but are administered by Air Reserve Augmentation Flights.
The total effective strength is 1469.

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APPENDIX M

Canadian Forces Communication Reserve by Unit

Unit	Location	Strength (as of July 1995)
70 Communication Group		
Reserve Electronic Warfare Squadron	Kingston, Ont	113
700 Communication Squadron	Borden, Ont	68
709 Communication Regiment	Toronto, Ont	101
763 Communication Regiment	Ottawa, Ont	120
705 Communication Squadron	Hamilton, Ont	80
70 Communication Group PRL	Trenton, Ont	8
71 Communication Group		
713 Communication Regiment	Beauport, Que	101
714 Communication Regiment	Sherbrooke, Que	89
712 Communication Squadron	Montreal, Que	98
71 Communication Group PRL	St Hubert, Que	10
72 Communication Group		
Reserve Communication Troop	Glace Bay, Nfld	40
728 Communication Squadron	St John's, Nfld	102
721 Communication Regiment	Charlottetown, PEI	112
723 Communication Squadron	Halifax, NS	101
722 Communication Squadron	Saint John, NB	80
72 Communication Group PRL	Halifax, NS	12
73 Communications Group		
736 Communication Squadron	Thunder Bay, Ont	64
734 Communication Regiment	Regina, Man	68
735 Communication Squadron	Winnipeg, Man	78
737 Communication Squadron	Saskatoon, Sask	62
73 Communication Group PRL	Winnipeg, Man	8
74 Communication Group		
744 Communication Regiment	Vancouver, BC	85
746 Communication Squadron	Calgary, Alta	95
745 Communication Squadron	Edmonton, Alta	64

749 Communication Troop	Red Deer, Alta	41
748 Communication Troop	Nanaimo, BC	52
741 Communication Squadron	Victoria, BC	90
74 Communication Group PRL	Vancouver, BC	26
ADM(DIS)	Ottawa, Ont	54

The Canadian Forces Communication Reserve is controlled by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Defence Information Services) (ADM(DIS)) in Ottawa. There are five groups (each with a small Primary Reserve List (PRL)) and 23 units with an effective strength of 2267.

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APPENDIX N

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARAF	Air Reserve Augmentation Flight
ARG	Air Reserve Group
CCUs	Convoy Commodore Units
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFBs	Canadian Forces Bases
CFLC	Canadian Forces Liaison Council
CFNA	Canadian Forces Northern Area
CFRCs	Canadian Forces Recruiting Centres
CIC	Cadet Instructor Cadre
CSW	Contingency Support Wing
CO	Commanding Officer
COS	Chief of Staff
DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans
DISO	Defence Information Services Organization
DND	Department of National Defence
HDUs	Harbour Defence Units
IBTS	Individual Battle Task Standards
IRPPS	Interim Reserve Pay and Personnel System
LFAA	Land Force Atlantic Area
LFC	Land Force Command
LFCA	Land Force Central Area
LFQA	Land Force Quebec Area
LFWA	Land Force Western Area
MARLANT	Maritime Forces Atlantic
MARPAC	Maritime Forces Pacific
MCDVs	Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels
MND	Minister of National Defence
MTSCs	Militia Training Support Centres
NAVRESHQ	Naval Reserve Headquarters
NCM	Non-Commissioned Member
NCSUs	Naval Control of Shipping Units
NDA	National Defence Act
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NRDs	Naval Reserve Divisions
PCMR	Pacific Coast Militia Rangers

QR&Os	Queen's Regulations and Orders
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RDS	Reserve Data System
RESO	Reserve Entry Scheme Officer
RETP	Reserve Entry Training Plan
RIIP	Reserve Integrated Information Program
RMC	Royal Military College
ROTP	Regular Officer Training Plan
SHR	Supplementary Holding Reserve
SR	Supplementary Reserve
SRR	Supplementary Ready Reserve
TAE	Total Army Establishment
TASS	Tactical Air Support Squadron
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
WO	Warrant Officer

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